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This study examined the interaction between rebellious African slaves, who took
refuge in Florida, and the governments of Spain, Britain and the United States. The rebels
fled British and American slavery in the Carolinas and Georgia. The study is based on the
premise that this interaction reveals a genuine political relationship between the rebels and
the governments. Administrative documents, records and military correspondence ofthe
various governments furnish the foundation ofthe study's analytical data.
This is a case study in which a political-historical method is used to analyze
documents, diaries, and other data. The researcher found that numerous references about
rebel slaves in Florida exist in the documents. Also, each government formed specific
policies because ofthe rebels.
The conclusions drawn from the findings suggest that because the Florida rebels
were able to sustain their freedom through war, they received the scrutiny ofthe various
governments. As a military ally, the rebels helped Spain keep its Florida colony until 1821.
British and United States political leaders were forced to seek first diplomatic, then
military measures, to counter the activities ofthe rebels and their allies.
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Between the 17th and 19th centuries, a few thousand African slaves rebelled
against slavery by escaping to Florida. These slaves lived among, and became identified
with, the Florida Native Americans known as Seminole.
This study ofthe relationship between Black Seminole rebels and Spanish, British
and American political policies examines political and historic events and issues not
generally discussed or factored into other analyses. Since Joshua Giddings wrote Exiles of
Florida, scholars have documented the history ofslave escapees in Florida and their armed
rebellions against the slave industry. Giddings, an abolitionist congressman from Ohio,
wrote Exiles in 1856. He follows the Seminole from the 18th century up to their flight into
Mexico in the mid- 19th century. As recently as 1993, in Freedom on the Border. Kevin
Mulroy chronicles how runaway Black Seminole utilized the border between the United
States and Spanish Florida to remain free.
In contrast to the aforementioned studies, I specifically seek to understand the
relationship between the Black Seminole and political policies of Spain, Britain and the
United States. Though the existence ofrunaway slaves from South Carolina and Georgia
among the Seminole ofFlorida has been copiously documented, the runaways have
generally been depicted as third parties, in broader political struggles between the British
and the Spanish, the United States and the Spanish, or the United States and the Seminole
Indians. In this type ofanalysis writers have generally described the runaway slaves as an
appendage or an ally ofthe Spaniards or Seminole, in their struggle against the British and
United States for political empowerment and self-determination..
A closer review ofthese political, military and historical conflicts would invariably
reveal the nexus that exists between the runaways, and the political policies of Spain,
Britain, and the United States.
This study begins by showing the relationship of slave rebels to the early New
World politics of Spain and Britain. It is important to understand that this relationship
precedes British settlement in North America; and helps establish a foundation for
understanding the North American relationship.
Primarily, the relationship of slave rebels to Spanish, British, and U.S. politics
between 1693 and 1845 is examined. As a result ofexploring these political relationships,
the study sheds light upon the rebels' relationship to: Spain's survival in North America
between 1691 and 1821; British colonial policy in the Southeast until 1763; the Founding
Fathers' policies towards the Seminole; U.S. acquisition ofFlorida; the Seminole Wars;
the Presidential campaign of 1840; and U.S. Congressional Gag Rules from 1835 to 1844.
It is hoped that this study will provide a frame ofanalysis for examining how the
African slave traditionally responded to being placed in political bondage. Traditionally,
our perspective has ranged from docile acquiescence to the limited rebellions of Gabriel
Prosser, Denmark Vessey and Nat Turner. However, a careful analysis ofthe Seminole
not only reveals the fact that Africans militarily rebelled against North American slavery,
from its beginning to 1844, but additionally, the study reveals how these rebel slaves had a
relationship to political policies, throughout the time frame ofthe study.
Definition ofConcepts and Terms
Many ofthe words and concepts and ideas referred to in this study have more
than one meaning to researchers and readers. Therefore, in this section it is necessary to
clarify anything that may predictably confuse the reader. Also, words and phrases that
may be totally foreign to the reader will be defined here.
When the Spanish colonist arrived in the Western Hemisphere they referred first
to runaway cattle and later to Native American and African slaves as "cimmardns." The
word is defined as wild, unruly, or as a runaway slave.1 Perhaps the most common usage
ofthe term "cimmaron" comes in an abbreviated form "maroon," which was originated by
the British and French pirates who encountered Spanish colonial society in the sixteenth
century.2
Another variation of"cimmaron" came from the British seaman Sir Francis
Drake's voyage of 1572-73. Drake's chaplain on board referred to the rebel slaves as
"symerons."3
By the late seventeenth century, Native Americans and Africans who were slaves
ofthe British in South Carolina escaped into Florida.4 These runaway slaves were
1 For a detailed explanation ofthe word Cimmaron, refer to Mariano Velazquez de la
Cadena, New Revised Velazquez Spanish and English Dictionary (Chicago: Follett
Publishing Company, 1974); Richard Price, ed. Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave
Communities in the Americas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 1-2.
2 For a detailed explanation ofthe word Maroon, refer to Catherine Schwarz, ed.,
Chambers Concise Dictionary (Edinburgh: W & R Chambers Ltd., 1988); Price, Ibid,
1-2;
3 Philip Nichols, "Sir Francis Drake Revived," in Documents Concerning English
Voyages to Spanish Main 1569-80. ed. I. A. Wright (original publication in 1628;
reprint Nendel, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint LTD, 1932.) 259.
4 J.W. Fortescue, ed. Calendar of State Papers. Colonial Series. America and the West
Indies 1681-85. vol. 13. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1898; 2nd edition.
technically "cimaroons" in a Spanish colony. Between 1763-83, Florida became a British
colony. During this period the combined population ofthose original South Carolina
cimaroons and newly arriving free Natives, plus more African runaways from both
Georgia and South Carolina began to be identified as the "Seminole" by the British.5
"Seminole" is an English corruption of"cimaroon."
For the purposes ofthis study "Seminole" will be used in reference to all Native
Americans in Florida after 1763. Also "Seminole" will at times be used to refer
collectively to both Native Americans ofFlorida and the runaway Africans among them.
By definition a rebel is one who opposes or disobeys authority and control; or
takes arms against the government or ruler ofa country.6 The enslavement ofAfricans by
Europeans in the Western Hemisphere was a prelude to the subsequent oppression of
Blacks through contemporary times, from Brazil to the United States. Slaves who fled to
gain their freedom and those who fought to maintain it were definitively rebels. They
were the first African rebels ofthe Western Hemisphere and the predecessors ofBlacks
who oppose today's authorities. Though "cimaroon," "maroon," and "Seminole
accurately describe them, in most cases this study will refer to them as "rebels." In some
Nendel, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint Ltd., 1964) 187. Page reference is to reprint
edition; Jane Landers, "African Presence in Early Spanish Colonization ofthe
Caribbean and the Southeastern Borderlands," in Columbian Consequences, vol. 2, ed.
David Hurst Thomas (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989).
5 Robert Weir, Colonial South Carolina (Milwood, New York: Kraus Thomson LTD,
1983) 31; Joshua Giddings, Exiles ofFlorida (Follet, Foster and Company, 1858) 1-3;
William S. Sturtevant, "Creek into Seminole," in eds. Eleanor B. Leacock and Nancy
Lurie, North American Indians in Historical Perspective (New York: Random House,
1971) 92-105; James W. Covington, The Seminoles ofFlorida (Gainesville: University
Press ofFlorida, 1993) 3-5.
6 The usage ofthe word "rebel" is explained in Webster's Third New International
Dictionary (Springfield, MA: G. & C. Meniam Company, Publishers, 1961).
instances for the sake of clarity a prefix such as "cimeroon," "maroon," "African,"
"Black," or "Seminole" will be added to "rebel."
This study seeks to explain the relationship between Black-Seminole rebels and
North American politics. "Relationship" is defined as any connection, association, or
involvement, direct or indirect, between the rebels and politics. For the purposes ofthis
study "politics" refers to any direct or indirect reference, comment, or acts made by
politicians, administrators, or military leaders. Most ofthese responses are letters or
governmental documents which discuss government efforts to end the rebel threat to the
slave industry. Individual responses often are the puzzle pieces which reflect upon greater
trends or emerging policies. At times legislative and executive policies will be studied
which have a direct relationship to the rebels.
North American politics can refer to the governmental structures ofcolonial
Spain, Britain and the United States, at the national and local levels. Native Americans are
commonly referred to as Indians. In this study I will generally use their tribal names unless
for the sake of clarity, "Native," "Native-American," or even "Indian" would be more
appropriate.
Research Question or Problem
This is a study which seeks to discover, understand and reveal the relationship
which did exist between the African Seminole rebels and the governments ofcolonial
Spain and Britain and the United States. When possible, political activity which reveals
quid pro quo, or cause and effect relationships between the rebels and North American
governments, will be discussed. Peripheral research questions include: What constitutes




This is a case study ofthe political relationship between Black Seminoles and the
colonial governments of Spain and Britain, and the United States. Therefore, the research
method ofthis study must be political-historical, with an Afrocentric emphasis. African
input generally was not present in the political documents being studied. However, unique
conditions of slavery and oppression were made synonymous with being African in the
"New World." Therefore, the quest for freedom and the desire to minimize oppression
permeated all aspects oflife for the Florida rebels. This was a unique African reality.
Consequently, the Afrocentric emphasis requires that this study make an assessment ofany
relationship between the rebel quest for freedom and the political documents under
review.
Techniques
The primary technique ofthis study will be content analysis. Political documents
of Spain, Britain, and the United States will be the subject ofmy analysis. Generally, two
types ofdocuments exist: episodic and running. Episodic documents are much harder to
locate. Their conditions of storage and accessibility make them difficult for researchers to
gather. Their precarious accessibility renders them less suitable for numerical and
quantitative measurement. Episodic records are better for qualitative illustrations. I think
that episodic records can go a long way towards providing information which may be very
convincing and persuasive in my effort to illustrate the various relationships between
political actors and the African Seminole.
Running records are usually much easier to find than episodic ones. They are
generally maintained by organizations such as governments or historical groups.
Normally, they are cyclically updated and stored so that they can be readily accessed. I
will make use ofrunning records. Examples ofthese include the South Carolina legislative
records and the Congressional Record. Examples ofepisodic records are the King of
Spain's Edict of 1693 and Joshua Giddings' book The Exiles ofFlorida.
After gathering documents, my next step is content analysis. I will decide which
ofthe documents are truly useful in helping me show the rebel Seminole relationship to
American politics. Since I am not relying upon a certain numerical sampling ofdocuments
to state my argument, my focus will not be on quantitative analysis. Instead, I am seeking
certain reasonably convincing records. Therefore, my analysis is more qualitative. I will
combine the episodic and running records to state my argument. I am proceeding with
this method aware ofthe pros and cons. I will have access to a subject which would
otherwise be inaccessible because ofthe historical setting and to a small degree, perhaps,
geographical inhibitions. Also, archival data is largely non-reactive. Those who recorded
the data generally did so without consideration offuture researchers. Written records help
facilitate chronological observations. Additionally, written records are probably cheaper
to obtain than is raw data.
On the other hand I realize that I have to consider any bias a writer may have had.
Also, I'll be limited to the use ofthose documents that happen to have survived. Because
many episodic records are not kept under optimal circumstances, I must be prepared to
contend with the hazards ofpoor storage. Also, there may be examples offorgeries or
lies. In spite ofthose drawbacks, I believe I can make good use ofthe content analysis
technique.
Another technique will be interviews. I will interview Dr. Jane Landers, the
author of several articles on the Seminole in Florida. Dr. Landers teaches at Vanderbilt
University and has produced a documentary on the subject. Also, I will interview Mrs.
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Charles Emily Wilson, who is a tribal historian for the African Seminole in Bracketville,
Texas. In addition to these two interviews, I will also talk with William Dub Warrior.
Both Mrs. Wilson and William Warrior are descendants ofthe African Seminole. They
will furnish insight on the perspective ofthe Seminole. Giddings points out that most of
the chroniclers ofthe Seminole saga were Southerners, and as such he questions then-
perception ofAfricans as slaves ofthe Creeks and Indian Seminole. Mr. Warrior and Mrs.
Wilson will provide resources for discovering how their ancestors perceived themselves.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
In reviewing the literature it is important to remember that "cimmardn" is
the root word of both "maroon" and "Seminole." Though "maroon" is a
shortened version of "cimmaron," both terms generally designated runaway
African slaves. While "Seminole" can be seen as an English corruption of
"cimmaron," it was most widely applied to Creek Indians who had never been
slaves. Generally, runaway slaves from South Carolina and Georgia will be
referred to as "maroons" before the American Revolution and "African Seminole"
after the establishment of the United States. In a general sense, then, "maroon"
refers to runaway Africans exclusively, even though some Indians also escaped by
running to Florida. "Seminole" will refer to both Africans and Indians unless
otherwise specified.
African maroons played a definite role in England's early gains against
Spain. However, general texts do not reveal this.
In The American Pageant. Thomas A. Bailey credits Sir Francis Drake for leading
England's grand entrance into the New World against Spain, omitting the crucial
factor of the maroons in Drake's success. In The Beards' New Basic History of
the United States. William Beard likewise credits Drake as leading the British-
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Protestant attack upon Spain and Catholicism. Both Bailey and Beard view Drake
as a pirate, but neither mention the maroons. Sources which verify the maroons'
assistance to Drake are numerous. In Sir Francis Drake Revived, the preacher
who accompanied Drake on the voyage tells of a two-year voyage. Reverend
Phillip Nichols writes of a 1572-73 odyssey in which Drake is saved from total
disaster by the maroons. Because they hated their Spanish masters, the maroons
rescued the Drake mission. Drake had left England with two ships and seventy-
three men. After attempting to attack the Spanish, he lost one ship and all but
twenty-four of his men. Included in Drake's casualties were his two brothers.
His remaining crew was dying from disease. Nichols credits the maroons with
housing Drake for eight months and then with providing Drake with sixty
additional troops. With the help of the maroon warriors, thirty tons of silver and
gold were captured.
Nichols' story is referenced by George Thomson in Sir Francis Drake. He
says that without the cimmarons, Drake's mission would have failed. He credits
the success of this mission with being the beginning of the end of Spanish and
Catholic dominance. In Maroon Societies. Richard Price likewise credits the
maroons as being a key factor in Drake's success.
None of the authors mentioned focuses on maroon political involvement.
But Nichols speaks of a maroon king and a few thousand inhabitants. Also, he
makes clear the fact that the maroons changed the flow of gold to Spain. These
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sources validate the notion of autonomous maroons impacting the European
political equation.
Historian Irene A. Wright, in "The Spanish Resistance to the English
Occupation of Jamaica, 1655-60," Transactions of the Roval Historical Society.
credits Spanish maroons with assisting a handful of Spanish resisters from their
mountain strongholds. Wright says that in 1655, British troops overran the island
and chased all but a handful of Spaniards out. These few Spaniards were given
refuge by the maroons in the bases from which they had fought the Spanish
government. From these bases they waged a five-year guerrilla war which
prevented British civilian settlement of the island. Wright says that the Spanish
government of Jamaica ceased fighting only after the primary maroon leader,
known as "Governor" Juan Bolas, led the British troops to their mountain bases.
The British had been unable to find these bases for five years. The Spanish
governor immediately surrendered.
In The Calendar of State Papers. Colonial Series VI. America and the
West Indies. British records support Wright's views. In 1655, the Council of
State reports that the island was taken and that the few remaining inhabitants had
fled to the hills. Between 1655-60, the record shows a steady influx of weapons
and troops to Jamaica. By 1661, Sir Charles Lyttelton, the Deputy Governor of
the island, appointed Juan Bolas as magistrate over Free Africans. Bolas was
awarded land for his help to the British in securing Jamaica. In The Fighting
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Maroons of Jamaica. Carey Robinson concurs with Wright and the Calendar to a
great degree. Robinson, however, believes that Bolas was always neutral between
Britain and Spain. He sees the greatest challenge of the Spanish resistance as
maintaining Bolas' neutrality. Robinson notes that Bolas was the most prominent
maroons leader but that others aided the Spanish resistance during the five-year
period. He cites both Spanish and British forces offering freedom to all maroons
in exchange for military assistance.
In The Maroons of Jamaica 1655-1796. Mavis C. Campbell does not
acknowledge the role of maroons in Spain's five-year guerrilla struggle. Campbell
notes that Spain fought for five years, but she says that the island was essentially
conquered in the first year.
I think there is enough evidence to also show the maroons' political
impact in this case. The maroons in general, and Bolas in particular, held the
balance of power between Britain and Spain over a key colony. Bolas was a
political actor who negotiated with both British and Spanish governments.
In 1693, the King of Spain issued an order to the Spanish authorities in St.
Augustine, Florida. This order is recorded in The Archives of the Indies. In the
order, the King, discussing the fate of several runaway African Slaves from
Charleston, South Carolina, said that these slaves which had just arrived in Florida
should be set free and "given anything they need and favor them as much as
possible." Perhaps more important, the King said he hoped this policy would be
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an example to the other British slaves. This policy shows that Spain knew the
pivotal military role that maroons could play. By offering them special treatment,
the King gave them autonomy and won their allegiance.
According to The Archives. English slaves from Carolina had been
escaping to St. Augustine since the 1680's. Florida had always been a strategic
site in Spain's efforts to guard her mines and shipping routes in Mexico and the
West Indies. After England settled in Carolina, military conflict began between
her and Spain. But as English strength grew in North America, the Spanish level
of preparedness proved inadequate. Therefore, it seems the King knew from
experience in Panama and Jamaica that in the maroons lay the balance of power.
The Archives state that initially the Spanish government was directed by the King
to compensate British slave owners from Carolina who came to St. Augustine. By
1733, the King forbade payment. Additionally, as stated in The Archives, by 1738
the number of maroons had become so great that the Governor had them build a
combination and military fort. The fort had to be encountered before St.
Augustine could be attacked. This fort, called "Mose," stood as the first line of
defense for Spain in Florida until the Treaty of Paris in 1763 forced Spain to yield
Florida to the British. The fort, symbolizing maroon autonomy, existed only
because of the maroon's political significance.
In "A free African town in Spanish colonial Florida," Jane Landers reflects
upon much of the information about the maroons included in The Archives of the
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Indies. According to Landers, both African and Indian slaves of the British
escaped to Florida. Landers notes the King of Spain's order of 1693, his policies
of refusing to continue compensating Carolina slave holders, and the
establishment of Mose. Landers' research sheds crucial light upon the genesis of
the Seminole people. She observes that the Yamasee branch of the Creek nation
had been frequently united with Carolina maroons as the vanguard of St.
Augustine's attacks upon Carolina. Landers says that the maroons in Florida and
Carolina slaves still in captivity united with Indians in the Yamasee War of 1714.
This war nearly destroyed the Carolina colony.
The Carolina legislature says that the war was initiated in St. Augustine.
Landers says that the Yamasee Chief Jorge declared that he made treaties with
Carolina slaves. One of these slaves fled to Florida with him. That slave,
Francisco Menendez, a Mandingo, became the Commander of Mose and the leader
of the St. Augustine maroons. The Governor of St. Augustine sought special
decorations for Menendez for his leadership against several British attacks.
Records from The Archives and the research of Landers indicate that Spanish
military and political survival in Florida as in Jamaica was assisted by the
maroons. Also, these sources suggest that the core of the Seminole people was
born in war treaties between Yamasees and Carolina maroons, perhaps totally
independent of even the Spanish.
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In The Negro on the American Frontier. Kenneth Porter discusses the
Spanish reliance upon Seminole Africans in Madison's Patriots' War of 1811-14.
He points out that the Spanish Victory was possible only with the help of the
Seminole, especially the Africans. Joseph Smith underscores the critical role of
the African Seminole in Madison's Patriots' War in The Plot to Steal Florida.
However, he primarily observes the role of Africans as allies of the Seminole,
rather than of Spain.
The political role of the African Seminole is implicit in the observations of
Porter and Smith. However, neither specifically mentions what that role is.
In The Seminoles of Florida, James W. Covington does not acknowledge a
pre-American Revolutionary presence of the African Carolina maroons in Florida.
Covington does not mention maroons as being a force until 1812. He says that
the word "Seminole" was first applied to Creek Indians, who immigrated into
Florida after the indigenous Apalachee people were exterminated by the British
and Creeks. He cites the British as being the originators of the term because they
learned it meant runaway; however, he said that the Creek immigrants rejected the
definition runaway and preferred the interpretation of migrant or pioneer.
Covington writes that some Africans were captured and purchased as slaves of the
Creeks, while some runaways were permitted to settle among them in Florida's
forest.
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In Freedom on the Border. Kevin Mulroy mentions the Spanish use of
maroons as key elements in their defense of Florida, including Fort Mose, and he
also mentions the King's order of 1693. Though Mulroy notes the existence of
Fort Mose, he dates Spanish land grants to the maroons as beginning in the early
1800's. This runs counter to The Archives and Landers' data. Mulroy says the
word "Seminole" is a corruption of "cimmaron" and that it came into use only
after the British obtained Florida in the Treaty of Paris in 1763. He writes that
word "Seminole" originally applied to Creeks who migrated into Florida only but
came to be applied to Africans later. Mulroy believes that African maroons
primarily existed as quasi-slaves of Creeks but that some were free runaways. He
notes that by 1812 the term "Seminole" applied to both African and Red. Neither
Mulroy nor Covington acknowledge any runaway Indian slaves as being
contributors to the Seminole people.
In the article "Creek into Seminole," in North American Indians in
Historical Perspective. William Sturtevant says that the Seminoles are a purely
post-European phenomenon. Though Sturtevant acknowledges the Seminole
connection to "cimmaron," he says it meant "pioneer" when applied to the Creeks
in Florida. Also, he dates the term's origin to British occupation after the Treaty
of Paris in 1763. Sturtevant mentions in passing runaway African slaves from
Carolina. However, he cites no connection of maroons to British-Spanish conflict
nor to their being soldiers nor part of the Seminole people.
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Robert Weir cites both runaway Indian and African slaves as inhabitants of
Fort Mose in addition to being the founders of the Seminole people in colonial
South Carolina. It seems that few authors search for the reasons behind an
apparent British corruption of "cimmaron." Sturtevant and Covington discuss
African runaways during the Spanish occupation. They discuss Britain's
application of the term during their occupation yet they don't ask about whom
Spain may have applied the term to during its occupation. But answers are
provided by The Archives and other sources.
Though Mulroy, Porter, Smith, and The Archives acknowledge a key role
of African maroons in the defense strategy of the Spanish, they do not mention a
comprehensive role. In every key defensive engagement of Spain in Florida
between 1693 and 1819, the Africans were vital participants. Porter sees a crucial
role for Africans which spans most of the years between 1693 and 1819, but,
though he cites the role of Africans in these key battles, he doesn't mention that
Spain's survival in North America was enhanced.
A key theme which emerges while examining the African Seminole impact
upon British politics is the fact that colonial development was severely limited.
This observation seems clear in the Calendar of State Papers. Narratives of Earlv
Carolina, and Colonial Records of South Carolina and Georgia.
The Calendar contains some seventeenth century accounts of how Red and
African runaway slaves or cimmarones attacked frontier settlements. From these
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attacks the limits upon development or expansion are concluded. The Colonial
Records both of South Carolina and of Georgia make direct statements about the
manner in which development and expansion were curtailed by African runaways
from British colonies who raided frontier settlements with the Spanish and
Indians.
The concept of the allied efforts from Florida limiting British colonial
expansion is handily acknowledged. In The Southern Colonial Frontier. 1607-
1763. W. Stitt Robinson mentions the Yamasee War. However, Robinson says
this war led to South Carolina's establishing frontier posts as nuclei of
settlements. In Colonial South Carolina. Robert Weir also says that the Yamasee
lands were seized and settlement was encouraged at discounted rates to attract
settlers. Also, though, Weir's and Robinson's views contradict the statement in
the Colonial Records, which speaks alarmingly of the Yamasee War and its
follow-up attacks by "nimble parties" of Africans and Indians.
Colonial Records also confirm that Georgia was primarily founded as a
military garrison to help secure development in South Carolina, but Weir does not
mention this. He stresses the colony's humanitarian purposes. In Colonial
Georgia. Kenneth Coleman says that slavery was banned in early Georgia, but he
fails to explain any relationship between slavery, security, and colonial growth
being limited by the proximity of the Florida maroons.
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There are many sources regarding the maroons' impact upon the British
politics in the Southeast before the 1763 British occupation of Florida. In The
Seminoles. Covington tells us that Governor Moore of South Carolina invaded
Florida with Creeks in 1704. Also, he tells us that Thomas Nairne, also of South
Carolina, invaded Florida. Both of these men were political leaders who launched
invasions at a time when Spain was sending escaped Carolina Africans and Indians
to invade Carolina. Covington doesn't directly discuss the relationship of these
attacks to the presence of maroons in St. Augustine, but he does bring to light
other sources which refer to the context of such attacks.
Several direct references to runaway African slaves can be found in The
Calendar of State Papers. Colonial Series Volume II. In the Papers, colonial
politicians reveal their fear of the phenomenon of maroonage. In 1689, the
London proprietors of Carolina wrote to Governor Seth Sothell that he should
"take care to prevent servants and Negroes from running away to the Spanish at
St. Augustine." In 1699, Edmond Randolph of Charleston (which the Spaniards
called St. Jorge), wrote to the Council of Trade and Plantation in London
informing London that Africans outnumbered Whites in Carolina four to one. He
also said that one hundred Spaniards, Indians, and Africans had invaded Carolina
in 1686 and had carried away at least thirteen slaves whom they refused to return.
He informed London that the Spaniards said the British were on their land. In
1700, Sir William Beeston, a Carolina proprietor in London, discussed slaves
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fleeing to the Spanish. In 1715, the Carolina Governor informed Lord Townsend
of London that in the Yamasee War of 1714-15 the Yamasee's primary support
came from St. Augustine. In 1716, two South Carolina assemblymen, Joseph
Boone and Richard Beresford, notified London that Spain, Yamasees, and African
maroons were preventing the resettlement of South Carolina after the war and
stealing slaves and even enslaving whites. Boone urged London to wage war
against St. Augustine. London wrote back saying Spain was repaying them for
their enslavement of their Indians. Also, the proprietors informed Boone that
many Carolina traders had reported seeing their slaves in St. Augustine.
Narratives of Earlv Carolina, edited by Alexander Salley, indicates that in
1681 Governor Morton assembled the parliament to end the Indian slave trade and
prevent maroonage. Also, a Carolina official, John Oldmixen, reported that
between 1700-02, Governor Moore illegally tried to dominate the Indian slave
trade. In order to hide his misdeeds, Moore invaded St. Augustine with 1,200
soldiers. He was not able to conquer St. Augustine, but he took many Apalachee
Indians as slaves. Edward Randolph, the Surveyor General at Charleston, wrote
to the London Board of Trade in 1698 reporting that one hundred African, Indian,
and White soldiers from St. Augustine had raided Governor Morton's plantation,
taking many slaves. According to Randolph, the soldiers said that they had direct
orders from the King of Spain not to return any slaves.
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In 1730, The Colonial Records of South Carolina. The Journal of the
Commons House of the Assembly. 1736-39. edited by J.H. Easterby, recorded
that the Assembly President had reported that runaways and the St. Augustine
forces were a deadly problem to the colony and that everything possible had to be
done to deal with the problem. The assembly discussed the Spanish policy of
encouraging Negro slaves to run to St. Augustine. A house member reported
going to seek fifty of his slaves in St. Augustine, where he spoke to the Spanish
Governor, who said Spain would not return any slaves. Between 1736-39, the
Assembly passed a resolution to solve the problem by, first, seeking military help
from London, second, paying friendly Indians to capture slaves, and third,
launching an invasion from Charleston. Also, the Colonial Record shows that a
special Committee of Desertions was formed. The Committee reported that the
Spanish Edict of 1693 was distributed throughout South Carolina. Also, the
Committee reported that this policy threatened the British Empire in America.
English Historical Documents: American Colonial Document to 1776.
edited by Merrill Jensen, contains papers from Georgia founder James Oglethorpe,
who told the King that Georgia would be "a barrier between South Carolina and
St. Augustine because Africans are not permitted, any seen will be captured."
Also in the Documents in 1743, Georgians listed reasons for the retardation of
their colony, complaining that slaves were essential. They said that if the colony
had only been meant to be a military outpost, then inhabitants were not needed.
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The preceding documents, which bear evidence of the impact Florida
maroons had upon the British in the Southeast, contrast with certain other authors
who made limited mention of the impact. In The Creek Frontier 1540-1783.
David Cockrane discusses the Indian slave trade. He mentions Governor Moore's
invasion of Florida with 1,000 men, and the Yamasee War, but, except for more
casual references to the African slaves, he fails to discuss any direct African
strategic impact. In Colonial South Carolina: A Political History 1663-1763.
Eugene Sirmans notes the Spanish political impact on South Carolina in general
but writes little about how politicians responded. Also, in Slavery in Colonial
Georgia 1730-1735. Betty Word writes about the general impact of Spanish policy
upon the founding of Georgia but doesn't mention how particular legislators
responded.
In Indian Affairs. Laws and Treaties, Charles J. Kappler writes about the
impact of the African Seminole upon the Washington administration. Kappler
displays the text of the Treaties ofNew York and Colrein. The New York Treaty
was signed by Secretary of War Knox and several Creek chiefs. The Chiefs
agreed to exist under U.S. protection rather than Spanish, and all Creeks,
including Seminole, were to remain at peace with the U.S. Additionally, the
Creeks agreed to deliver all Negroes among the Seminole to the Commander of
U.S. forces in sourthern Georgia. This treaty was signed in 1790. In 1796, the
Treaty of Colrein was signed between the Creek chiefs and presidential
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commissioners were appointed. This treaty essentially underscored the Treaty of
New York.
In his book Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of
America. Miller lists secret articles to the New York Treaty. He writes that these
secret articles were never publicized but were kept in the State Department
archives. In exchange for capturing slaves in Florida, the minor chiefs were to
receive $100 per year, and Chief McGillivray was paid $200 per year. Also,
McGillivray was made a Brigadier General.
Ohio abolitionist, Congressman Joshua Giddings, spoke about the
Seminole from the House floor. In Speeches in Congress. Giddings says that the
Indian Removal Policy, as well as the Seminole War, were part of a government
cover-up which went back to George Washington. Giddings refers to the secret
treaties ofNew York and Colrein. He says that the Creeks were illegally paid to
be slave catchers.
The primary issue which characterized the early efforts of the United
States political leaders in response to the African Seminole was the goal of
obtaining Florida. But most scholars seem to deemphasize the importance of the
Seminole. In "Jefferson and an American foreign policy," Walter Lefeber sees the
primary effort of the United States towards Florida as being rooted in a
Jeffersonian desire to expand democracy. But Lefeber does also mention that
Spain was too weak to control clashes between Florida Indians and advancing
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U.S. settlers. Here, Lefeber does make a very indirect inference to the U.S. desire
to curtail the troubles originating in Florida.
In Shaping of America. D.W. Meinig says that Jefferson and Madison
wanted to keep Florida out of the hands of the French or British. Meinig says this
was a genuine fear. Also, Meinig's view is underscored in a speech in Congress
by Georgia Senator Jackson, who questioned whom the U.S. would prefer to deal
with in Florida, a weak Spain or a stronger power. But, at the core of Jackson's
concerns lay his contituents' obsessions with ex-slaves in Florida. Meinig points
this out, also, though in a slightly indirect manner. He points out that slave
holders were the biggest supporters of the Florida effort because it was a haven
for their slaves.
Lefeber only slightly hints of African Seminole as a possible Florida issue.
He does not mention them by name, but he does cite settler-Indian clashes as a
key factor in Jefferson's motivation.
In The Plot to Steal Florida. Joseph B. Smith writes that in 1790, Thomas
Jefferson covertly began making plans to take Florida from Spain. Smith says that
in 1790, Spain began allowing Americans to settle in Florida. Jefferson told
Washington that this new Spanish policy presented an opportunity to acquire
Florida. According to Smith, Jefferson believed that if enough Americans settled
in Florida the government could incite a rebellion and acquire the territory.
However, Jefferson realized this secret strategy could take many years. Smith
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says that ever since Jefferson had served as Washington's Secretary of State, he
had been obsessed with acquiring Florida through covert plots. Smith writes that
these covert plans of Jefferson were carried out through James Madison and
James Monroe.
At the time of the Louisiana purchase, the land between New Orleans and
Pennsacola along the Gulf of Mexico was known as West Florida. Jefferson tried
to influence France to persuade Spain to grant the U.S. all of Florida, but, failing
that, he sought to argue that West Florida was part of the Louisiana purchase.
Through covert rebellions, Jefferson acquired West Florida. He attempted to
acquire the rest of Florida by the same means. When Madison became president,
he continued Jefferson's ideas. The House and the Senate authorized a secret war
to acquire Florida if the rebellion failed. Four hundred U.S. troops and
mercenaries went into Florida from Georgia and West Florida in 1813. Smith
reported that Madison sought to entice the Seminole into supporting the U.S., but
he says that instead, the African Seminole led the effort against the Americans.
When it was obvious that the Seminole could not be subdued, Congress ordered
the troops to retreat.
In The History of the United States. Henry Adams writes that during the
administrations of Jefferson and Madison the nation was dominated by the South.
The South was dominated by the slave interest, and the foremost issue in the
minds of the slave holders was the acquisition of Florida. Adams says that
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Northerners thought Florida was a local issue which did not concern the whole
nation. But, Adams points out, neither the politics of the nation or events could
be understood without seeing the importance of this issue.
Neither Smith nor Adams emphasizes the underlying obsession of the U.S.
with Florida, but we know from the records of the unsuccessful military campaign
against the Seminole as well as from the records of the South Carolina
legislature's reactions, that the autonomy of the Seminole was the issue. Smith
and Adams say that Jefferson and Madison portrayed Spain as being too weak to
control the Indians who harrassed white settlers in Georgia and Florida.
However, we know from Spanish records in The Archives and South Carolina
Legislative Records that Spain knew of its own weakness and therefore relied
upon the military success of the Seminole to hang onto Florida.
Several primary sources in addition to Meinig and Adams leave no doubt
that Southerners were the primary backers of the nation's quest to acquire
Florida. Meinig, however, underscores the role of the African Seminole.
In The Exiles of Florida. Ohio's abolitionist Congressman Joshua Giddings
writes extensively about how the South deceived the North on the subject of the
Seminole. Giddings says that in 1775, the Georgia Council for Public Safety
sought to get the Continental Congress to station troops in southern Georgia to
prevent slaves from escaping into Florida. He cites this example to show that
from the beginning of the nation up to the time he wrote his book just before the
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Civil War, Southerners had illegally used Northern tax dollars to support the slave
industry. The Treaties ofNew York and Colrein were the culmination of constant
pressure from Georgia upon George Washington. Giddings documents that
Georgia state officials said they made a treaty with Creek Indians in 1783 which
was identical to the New York and Colrein Treaties of 1790 and 1796. First of
all, Georgia couldn't make a treaty, but as Giddings points out, Georgia clearly
required Creek Indians to capture "Negroes." Washington secretly agreed to pay
Indians for the same. As an abolitionist in Congress, Giddings traces similar
abuses up to the Civil War. Georgia was in a constant state of war with the
Seminole, and its officials believed that the new Constitution would make the
Federal government responsible for the Seminole. Giddings had no knowledge of
Jefferson's covert efforts to acquire Florida, but he discusses Madison's covert
and unsuccessful efforts in Florida.
Giddings also discusses England's Lord Cockrane who, during the War of
1812, built a fort in the heart of Seminole country and left it to the African
Seminole. A series of military campaigns were launched by Colonel Clinch, who
finally destroyed the fort. The First Seminole War began after Jackson's
destruction of the fort.
About four hundred Seminole were killed at the fort. In retaliation the
Seminole massacred Lt. Scott and forty men. President Monroe later got
Congress to authorize warfare. Giddings says most Northern Congressmen were
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new and knew nothing about the truth of the war. Monroe accused Spain of
violating a 179S treaty by not controlling the Seminole. In general, the nation
believed it was an Indian war. However, those in Congress who knew the truth
would say nothing because to press an issue of slavery was considered to be
asking for disunion.
The Madison Administration's covert effort to acquire Florida did have
the legitimate pretext of British involvement because of the War of 1812. In a
secret Congressional meeting, Madison stressed the need to address issues on the
Georgia-Florida border. To an extent this was the start of the First Seminole
War. Key political policies which tend to suggest that African Seminole rather
than Spain were the primary target of both Madison and Monroe were developed
by the Federal government before, during, and after the war.
Giddings writes that the Madison Administration and Generals Gaines and
Jackson were obsessed with destroying the so-called Negro fort and returning
African Seminole to their masters and that after the fort was destroyed the war
began. In Freedom on the Border. Mulroy cites the fort's destruction as the start
of the war, but he doesn't connect this event to U.S. policies oriented towards
African Seminole.
Kenneth Porter does see the fort's destruction as the start of the First
Seminole War. He sees the war as part of a broader American policy which was
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rooted in the conquest of a particular group of African Seminole who lifted the
siege of St. Augustine in Madison's secret war.
In African and Seminole. Daniel F. Littlefield notes that the Patriots' War
made the U.S. acutely aware of African Seminole in Florida, and he believes the
destruction of the Negro fort started the First Seminole War. However, he does
not mention any political strategy in connection with the fort's destruction.
The Negro fort was not mentioned by Congressmen or Senators in
speeches concerning the First Seminole War. They emphasized Indian attacks
upon settlers, but in the House documents which accompanied a Congressional
investigation on the war, evidence points to the Negro fort as the direct cause.
This investigation underscored the views of Giddings and Porter in particular. It
seems that the war was an effort to destroy the fort and key villages and to
reenslave the African Seminole. This leads to the belief that during the Madison
Administration, the nation's policy shifted from a general goal of acquiring
Florida to neutralizing the African Seminole specifically.
A crucial development which further suggests that African Seminole were
at the core of U.S. Florida policy also occurred after the war. By 1821, the U.S.
gained full title to Florida and also the Treaty of Indian Springs was signed.
Giddings says this Treaty forced the Upper Creeks to give most of their land to
the State of Georgia because they had not been able to capture the African
Seminole. The Creeks would also receive $250,000, but that money would be
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paid to the Georgia slave holders as well. In exchange, the Creeks were granted
title to the African Seminole, but the federal government held that title in a trust
for the Creeks. Giddings says this made the federal government a slave holder.
Now in the wake of a war which had demonstrated the African Seminole were at
the core of the administration's Florida policy, a Treaty was signed with Creeks
which furthered this possibility.
Mulroy doesn't mention the Indian Springs Treaty at all. Porter does not
mention this treaty either, though he does suggest that African Seminole were at
the core of the U.S. Florida policy. Likewise Daniel Littlefield fails to mention
the Indian Springs Treaty. However, this treaty was concluded just as the U.S.
acquired Florida and it appears to place the African Seminole squarely at the core
of its policy.
The Indian Springs Treaty distinguished the African Seminole as a special
entity in the formation of national policy. Porter and Giddings acknowledge the
special emphasis which the U.S. placed upon the Africans. Another so-called
Indian Treaty which emphasized special treatment for Africans led to the Second
Seminole War and further suggested that Africans were at the core of the nation's
Seminole diplomacy. In 1832, the terms of the Treaty of Payne's Landing were
completed. The treaty was concluded in compliance with Andrew Jackson's
Indian Removal Policy. Giddings points out that two African Seminole chiefs and
six Indians negotiated the treaty. He writes that the African Seminole chiefs
31
specifically stipulated that they would only emigrate to Arkansas as required by
the treaty if the Seminole lived separate from the Upper Creeks, who claimed
them as slaves. The government refused this request, saying that the African
Seminole could be claimed by slave holders in Georgia and Florida, and it further
compelled the Indians to emigrate without the African Seminole. Giddings
believes that this policy which isolated the African Seminole was the direct cause
of the Second Seminole War. It seems that this policy further emphasized African
Seminole as being the core issue of the Seminole diplomatic efforts. Mulroy also
sees the treatment of African Seminole after the treaty as the spark which set off
the new war.
Covington writes of the treaty as being the cause of the war, but he does
not mention African Seminole as the reason for the Seminole refusal to emigrate.
He only says that African Seminole were a source of tension in the aftermath of
the Treaty of Payne's Landing. Porter did not mention the Treaty of Payne's
Landing, he he wrote that the war began because the U.S. attempted to prevent
African Seminole's removal.
America's effort to separate the African and Indian Seminole intitiated the
Second Seminole War, the goal of which was to enslave the Africans and move
Indians to the West. A key indirect consequence of the war was the failure of
President Van Buren to be reelected. In The Fox at Bay. James Curtis mentioned
Van Buren's efforts to win the war, but he did not connect these efforts to Van
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Buren's 1840 presidential campaign. However, in The Presidency of Martin Van
Buren. Major Wilson wrote that Van Buren had inherited the war and the Indians'
removal policy from Jackson. While Wilson noted that the war was Van Buren's
biggest problem, and he described Van Buren's efforts to deal with the war during
the campaingn of 1840, he did not relate the war to the election results.
According to Wilson, the war was not a slave-catching expedition because Van
Buren had begun to allow Blacks to go west and had paid slave holders to drop all
claims to them. In spite of this perspective on the war, Wilson does acknowledge
that the war was a Black war and not an Indian war.
Even though Wilson does not acknowledge the war's impact upon Van
Buren's reelection, his comment demonstrates that the Administration was under
fire for its inability to conclude the war. Wilson does at least indicate the central
role of the African Seminole.
In The Romantic Age of American Politics. John Niven points out that the
war and the Indian Removal Policy furnished Van Buren's opponents with plenty
of means for attacks. Niven says that each session of Congress opened with
criticism of Van Buren's inability to capture a few Negroes and Indians. Donald
Cole, in Martin Van Buren and the American Political System, says that after
1,500 deaths and the expenditure of fifty million dollars, the war was still
unwinnable. Cole says it was therefore a heavy burden upon Van Buren's
campaign. While Democrats and Whigs argued over the escalation of the war,
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Cole says, Van Buren pointed out that except for the Seminole the removal efforts
had succeeded.
None of the above authors places direct blame for Van Buren's defeat on
the war, but all note his execution of the war during the campaign. Inevitably this
connection seems to suggest at least some indirect impact of African Seminole
upon Van Buren's defeat.
Giddings points to the war as a more direct variable in Van Buren's
defeat. Specifically, Giddings notes that just previous to the election, William Jay
published a book which caused Northerners to scrutinize all government actions
regarding slavery. With this additional focus upon governmental action, Giddings
says that the Administration was frozen in quicksand and that his iniability to
defeat the Seminole was a major reason why Van Buren lost the election. At this
time Van Buren and most of the rest of Congress and the nation as a whole knew
nothing about the true reasons for the war. Smith's The Plot to Steal Florida was
published in 1983. It seems that Giddings may not have known of Jefferson's
covert plans for Florida. If Giddings as a Congressman, could not gain access to
this covert information by 1858, then, as Henry Adams has written, the Florida
issue was an extremely high-security issue for the Southern slave interest.
In the wake of Van Buren's defeat, the war raged on. The Secretary of
War was informed by the military in 1840 that in order to remove the Seminole
from Florida, the government must promise them that African Seminole would be
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allowed to go free. This could only be done after paying Florida and Georgia
slave holders for their claims upon these slaves. Knowing that the Gag Rule,
which had been initiated by Southern Democrats in 1836 to prevent issues which
questioned slavery from being debated in Congress on the basis that debates
would cause a civil war, would shield it from scrutiny, the Congress proposed a
bill which authorized paying $100,000 to settle claims. Giddings used this bill in
1841 as an opportunity to challenge the Gag Rule. Giddings, William Slade, and
John Qunicy Adams used this bill to get around the Rule. Southern members of
the House said this debate neutralized the Gag Rule.
As James Stewart points out in Joshua Giddings and the Tactics of Radical
Politics, success in speaking out against slavery embolded Giddings and his allies
to launch a formal assault against the Rule. Giddings assembled a special
committee to challenge the Rule directly. The chief issue was considered to be
the Florida War, but other issues were used also. In 1842, Giddings put up such a
strong challenge to the Gag Rule that he was censored by the House and removed
from office. Giddings' removal by the South helped unite the national
abolititionist movement. He was reelected with a mandate to push the anti-slavery
cause and fight the Gag Rule. His reelection effectively ended the rule. He came
back and continued where he had left off. His defeat of the rule by 1844 removed
the barrier which had existed between the North and South since the debates for
ratification of the Constitution.
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This also suggests that the Seminole War exerted definite indirect
influences upon the politics leading to the Civil War. If the Seminole had been
defeated by Washington, Jefferson, or Jackson, they could not have influenced the
campaign of Van Buren, nor could they have furnished Giddings with a blatant
unconstitutional act with which to challenge the Gag Rule. Once the Gag Rule
was removed, open congressional debate on the issue of slavery occurred for the
first time since the Constitional Convention.
Norma L. Peterson discusses the Gag Rule in The Presidency of William
Henrv Harrison and John Tvler. Peterson verifies the Gag's impact upon debates
on slavery, but she does not connect the obscure Seminole War to the defeat of
the rule. Rather, Peterson credits John Quincy Adams' agitation of the Texas
annexation issue for the defeat of the Gag. In Mr. Polk's War. John H. Schroeder
says that Giddings, as the leader of the radical Whigs, used many issues touching
upon slavery to break the Gag Rule, including the slave trade in Washington, DC
and the annexation of Texas. However, Schroeder fails to include a connection to
the Seminole War. In A House Divided. Richard H. Sewall seems to connect the
efforts to abolish the Gag Rule with abolitionist fears that the slave holders were
so powerful that they could threaten civil liberties. Sewell also does not mention
the Seminole War, but he does connect Giddings as a leader of the anti-Gag
effort. In Disrupted Decades Robert H. Jones says that James G. Birney formed
an anti-slavery lobby in Washington which was supported by Giddings, John
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Quincy Adams, William Slade, and Seth Gates. Again, however, Jones makes no
connection to the Seminole War.
Even though none of the above authors say that the war was related to the
end of the Gag Rule, Giddings is frequently mentioned as a key leader in the
struggle. In Exiles of Florida. Giddings says that he was indeed able to use bits
and pieces of clues he gained on the war to weaken the Gag Rule. It seems that
the Seminole War was not the final issue but that, according to Giddings, it was
the most consistent issue for the anti-Gag cause. After the repeal of the Gag,
Sewell points out that Congress became an anti-slavery debating society.
Therefore, it seems that the Black Seminole had at least an indirect connection to
the repeal of the Gag.
CHAPTER III
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN RED AND BLACK SEMINOLES
Rebel slave communities existed throughout the Western Hemisphere
during the history of enslavement. In his comprehensive hemispheric study
Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas. Richard Price
details the vast extent of rebellion. In surveying the phenomenon of rebellion
in the Western Hemisphere under the Spanish, British, French, Portuguese,
Dutch and the United States, it is useful to categorize several levels of
rebellion. Too often the existence of Africans during the years of enslavement
in America have been trivialized. The categories mentioned give some
indication of the complexity and success of African resistance to slavery.
"Level A rebellion" applies to slaves who escape but pose no threat to anyone
except perhaps their masters. Rebellion at this level may consist of a few
individuals hiding out in the forest, mountains, and swamps, or there may be a
larger number of rebels.
The key characteristic at this level is that the threat to the institution
of slavery and the government is at most local, if at all. A few runaways could
never threaten the government. Even a larger number of runaways at this level
are easily subdued. In general their impact is upon a few plantations and/ or
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of short duration. Level A rebellion can range from single individuals who
escape, to the limited rebellion of Nat Turner. Because of the relatively
minimal extent of its threat, level A can be referred to as "micro-level
rebellion."
Level-B rebels were able to prevent re-enslavement only through the
use of offensive and defensive guerrilla warfare.1 Level-B rebels not only can
prevent capture by the local authorities but also can resist any military
overtures by the national or colonial government. At this level, communities
are formed with the number of inhabitants ranging from a few dozen to
thousands of members. These rebel societies are autonomous as long as they
can successfully resist the government's military authority.
Perhaps the best example of level B rebellion is the Brazilian slave
settlement, or quilomba. Palmares. Palmares had approximately 15-20,000
inhabitants. For a century, between 1597-1697, these rebels successfully
defeated all efforts of the Portuguese and Dutch colonial governments to
destroy and re-enslave them. R. K. Kent describes Palmares as a "Negro
Republic," with a king who resided in a capital city. The capital contained the
king's palace, ruling officials, including a police force, and 1,500 houses. In
one of the smaller towns, the king's brother ruled over a village of eight
'Chambers Concise Dictionary, 459.
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hundred houses. This city was only for the training of soldiers. 2
"Level-C" rebellion is similar to level B. Level C is distinguished by
the fact that the government acknowledges its inability to conquer the rebels
and concedes certain territorial and political gains. This process was formally
concluded with a treaty. An example of level-C rebellion occurred in Mexico.
By 1608 an Angolan slave, Yanga, established a rebel community of
approximately two hundred inhabitants. After successfully resisting the efforts
of the Spanish military for several years, Yanga was able to sign a treaty with
Spain. He was made governor of San Lorenzo de los Negros in exchange for
ceasing his attacks upon the Spanish colonial government.3
"Level-D" rebellions occurred in the context of European competition
for the Western Hemisphere. Rebels fled to governments or Native
Americans, who were opposed to their masters. In exchange for assurances of
freedom and sometimes land or other resources, rebels fought against their
former masters and helped to free other slaves. The African Seminoles were
precisely this type of rebels, as this study will reveal.
"Level-E" rebellion was the rarest of all. It occurred only in the
French colony of Saint Domingue. At this level of rebellion the slave
2i




population was so much greater than the white population, and its military
became so overwhelming that the rebels were able to overthrow the
government and replace it with their own leaders. These rebels created the
Haitian Republic.4
Level B, C, D, and E, can be referred to as "macro-level" rebellion,
(MLR). This is because in scale and scope the rebels have become an effective
guerrilla force which is able to resist the efforts of the national government.
Their autonomy and survival is maintained by one thing only, guerrilla
warfare. The rebels' success in warfare permitted them to orchestrate their
fate in the context of governments which sought to oppress them. The
Spanish, British, and United States political-economic systems were heavily
dependent upon African slavery during the periods included in this study.
Therefore, the military success of the Seminole rebels allowed them to
interdict the normal flow of government.
It is this success in warfare which yields a reciprocal political response.
The political responses to whatever degree they occur provide the fruits for
analysis in this study. This is underscored by the extensive writings of the
noted nineteenth-century military strategist and political scientist Carl Von
Clauswitz. According to Von Clauswitz, "the political object, as the original
4For a detailed history of Haiti, seeCarolyn E. Fick, The Makinp of Haiti
(Knoxville:University of Tennessee Press, 1990).
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motive of the war, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the
military force and also the amount of effort to be made." Therefore, he
concludes, "war is not merely a political act but also a real political
instrument, a continuation of political commerce. . . . Policy, therefore, is
interwoven with the whole notion of war and must exercise a continuous
action upon it."5
Because it existed solely as a by-product of military force, macro-level
rebellion (MLR) will be studied as a political commodity. As such it provides
the foundation and basis for seeking a reciprocal relationship to it in the
politics of Spain, Britain, and the United States
The efforts of governments to suppress MLR led to war. The resulting
wars were "political commerce." In this regard the battlefields existed parallel
to the legislative chamber. Policy outcome was decided by soldiers. To the
extent that political strategy for the rebels was executed and devised by the
same individuals, the scope and depth of any political activities can be best
understood by a study of how the opposing governments responded to them.
Rebel policies or decisions regarding freedom were usually contingent
upon the necessities of and outcome on the battlefield. And also, rebel slaves
were generally not part of an extensive chain of command. However, the
s,
5 Carl Von Clauswitz, On War, trans. J J. Graham, 6th printing, vol. (New
York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1956) 11-23.
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soldiers that opposed them were usually employed to execute the policy of the
national government. There may have been several layers of bureaucracy
between the soldier and the origin of the policy.
The soldier met the rebels on the battlefield. In a political context, the
battlefield was transformed into a "quasi-legislature" from which the throes of
warfare could dictate policy outcome. However, while the policy results were
not likely to reverberate far beyond the individual rebel, in the opposing
governments we can observe multiple levels of bureaucratic reaction to the
success or failure of policy. This bureaucratic reaction furnishes the basis for
examining the political relationship between MLR and Spain, Britain, and the
United States Consequently this study reveals the relationship between North
American politics and the Florida Seminole rebels.
Who are the African Seminole rebels?
This study examines the political relationship between the African
Seminole rebels and Spain, Britain and the United States; but as this process
ensues it is important to remain cognizant of the context in which these rebels
existed. As level-D rebels, they participated in alliances. Therefore, it is
essential to distinguish between bureaucratic reaction to the rebels, and the
allies in general.
As the study reveals, various political documents draw clear
43
distinctions between the allies and the rebels. The identity and role of African
rebels in alliance with Spain, between 1693 and 1763, is not problematic. In
the context of Spanish Florida, the phenomenon of MLR existed at the D level.
The study will show that the freedom of the rebels was challenged on
numerous occasions by the British government. But the phenomenon of level-
D rebellion also existed from about 1790 to 1842. This time the rebels were
again allies of both Spain and Seminoles until 1821, and in alliance with the
Seminoles only from 1821 to 1842. Any clear understanding of the political
reaction to the Florida rebels requires a review of two issues which are
germane to the alliance of Native and African Seminoles: first, the distinction
between Cimaroons and Seminoles, and second, the Native American
enslavement of Africans in the Southeast.
These two issues must be explored because government records and
especially scholarly research on the Seminole too often fails to distinguish
between the rebels and the natives. As a result the role of Africans is often
minimized or subverted. When this happens political reaction to the rebels can
be attributed to the Native Americans. Should this occur often enough, the
premise of the study would seem to be moot.
Clarifying the distinction between Seminole and "Cimaroon," as well as
clarifying the issue of Native enslavement of Africans, will bring greater
understanding of the rebels' relationship to North American politics.
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For the purposes of this study "Seminole" has been defined in the
Definition of Concepts section in the most accurate and comprehensive way
possible. Nevertheless, there are generally two perspectives on the origin of
the Seminole. On the one hand there is the most popular perspective, that the
Seminoles are essentially an amalgam of the Creek confederation which
migrated from Georgia into Florida and incorporated the few remnants of the
nearly extinct Florida natives. The Seminole are seen as originating about the
time of the British occupation, though the Creek influx is believed to have
continued into the nineteenth century. The African presence is explained as
either runaway slaves permitted to settle or as slaves of the Seminole, who
were bought or captured from white settlers.6 The second and less popular
perspective is that the first Seminole were both African and Native Americans
who came to Florida fleeing British slavery in South Carolina. From this
perspective it is asserted that the migration of Africans and Yamasees and
Apalachees (both said to be branches of the Creek Confederation), began in
6,
Gatschet, an employee of the U.S. Bureau of Ethnology, believed both
Yamasees and Apalachees were branches of the Creek. Covington, 3-15, 29-
30; William C. Sturtevant, "Creek...," 92-129; Kevin Mulroy, Freedom on the
Border_(Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 1993)1-13; Albert S.
Gatscket, A Migration Legend of the Creek Indians rPhilariftlphia- D. G.
Printon 1884; reprint New York: AMS Press, 1969), 52, 65, 66, 74. Gatschet,
an employee of the U. S. Bureau of Ethnology, believed both Yamasees and
Apalachees were branches of the Creek.
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the 1680s.7 The second view merges these original migrants with the larger
Creek migration in the mid-eighteenth century.
Implicit in this later perspective is the idea of continuity between the
rebels from 1693 until 1842. The idea of continuity is a premise upon which
this study is based. The study theorizes that the continuous existence of a
considerable number of autonomous rebels is the best explanation for the
perplexing alliance between Africans and Natives in Florida; but in addition to
this, it best explains the concept of slavery between these two allies.
This study asserts that a state of level-D macro-rebellion existed in
Florida from 1693-1842. Therefore, rebels existed with their allies, and were
able to militarily defend their freedom. One clue which helps to support this
assertion is the etymological linkage between the words "Seminole" and
"cimaroon." Some scholars who hold the former view on the origin of the
Seminoles say that the word comes from "cimaroon." However, they say that
"Seminole" refers not to runaway slaves but to Creek migrants in Florida who
broke away from the Creek confederacy.8 However, since the term
"Seminole" was originated during the British occupation, if the word was
intended to refer only to Creek migrants, it seems an English word could have
been used.
7Weir, Colonial South Carolina. 31: Giddings, Exiles. 2-4.
8 James W. Covington, Seminoles. 3-5; Sturtevant, "Creek...," 92-105; Mulroy, Border. 6-8.
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As mentioned earlier, the British spelled "cimaroon" as "symeron"
during Drake's 1572 voyage. In that case there was no change in meaning. It
is therefore possible that the similarly derived "Seminole" retained some of the
meaning from its etymological origin. If so, that original linkage may show
roots from either African or Native cimaroons.
Between 1693 and 1763 an alliance of Spanish, Muscogee-speaking
Yamasees and Apalachees, and African rebels existed.9 This alliance was
especially complicated by intermarriage between African men of St. Augustine
and Native women in regional villages. Nevertheless, records indicate that the
Spanish evacuated all of their Black allies to Cuba when British occupation
began in 1763. This prevented their re-enslavement by the masters from whom
they had fled.10
However, there is no clear record of the number of Africans who fled
from South Carolina and Georgia into Florida. Even if many African rebels
remained in Florida among Indians or in the swamps, it may have been
impossible for them to be found or detected if they sought to evade the
British. The first extensive effort to explore and chart Florida came during the
Second Seminole War between 1835-42. During this war the best efforts of
thousands of U. S. Soldiers to find African and Native Seminoles proved that
9Gatschet, Legend. 10, 52, 62, 74.
10Jane Landers, "African presence...," 315-32; Mulroy, Border. 9.
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they could easily evade capture or detection for many years.11
The British naturalist William Bartram did extensive research in South
Carolina, Georgia and Florida, between 1773-76. He reported some
assimilation of Spanish culture among Seminoles in Florida. Bartram made no
reports about any Africans among them; however, though he traveled in a
region of America where the slave population perhaps exceeded the white, he
essentially said nothing of the slaves. Therefore, his silence upon Blacks
among Seminoles does not exclude their existence.12
To the extent that the Seminoles mentioned by Bartram had ties to the
earlier Spanish, then it is possible that some Africans from the alliance were
present also. Some African-Native linkage may have endured even after the
Spanish departure. In addition to family links, Africans had also assimilated
some of the Muscogee language and culture and there were old alliances
between Africans and Yamasees which even precede flight into Florida.13 The
11 John T. Sprague, The Origin. Progress and Conclusion of the Florida War.
facsimile of 1848 edition, Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1964, New
York, 1848; reprint, 114, 309-10, page references are to the reprint edition;
Walter Lowrie and Mathew St. Clair Clarke, eds. American State Papers. Class V.
vol. 7. (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1838) 135-150.
12 William Bartram, Travels. (London, 1792; reprint, Savannah: Beehive Press, 1973) 164.
"Jane Landers, "A free town in Spanish colonial Florida," American
Historical Review, 95 (Febl990) 17; Journal of the Commissioners for Trade
and Plantations. 1764-67. (His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1986) 45.
Upon assuming administrative duties in Florida, the Earl of Halifax discusses
the fate of Indians left on Spanish lands.
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pre-British alliance of Natives and Africans forged bonds which could have
assisted a merger with Creeks emigrating into Florida.
Some Creek emigrants had been allies of the British and as such they
had participated in wars against the Florida allies. However, even in alliance
with Britain they could not conquer Florida. Therefore, to the extent that
Africans and Natives were still present after the Spanish departure, in the
absence of military dominance by Creek emigrants, linguistic similarities would
have helped in the assimilation of the allies and Creeks on an equal basis.
It is unlikely that all Africans who had fled into Florida were evacuated
with the Spanish. In all probability only those most closely associated with
Spain left. Even though Spain and later Britain had political rights to all of
the Florida territory, for all practical purposes their administrative authority
only extended to a small region around the capital. During the Second
Seminole War in the 1830s, United States Commander General Jessup
informed Secretary of War Poinsett that Florida was an unexplored wilderness,
"the interior of which we were as ignorant as the interior of China."14 With
only a fraction of the later United States manpower and resources in Florida, it
is unlikely that colonial Spain or Britain were any better informed about the
number or location of rebel African slaves.
Even if most rebels were transported out, others continued to flee into
14Sprague, Florida War. 200.
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Florida after 1763.15 By 1771 over half of the inhabitants in British Florida
consisted of newly imported African slaves. The slave population ranged from
1,000 to 3,000 during this period. However, during the American Revolution,
from 1776-1783, British refugees from the Carolinas and Georgia fled to
Florida with their slaves. By 1783 there were up to 12,000 slaves and 9,000
whites.16
British colonial records indicate that the Seminoles stole slaves from
British plantations. The issue of greatest concern in the short history of the
Florida Colonial Assembly, 1781-84, was punishing slaves for murder and
rebellion. " Therefore, it does seem probable that after 1763 rebels continued
to exist among the Natives of Florida.
In 1784 with the British loss of the Revolution, Spain regained title to
Florida. Population statistics during and after the Revolutionary War are
inconclusive. In Loyalists in East Florida. Siebert reports that 6,540 Blacks
and 3,398 whites were evacuated by the British.18 A Spanish census reported
15 "The original papers of Governor John Reynolds," in The Colonial
Records of Georgia vol 28 Part II, Kenneth Coleman and Milton Ready, eds.
(Athens, GA: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1977) 191.
16Charles Loch Mowat, East Florida as a British Province 1763-84
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1964) 64-67, 126, 137.
"Ibid, 114, 127, 129-33.
"Wilbur H. Siebert, Loyalist in East Florida Vol (Deland: Florida State
Historical Society, 1929) 208.
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that 6,000 Blacks and Whites were evacuated. Florida Governor Tonyn
reported that 4,000 refugees had passed into the United States interior.19
Also, the British processed claims for hundreds of lost, stolen or runaway
slaves in Florida after the evacuation.20
During British occupation it was likely that many rebels remained in
Florida and continued assisting in the rebellion of other slaves. But even if
there were none left from the first era of Spanish occupation, the consistency
and growth of British slavery continued to yield rebels to the interior of
Florida. Among the first orders of business for the new United States
government was to stop the flow of rebels into Florida.21
Any interaction between rebels and Natives in Florida during the years
of British occupation provided the physical linkage which supports
etymological ties between the words "Seminole" and "cimaroon. Also, this
fosters the continued presence of macro-level rebellion in Florida. The
continuous presence of militarily autonomous rebels helps explain African
slavery and the "Five Civilized Tribes." In spite of a common notion that
Native Americans essentially held amicable and even benevolent or fraternal
19Mowat, East Florida. 146.
20Siebert, Loyalist vol.11. 10, 16, 19, 409, 419.
21 John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-89
vol. 28 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1933) 118; Ibid
vol.34, 326, 430-31.
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feelings towards the enslaved African in North America, some Native peoples
held Africans as slaves. It was encouraged by the British in the Southeastern
colonies, and it seems that those with European fathers and Native mothers
were the key participants.22 Neither the British colonial government nor the
United States would allow a neutral policy by Natives on the subject of
slavery. Even before the Washington administration, the Continental Congress
had stipulations in treaties with at least thirteen Native peoples for the return
of escaped slaves.23
In American Indian Policy and American Reform. Christine Bolt
commented:
By the late colonial period it was only in the Carolinas and Georgia that
all three races were numerically strong. . .In this region they had many
opportunities for intermarriage and trade with each other and took
advantage of their opportunities. . . . Southern whites worried that Indians
and Blacks might combine against them. . . .It is my contention that
Whites in time passed on to the Southern Indians some of their more
derogatory perceptions of the Blacks and ... the five civilized tribes
followed whites in enslaving, disliking, and pulling apart from Blacks.24
The Cherokees, Chickasaws, Creeks, Choctaws, and Seminoles were
known as the "Five Civilized Tribes." This was because they gradually
attempted to assimilate the lifestyle of southern Whites, primarily by rejecting
22Christine Bolt, American Indian Policy and American Reform (London:
Allen & Unwin, 1987) 151-53.
CharlesKappler, ed., Indian Affairs. Laws and Treaties, vol. 2, (Washington DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1904) 4-8, 14, 16.
, American Indian. 5.
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"hunting and gathering," for survival and in its place adopting an economy
based upon slave-based agriculture.25
Except for the Seminole, the Five Civilized Tribes produced written
constitutions which included slave codes. Though slavery among the tribes
was perhaps milder than among whites, still many instances of cruelty to
Africans occurred.26 The institution of slavery began among the Five Civilized
Tribes during colonialism and continued until the Civil War. Each tribe signed
treaties and entered the Civil War on the side of the Confederacy.27
Though relations between Cherokees, Choctaws, Chickasaws and
Creeks towards their African slaves is fairly clear and unambiguous, the
situation concerning the Seminole is just the opposite. On the one hand,
slavery did exist among the Seminole. But it has been described as a system in
which the bonds between master and slave were so tenuous that slaves usually
lived miles away from their Indian masters and only paid a small percent of
2S-
Ibid, 151-56; GrantForman, FiveCivilizedTribes. (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1934) 1-30; Daniel F. Littlefield, The Cherokee Freedman.
preface; (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978)1-11, also see preface; Daniel
F. Littlefield, The Chickasaw Freedman (Westpnrt, CT: Greenwood Press
1980) 1-15.
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Bolt, American Indian. 155; Littlefield, Chickasaw. 5; Littlefield,
Cherokee. 1-11.
27Bolt, American Indian. 164; Littlefield, Chickasaw. 19; Littlefield,
Cherokee, 1-11; JohnRoss, The Papers of Chief John Ross vol. II, 1840-1866,
ed. Gary E. Moulton (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984) 488-517.
53
crops or livestock annually to their so-called owners.28
On the other hand, United States Congressional Documents from at
least 1821 to 1842 specifically state that "Negroes govern the Seminole
Indians." This documentation was submitted to Congress from Florida
governors, Seminole Indian agents, United States army generals, and slave-
holding citizens of Florida.29
Even though the resources indicate that both slave and free Blacks live
among the Seminole, at times all Blacks are referred to as "the slaves," who
"rule" the Seminole. This type of documentation contradicts and tends to
refute the idea of African slavery among the Seminole. In the Florida Wars.
Virginia B. Peters wrote on the Black and Red Seminole:
There is a lack of specific knowledge about the relationship between the
Negroes and Indians. In order to protect their allies, the Indian had to
insist to white authorities that the Blacks were all slaves which they
intended to defend from the depredations and claims of Americans. Also,
although many army officers came to sympathize with and respect their
Indian enemies, they suffered from the blindness of their time; they could
never see the Negro enemy as capable of the dignity and intelligence they
were willing to bestow on the chiefs. Joshua Giddings, alone, saw the role
of the Negro in Florida as that of an equal partner.30
Joshua Giddings was a Congressman who represented the state of Ohio
28Covington, TheSeminoles. 29-30; Mulroy, Border. 7-8.
29 Clarke and Lowrie, American State Papers. Class V vni 2, 411; Ibid,
Class V. vol. 6, 68-69; Ibid, vol.7, 832-35; Sprague, 309-10.
30 Virginia B. Peters, The Florida Wars fHamdftn CT: Archon Books, 1979)
98.
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from 1838 to 1859. As Chairman of the House Committee on Claims in 1839,
Giddings opposed appropriations for the Seminole War. He believed that the
war was an effort in support of slavery. According to Giddings, United States
policies concerning the Seminole had all been crafted by a federal government
which, since Washington and Jefferson, had been dominated by the institution
of slavery. He therefore concluded that all knowledge about the Seminole was
tainted by the interest of slave holders.31
Considering Giddings' comments, it is important to understand that all
presidents between 1788 and 1840 who served two terms were slave holders.
Only John Adams, John Quincy Adams, and Martin Van Buren were in office
one term. As this study will show, the slave-holding presidents had the
greatest influence over the federal Seminole policy. These slave-holding
presidents, Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe and Jackson, were in
office for forty years as opposed to twelve years for the others. They
certainly had a greater opportunity and interest to shape the federal policy
toward slavery. This would include the institution of slavery among the Five
Civilized Tribes. Also, this included the gathering and dispersal of
information about the Red and Black Seminoles.
None the less it was these same Federal sources, in the context of the
31 Biographical Directory of the United States Cnn^^ (Wach;»c^n DC
US. Government Printing Office, 1989) 1057; Giddings, Exiles. 35, 50, 242-
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First and Second Seminole Wars, who went to great lengths to insist that the
roles of masters and slaves, between African and Natives, had been reversed.
Such contradictory statements can be best explained by the continued presence
of a macro-level rebellion.
Through the alliances with Spain and the Indians of Florida, rebel
slaves had the capability to resist slavery from 1693 until 1842. This macro-
rebellion capability apparently withstood the efforts of Native Americans in
Florida. Slavery among the Cherokees, Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Creeks
has been described as severe; only the Seminole are described as benevolent
masters.
Between 1820 and 1837 the slave population among the Five Civilized
Tribes ranged from two percent to twenty percent of the Native total.
However, only among the Seminole is a free rebel population accounted for.
The rebels were twenty percent of the total Seminole population; and the
slaves were described as autonomous from the Natives. Also, a steady flow of
slaves are said to have run to the Seminole.32
The continued presence of the macro rebellion is the best explanation
for the unique lifestyle of Africans in Florida. Any desire of immigrant Creeks
to enslave Africans was most likely scrutinized by the rebels. A type of
benevolent share cropping is described between Natives and Africans. But
32Bolt, American Indian Policy. 152-55.
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why would such a system only exist in Florida? The Seminole were a branch
of the Creeks, who practiced a relatively harsh form of slavery. If Native
Seminole had actually mastered the Africans, who could have compelled them
to be so benevolent? It seems that a large group of armed, autonomous rebels
is the best explanation. The relationship may have ultimately not been one of
master and slave.
The relationship between the rebels and Seminole was both old and
complex. Peters believed that Native Seminole claimed all Africans among
them as slaves as a political ploy to protect them from United States slave
holders. Such a theory has credence because the United States government
certainly recognized the Natives as legal political entities. Because of a
greater familiarity with Whites, rebel leaders often functioned as the
interpreters, or intermediaries, between Natives and the United States.33 It
seems they encouraged the idea of Native slavery as a legal barrier to the
United States claims upon them. Native claims actually provided court
challenges to the claims of United States citizens.34
The rebel position as intermediaries caused United States officials to
point to their control over Natives. In seeking to determine the true status of
"American State Papers. ClassII. vol. 2, 441; American State Papers-
Class V. vol.VI, 68-69, 454; Ibid Class V. vol.7, 832-34.
34 American State Papers. ClassV. vol.6, 459, 460.
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Africans among the Seminole, nothing presents as great a quandary as the
correspondence of American officials during the Seminole wars. The rebels
are described as the group who would determine war or peace with the United
States; also they were implicated as executioners of Natives who violated their
decisions.35
There is a lack of precise information about the relationship between
the African and Native Seminole. Very few sources document the beliefs of
the rebels themselves. Most of the data concerning the Seminole came from
individuals who had some relationship to the slave industry, which sought to
reclaim a fortune in slave property among the Florida Natives. Joshua
Giddings believed that federal resources on the subject were tainted by such a
bias.
Sources which contend that the rebels were slaves of the Natives must
be viewed parallel to those which project them as leaders among the Seminole.
Though it is possible that some Africans were subjected to enslavement by the
Seminole, this study takes the position that for the masses of rebels in Florida
it was a physical impossibility. Sources describe the relations between the two
as ranging from autonomous Africans giving a small annual tribute to Native
masters, to African control and mastery of the Natives.




unique setting in which rebel autonomy was possible. Within this context of
freedom through the alliance, it appears that rebels sought to bolster their
continuous military advantage with legal challenges to the claims of whites.
During the years of Spanish occupation from 1693 to 1763, and 1784
to 1821, the British and later United States generally directed all claims for
slaves to the governor in St. Augustine. Therefore, any challenge to the
freedom of the rebels was subjected to a rigorous two-step process. First,
Spain's right to legally free British slaves, and second, occasionally the British
and United States invaded in an effort to capture the rebels. The rebels were
only required to bolster Spain militarily.
In 1821, Florida became United States territory. This study asserts
that the rebels sought to maintain their security with a similar two-step
process. Though the United States possessed Florida, they still maintained
nominal respect for the property rights of Natives in Florida. Rebel leaders
were fully cognizant of this fact. Indeed they were frequently present at treaty
negotiations as official interpreters for the Seminole. They naturally were
capable of representing their own interest.
It seems that the rebel leadership designated their people as legal
property of the Seminole to provide a tenuous shield of legality, to fill the
vacuum left by the Spanish. In all probability the rebels compensated the
Seminole with produce to show their appreciation for this complex alliance,
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which jeopardized Native relations with the United States.
The British and Americans had to observe and respect the Spanish legal
barrier because Spain was a great European power. Therefore, a military
defense of the policy was rarely needed. But the claims of Native ownership
of Florida rebels was given only limited credence when challenged by Georgia
and Florida slave holders. Therefore, the rebel freedom ultimately hinged on
the second step of military force, and hence upon the Seminole Wars.
Circumstantial evidence suggests that at all times, between 1693 and
1842, an autonomous group of rebels was present in Florida. The presence of
this group would have prevented enslavement as it existed among the other
Five Civilized Tribes. Indeed the contradictory resources tend to preclude any
actual Native Seminole enslavement of Africans. However, the rebel
autonomy and strength in the alliance probably allowed them to project
themselves as slaves. They attempted to protect their freedom legally, hoping
that military efforts would not be necessary.
British and American politicians, administrators and military leaders
responded both to the alliance and to the rebels specifically in their efforts to
secure slavery. Spain united with the rebels to secure its hold on Florida. The
complexity of the rebel existence must therefore be explained in context, to bring
clarity to the Spanish, British, and United States political reaction to them.
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The next chapter will discuss the origin of Spanish-British New World
competition. It is within the context of this competition that Spain first
discovers the value of forming alliances with rebel slaves. Such discoveries in
Jamaica and Panama set the stage for events in Florida.
CHAPTER IV
AFRICAN SEMINOLE REBELS AND THE NEW WORLD POLICIES
OF SPAIN AND BRITAIN
The Seminole story begins in the context of European competition for
the North American continent. Spain and Portugal were the first European
nations to explore and lay claim to the "New World." After Columbus' first
voyage to the Western Hemisphere, Pope Alexander VI, a Spaniard, issued the
famous Inter Caetera. in which he drew an imaginary line which in effect
divided the lands of the Western Hemisphere between Spain and Portugal.1
This act by the Catholic Church included North America as part of Spain's
legal territory. In the first 30 years after Columbus' entry into the Western
Hemisphere, most of Spain's attention went into the West Indies and South
and Central America. But between 1520 and 1570 Spain began to fear
competition in North America. This fear encouraged Spain to begin some
settlement in what is today South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.2
!H. Parry and P. M. Sherlock. A Short History ofthe West TnHifts 2nd edition
(London: MacMUlan Company, 1963), 6.




Spanish fear was warranted by ongoing British competition in Europe.
This competition extended into religion, economics, and New World
Colonialism. Since Columbus' discoveries, Spain had reaped great wealth
from the land divisions of the Catholic Church. She was probably the richest
and most powerful nation in the world. However, the wealth encouraged a
decline in the traditional Spanish economic base of local agriculture and
manufacturers. The decline in Spanish home industries allowed England and
other European nations to expand their economies by exporting to Spain.
From its position of power, Spain sought to promote the interest of the
Catholic Church. This led to an alignment of church and state in Spain. As
the power of the church grew, it began to own an increasing share of wealth in
Spain. Also, this stifled free thought and trade.3 In contrast to this
development in Spain, the English King Henry VIII broke ties with the
Catholic Church, and embraced Protestantism. England tended to promote
free thought and trade, encouraging the development of stock pools which
were prepared to support colonialism. England essentially became a haven for
Protestants and the protector of this new faith.4
3 Lyon Gardiner Tyler. The American Nation: A History. England in America 1580-
1652 vol. 4, (New York: Harper Brothers, 1904), 3-4.
4 Thomas A. Bailey, The American Pageant: A History ofthe Republic, (Boston: D.C.
Heath and Company, 1966), 11.
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Queen Elizabeth, the daughter of Henry VIII, ordered English pirates
to attack Spanish colonies, ships, and other areas of interest.5 The voyages of
Sir John Hawkins and Sir Frances Drake accomplished this exact goal. While
attacking the Spanish, they also revealed to England how vulnerable and
unprotected Spain was north of Florida.6 In 1588 Philip II of Spain sought to
crush the English base of Protestantism, and New World competition. He sent
the 130-ship Spanish Armada to invade England but the British Navy, aided by
storms, inflicted a stunning defeat upon Spain and went on to gain control of
the North Atlantic Ocean. This cleared the way for British colonization of
North America.7
It is important to have an understanding of the Spanish-British rivalry.
To properly view the New World conflict of the two nations, one must
understand that it began in Europe. Also, one should see that the conflict was
religious, economic, and political. This depth of competition may help clarify
the role played by the rebels in North American Colonial politics. This was
the context in which the Spanish-British Colonial conflict began. The British
5 Charles and Mary Beard, revised by William Beard. The Beard's New Basic History
ofthe United States (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1968), 20.
6 Tyler, England, 7.
7Bailey, American. 11.
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victory over the Spanish Armada militarily paved the way for British
settlement.
Though the Spanish still claimed all territory between Florida and
Virginia, it was in that very territory that British colonization began in the
early 17th Century. In 1607 Spain unsuccessfully attempted to launch a
military attack upon the early British Virginia colony. Also, from 1670 to
1700 Spain and its Native allies launched continuous raids upon British
settlements in South Carolina, but these attacks were also unsuccessful.8
Long before Spain and Britain began to compete militarily in North
America, both nations found that their quest for power in the Western
Hemisphere was impacted by runaway African slaves. According to Charles
and Mary Beard, Queen Elizabeth ordered British pirates such as Sir Frances
Drake and Sir John Hawkins, to attack Spanish interest in the hemisphere. In
Sir Francis Drake. George M. Thompson informs us that the voyage of 1572-
73. which established Drake as Britain's leading seaman, could not have been
successful without the help of Spanish cimaroons.9
The flow of gold and silver from the New World to Spain was essential
to the execution of Spanish foreign policy. A key goal of British foreign




policy was the weakening of Spain. The British realized that much of the
Spanish wealth flowed from Panama and that this was a good target for
destabilization.10
Philip Nichols, who served on this famous voyage as Drake's chaplain,
wrote about events in Sir Francis Drake Revived" According to Nichols,
Drake left Plymouth, England in 1572, with two ships and 73 men, including
his two brothers. Within a few months of his attempting to raid Panama for
treasure, Drake had only one ship left. Through battle, starvation, and
disease, he had lost all but 28 of his crew. Both of his brothers had died.
Nichols says that Drake was saved by "Symerons," whom he defined as "a
Blacke people which about eightie yeares past fled from the Spaniards. . . .and
are since growne to a nation under two Kings of their owne. . . .ll12
Drake's mission had been crippled by attempting to raid Panama from
the sea. These rebels told him to wait five months until the rainy season
ended. They clothed, fed, housed, and medicated Drake's remaining crew
during this time. Also, they hid his ship in a shallow cove. When the rains
10 Ibid. Sir Francis Drake 64.
11 Philip Nichols, "...Sir Francis Drake Revived," in Documents Concerning English
Voyages to the Spanish Main 1 Sfi7.«n vol. 71, ed I. A. Wright. (London: Hakluyt
Society, 1628; reprint, Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint Ltd., 1932) 254-323 (page
references are to the reprint edition).
12Ibid, 257.
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stopped they marched through the jungles and over mountains to intercept a
Spanish mule train loaded with gold and silver. The rebels added 30 men to
Drake's 18 men for this mission. As a result Drake was able to load his ship
with treasure. Perhaps equally important, the rebel leader took Drake up a tall
tree on top of a mountain, so that he could see both the Atlantic and, for the
first time, the Pacific Ocean. Nichols credits the rebels with making the
voyage a success.13
Thomson credits Drake's voyage with helping to alter the course of
world history. Drake's success was a political victory for the British.
However, it was a political victory for the rebels. Nichols' report seems to
indicate that the rebels existed at macro-level of rebellion. They had
established towns from which they fought Spain for many years. It seems that
their goals were to free other slaves and to defeat a common foe on the
battlefield. Their success further destabilized the Spanish slave system, and,
in addition, because slaves were used in the mines, their alignment with Drake
interrupted the flow of wealth to Spain.
Since the Spanish were their enslavers, anyone who opposed them was
an ally of the rebels. For the British perhaps, an enemy of Spain was a friend
of theirs. Britain's political policy was to gain better access to the Western
Hemisphere, and Drake helped to assure this. Thus, to whatever extent Drake
13 Ibid., 310.
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helped to strengthen Britain and weaken Spain and thus help alter the world
political equation some credit must be given to the rebels for their role.
A second, pre-North American example of the rebel relationship to the
political rivalry between Spain and Britain was in Jamaica. According to Irene
Wright in "The Spanish Resistance to the English Occupation of Jamaica,
1655-60," Britain invaded Jamaica with 8,000 troops in 1655 and was able to
capture the whole island very quickly. Except for a handful of men, the
Spaniards fled to Cuba, leaving behind bands of rebels scattered about
Jamaica. The few remaining Spaniards persuaded the rebels to help them
resist the British. Since the governor of Jamaica had fled, one of the
remaining Spaniards, Ysassi, was appointed governor by the King. He was
ordered to try and hold on until help arrived. About 1,000 fresh troops were
sent to Ysassi from Mexico and Cuba but most of these either deserted, were
killed, or were sent back by Ysassi, who informed the King that he'd been
given refuge by the rebels in their headquarters. The location was in the
mountains and was the strongest place on the island. Ysassi said that from this
location with 100 men he could defeat 1,000. He said he preferred to wage
guerrilla war with rebel assistance rather than use other troops.
For five years, Ysassi and the rebels waged a successful guerrilla war
against British occupation forces, and they could have fought longer.
However, both Britain and Spain realized that the rebels held the military
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balance of power in Jamaica. Spain promised freedom, supplies and the King's
gratitude for their continued assistance. The British, on the other hand, were
able to provide not just promises but tangible supplies to the rebels.
Therefore, their leader, "Governor" Juan Bolas, led the British to Ysassi.
After Bolas' defection to the British, Ysassi immediately ceased his
resistance.14
Within a few months of taking full possession of Jamaica, Deputy
Governor Sir Charles Lyttelton proclaimed Juan Bolas to be magistrate over
the free Black population, with all powers except life and death over his
people. Bolas was given land and formed his own regiment. All this because
of his assistance to the British in capturing Jamaica.13
According to Carey Robinson in The Fighting Maroons of Jamaica.
Bolas had always been neutral towards Britain and Spain, and Ysassi's major
accomplishment had been to convince Bolas not to help the British for five
years. From the start of British occupation of Jamaica, Britain's General
Sedgewick complained that the rebels were the real obstacle to conquest.
Sedgewick acknowledged Bolas as the leader of the rebels. He noted that in
14 Irene A. Wright. "The Spanish Resistance to the English Occupation ofJamaica,
1655-1660." Transactions ofthe Royal Historical Society. Series 4. vol. 13 (London:
Butler and Tanner Ltd., 1930), 119-144.
15 W. Noel Sainsbury, ed. Calendar of State Papers. Colonial Series. 1574-1660. vol.
5, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1860) reprint, Vaduz: Kraus Reprint Ltd.,
1964, 122.
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1656 the rebels burned British headquarters and massacred forty soldiers.
Before the war ended, both British and Spanish authorities were offering
freedom to the rebels. According to Robinson, the British offered the rebels
freedom and the land of their choice, and Bolas was made a colonel and a
magistrate.16
The Panamanian and Jamaican examples clearly illustrate the impact of
macro-level rebellion, or MLR, to the politics of Spain and Britain. Long
before the British came to Central America the Spanish authorities in Panama
were sending official correspondence to the King of Spain, asking for stronger
measures against the cimarrones, who were a threat to slavery and
production.17 Appeals from the local to the national level are a sign that the
level of rebellion was macro rather than micro.18 To the extent that war is an
extension of political commerce, the battlefield was the political arena in
which these conflicting policies were settled. The fact that the rebels were
successful in battle meant that their goals prevailed.
When Queen Elizabeth sent Drake to challenge the Spanish monopoly
in the New World, government policy entered the political arena of the
16 Carey Robinson. The Fighting Maroons ofJamaica (Great Britain: William Collins
and Sangster,1869), 18-27.
"Nichols, Drake. 9-10.
"Robinson, Fighting Maroons. 1-18.
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battlefield. The British desire to weaken Spain while strengthening themselves
was in harmony with the ongoing policy of the Panama rebels. Britain had no
conflict with the rebels. Spain simply wanted to defend its interest against
both. In battle, these allies prevailed against Spanish interest. Drake gained
fortune, fame, and knighthood. The Queen succeeded in striking a blow at
Spain, and the rebels perhaps weakened and enjoyed continued success against
their old foe.
Regarding Jamaica, British desire to gain a rich West Indian island was
part of its political policy. There were not many Spaniards or slaves on the
island, and it seems that maroonage was minimal. But as Britain continued to
press its New World policy, the battlefield became a political arena for
executing policy. As a result, profound changes occurred. Britain sent 8,000
troops on 38 ships to Jamaica in an effort to gain a solid foothold in the heart
of the New World. In the wake of the British invasion, slaves escaped to the
hills and forests. The invasion and defeat of the Spaniards established the
freedom and autonomy of the rebels. When Ysassi sought their military
assistance and promised concessions, their participation on the battlefield and
in the political arena was assured. British counter offers to the rebels
established them as decisive political players in the Spanish-British political
conflict.
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In the Panamanian and Jamaican examples, rebels seemed to have held
the balance of power which assured the successful execution of British
political policies. The Spanish saw that their New World policies were
unsuccessful. In both Panama and Jamaica, runaway slaves helped to assure
the defeat of their objectives. However, perhaps Spain did learn the value of
forming political and military alliances with rebels. Strategic negotiations
between Ysassi and Juan Bolos allowed Spain to remain in Jamaica for five
years.
To the extent that the battlefield is a political arena for the settlement
of policy objectives, Jamaica and Panama serve as examples which
demonstrate how the rebels achieved political empowerment. These cases can
be seen as the beginning of a pattern in which MLR would continue to impact
the Spanish, British, and United States politics. There was no rebel political
continuity from Panama and Jamaica to North America. However, the quest
for the natural human right of freedom stimulated similar responses among
other slaves. The slave's willingness to rebel to achieve freedom was a
constant variable. In North America, the British switched roles with the
Spanish, and became the hated slave holders.
The Spanish, perhaps learning lessons from the conflicts in Panama and
Jamaica, took steps to assure the allegiance of rebel slaves. In executing his
defense of Jamaica, Yssasi informed the King of Spain that the British would
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soon threaten his colony in Florida. It is conceivable that the King heeded
Ysassi's warning about Florida and learned some strategic lessons about
alliances with rebels. A clue to this is that within 33 years of Spain's alliance
with Jamaican rebels, the King of Spain established a similar alliance with
rebels who escaped from British Colonies into Florida. In Jamaica the rebel-
Spanish alliance helped maintain a Spanish presence for five years after an
apparent English conquest. However, in Florida for nearly 117 years African
Seminole rebels helped defend Spain in conflicts with Britain and the United
States in Florida.
The following chapter will reveal numerous political and military
policies and calculations by Spain which will insure their alliance with the
rebels.
CHAPTER V
THE SPANISH AND THE REBELS IN FLORIDA, 1693-1821
Twenty-one years after Columbus sailed into the West Indies, Ponce de
Leon claimed Florida for Spain. By 1565 Spain had founded St. Augustine.
However, long before Spain began to settle these regions, the Papal Bull of
1492 had granted all of North America, parts of South and Central America,
and the West Indies to them. The British laid a competing claim to North
America as early as 1497, after the voyages of John and Sebastian Cabot to
Newfoundland.1 The voyages of Sir John Hawkins in the 1560's revealed how
militarily vulnerable Spain was throughout North America. Shortly after
Hawkins, Sir Humphrey Gilbert and Sir Walter Raleigh set sail for North
America to exploit the Spanish weakness. However, they were intercepted by
the Spanish Fleet and almost destroyed. Raleigh and Gilbert were only part of
a wave of British Pirates sent to attack the interest of Spain and Catholicism.
A devastating blow to Spain was Drake's triumphant voyage in 1572-73.
Drake's success helped to convince the Spanish King Philip II that drastic
measures were necessary to safeguard New World territories and Catholicism.
In 1588, Philip sent a 130-ship armada to invade England; however Spain's
defeat cleared the way for Britain's access to North America.2
The British-Spanish competition continued there. In 1607, Spain
launched military raids upon the New British colony in Jamestown, Virginia.
Tyler, American Nation. 6.
2Ibid, 9-30; Bailey, Pageant. 12-13.
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Spain still claimed this part of North America but was unable to evict the
British. By 1670, British colonization of the Carolinas began. Not only were
these new settlements in a region claimed by Spain but they were very close to
the Spanish base in Florida. With the help of Native Apalachee allies in
Florida, Spain began to launch continuous raids upon the Carolina region in an
effort to destroy the British settlements.3 Most of the military strength of
Spain was centered in the West Indies and Mexico, but Florida was vital to the
protection of shipping routes. Therefore, Spain saw the Florida Natives as
vital allies against British encroachment. As early as 1602, Spain realized that
Florida might never attract a significant population of Europeans. In spite of
this, they fortified St. Augustine, and the Catholic church began to convert the
Natives. At least three dozen missions were constructed in Florida by 1675.
Apalachees and other Natives lived near the missions.4
Except for a brief period of British occupation, between 1763-83,
Florida would remain a Spanish colony until 1821. Spain maintained its
presence in Florida by military strength, and to a great extent its armed forces
were dependent upon rebel slaves and Native Americans.3
This chapter will focus upon the political relationship between rebels
from Colonial South Carolina and Georgia and Spanish Florida between 1693
and 1819. The battlefield is an extension of the political arena. Consequently,
3 Ibid, 14.
4 Charlton W. Tebeau, A History ofFlorida (Coral Gables: University ofMiami Press,
1971) 43-55
5 Gatschet, Migration. 64, 65; Joseph B. Smith, The Plot to Steal Florida. (NY: Harbor
House, 1983)211,255.
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by analyzing Spain's alliance with the rebels and the subsequent response to
their battlefield success, it is possible to observe some corresponding policy
reactions by the Spanish colonial government.
The British policy of colonization in North America was in conflict
with Spain's previous claims to the territory. As in Panama and Jamaica, the
primary goal of African slaves was to obtain freedom and attack the institution
of slavery. Because macro rebellion is always a phenomenon which opposes
its enslaver, runaway slaves found a natural ally in Spanish Florida.
The rebel alliance with the Spanish forced both the British and later the
United States to undergo a two-step process, in order to threaten their
freedom. Because of Spain's great power status, rebel freedom first had to
undergo a legal and diplomatic challenge. Once it was clear that this had
failed, a military challenge was resorted too as the last resort. The military
challenges were the ultimate test both to macro rebellion and to the survival of
the Spanish in Florida.
The King of Spain formally recognized the utility of the Black
runaways in his Edict of 1693 which freed and encouraged more slaves to
come to St. Augustine. Then the rebels were incorporated into the Spanish
military which raided Carolina. The most formal acknowledgment of the
crucial role of the Black Seminoles came in 1738 when they were established
in a military garrison which guarded the entrance to the Spanish Capital in
Florida, St. Augustine.6
6 Jane Landers, "African Presence...," 321.
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The utility of the Black Seminoles in Spain's maintenance of Florida is
most clearly demonstrated in two major wars. In 1740 the King of England
declared war upon the Spanish in St. Augustine. In the war, Blacks of the
garrison, led by Carolina runaways, played a decisive role in defeating the
British. Finally, by 1812, the U.S. Congress secretly authorized James
Madison to invade and seize Florida, the Black Seminoles led a fierce counter
attack, which ultimately forced Congress to withdraw troops. Also, the
Washington Treaty of 1819 ceded Florida to the United States. This treaty
strongly implies that the ceding of Florida to the U.S. was the price Spain had
to pay for its long alliance with millions of dollars in U.S. slave property.
The Spanish-Seminole alliance resulted in political success for Spain
and for the Seminoles. In this context, Blacks thrived for 126 years as level-D
rebels. The Seminole-Spanish alliance began as Spain sought to enforce its
policy of keeping the British out of the region south of Virginia.
When the British established colonies in Virginia and the Carolinas, the
Spanish were determined to attack them. Opinion is divided over who first
used Native allies to supplement their defenses, but by the late 17th century
both nations were engaged in the practice. The British attack upon and
enslavement of Spain's ally, the Apalachees, may have been a calculated
military move. This would have strengthened their ability to execute their
political objectives. Though African slavery existed in Florida, as an
institution its scale and impact were negligible in comparison to the slavery of
the British, who developed slavery as a vital institution throughout their North
American colonies. Perhaps it was only logical for Britain to weaken Spain by
attacking Apalachees and for Spain to seek to destabilize Britain by allying
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with its slaves. Within the last quarter of the 17th century, both policies were
underway. This helped assure the genesis of the Seminoles and their role as
allies of Spain.7
By 1674 Dr. John Woodward signed a treaty with the Carolina Natives
which laid an economic foundation for the colony. The Westoe Natives agreed
to capture the Apalachee allies of Spain, and sell them as slaves to the British
Carolinians. The British sold most of them to the West Indies. This policy
would help secure the frontier between Carolina and Florida, because it tended
to eliminate Spain's chief military ally.8
This new British policy led to problems between the colonists and the
proprietors in London. One early Carolinian, John Oldmixon, says that
between 1682-84 the proprietors forbade Native slavery and that Governor
Morton and Surveyor General Mathews were removed from office for
participating in the trade. The new governor, Moore, sought to gain a
monopoly over the Native trade. Moore sought to dominate the colonial
assembly to achieve this goal, even to the extent of allowing Africans to vote.
An investigation into Moore's activities was launched. He initiated a Native
slave-catching expedition into Florida in 1702 under the guise of combating
7 Alexander Salley, Jr., ed., Narratives ofEarlv Carolina. 1650-1708. (New York:
Charles Scribner's Son, 1910) 122; J.W. Fortescue, ed, Calendar of State Papers. Colonial
Series. America and West Indies 1681-85. vol. 11 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1898, reprint, Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint Ltd., 1964) 16 (page reference
to reprint edition).
8 Eugene M. Sirmans. Colonial South Carolina. A Political History 1663-1763 (Chapel
Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press) 23.
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the Spanish enemy. On this expedition Moore was accompanied by 600
Whites and 600 Yamasee and over 1,000 Apalachees were enslaved.9
Covington believed that Moore invaded Florida with SO Whites and
1000 Creeks. He says Moore's slave raid captured 1300 Apalachee men,
women, and children, and killed off the last independent members. The
Apalachee Natives of Florida seem to have been the key target of the Native
slave trade. Though the trade began with Dr. Woodward, by the time of
Governor Moore's expedition the supply of Apalachees was nearly
exhausted.10
It seems that the Carolina Native slave trade was generally rooted in
the strategic goal of disposing of the Spanish ally. Native slavery had not
proved to be a stable foundation of colonization in the New World. It seems
likely that the British would not seek to establish a precedent in Carolina. On
the other hand, the African slave industry was hemispherically the economic
foundation. There was no reason to believe it would not replace Native
slavery in Carolina. There were thousands of Natives in the Southeast, but the
British regional policy tended to distinguish between the enslavement of the
masses and those who were Spanish allies.
From the beginning, Woodward notified a London proprietor, the Earl
of Shaftsbury, that local Westoes were going out getting slaves for the British
in 1674.11 Also, by 1680 the proprietors notified the Carolina Governor, in
9Salley, Narratives. 332-40.
10Covington. Seminoles. 3-4; Sturtevant, "Creek...", 92; Mulroy, Freedom. 6.
11 Salley, Narratives. 134.
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the instructions for founding the city of Charleston, that local Indians within a
two hundred mile radius could not be enslaved or sold out of Carolina.12 The
proprietors indicate that some colonist had been causing problems by
capturing Natives. It seems that many of the regional tribes were captured in
the slave trade. The Creeks sold captured Choctaw in Charleston. The
Yamasee played a major role in the Carolina Indian slave trade. They helped
to facilitate the capture of the Appalachee, and also, in order to work in
concert with the British Native slave industry, they positioned themselves at
strategic sites between St. Augustine and Carolina.13
The British accumulated Native and African slaves. It seems very
possible that the Apalachees would attempt to return to their Florida
homelands. If they had done so they could have been referred to as cimar6nes
by Spain. Though it is also possible that the Spanish viewed Apalachee
escapees as merely returning home, and not as runaway slaves.
The phenomenon of rebellion was a major concern for Carolina. As
early as 1683, Governor Moreton assembled the legislature to discuss ways of
ending the Native slave trade and of prohibiting Negro slaves from escaping.14
In 1689 Carolina Governor Seth Sothell received a letter from the London
proprietors which advised him to "take care to prevent servants and Negroes
running away to the Spanish at St. Augustine."13 Though the Carolina
12Fortescue, Calendar, vol. 10, 524-26.
"David H. Corkran. The Creek Frontier 1540-1783. (University ofOklahoma Press,
1967) 53, 57; Sturtevant, "Creek," 100.
14 Salley, Narratives. 332.
lsFortescue, Calendar, vol. 13 ,187.
80
political leaders do not specify the ethnicity of the Natives, it seems likely that
those from Florida would seek to return home. Perhaps slaves from other
regions would seek to run back to their own people and to familiar
surroundings. Florida was their primary destination and African slaves
accompanied them.
In the context of the political setting, the British were settling along
the Atlantic coast from Massachusetts to Carolina. Thousands of colonists
and slaves were proof of the British success in executing their policy goals. In
southern Carolina, a leading source of wealth until about 1714 was the Native
slave trade. Escaped African and Native slaves were beginning to de stabilize
the colony. The natural goal, desire or policy of slaves is to seek freedom.
To the extent that Apalachees, Africans and any other slaves escaped into
Florida, they were successful in executing their policy goals, and by definition
they were "cimarones."
As the enemies of the British masters, the escaped slaves were
naturally favored by the Spanish. Spain claimed all the land up to Virginia and
perhaps feared the British would soon get Florida unless something were done.
Governor Ysassi of Jamaica had warned the King of Spain thirty years earlier
that Britain would attempt to take Florida.l6 Spain launched preemptive
strikes against British settlements in Virginia. In Southern Carolina, Spain
launched small limited invasions in an effort to stunt the growth of the British.
Surveyor-General of Charleston, Edward Randolph, reported to the London
Board of Trade that in 1686 a Spanish force of 100, including Blacks and
16 Wright, "Spanish Resistance," 141.
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Indians, raided the plantation of Governor Moreton. The invaders took 13
slaves away with them. Also, the invaders told the British that the Carolinas
were Spanish property, and that the King of Spain had ordered them not to
return any slaves to the British. Additionally, the invaders informed the
British that the city of Charleston was really called St. Jorge. After that
invasion, the new Governor, Colleton, sought to negotiate with Spain for the
return of the African slaves who had fled with the St. Augustine forces and for
other Carolina slaves who daily escaped to Florida.17
The Carolina political authorities were extremely concerned about
Black slaves in particular escaping to Florida. Though the Native slave trade
was their most valuable industry in the late 17th century, the documents
reflect more concern with the maintenance of African slavery.
As the Spanish forces were invading the Charleston region, the Spanish
Governor at St. Augustine, Don Diego de Quiroga informed the King of Spain
that many runaway slaves from Charleston were arriving in the city. Quiroga
said the slaves had informed him that they were fleeing slavery because they
wanted to become Catholics. The governor said the British were pressuring
St. Augustine for the release of the slaves. He asked the King what should be
done with them.18
17 Salley, Narratives. 205; Fortescue, Calendar, vol. 17,104-107; Jane Landers," Free
Town," 9-30.
18 Irene Wright, ed. "Dispatches of Spanish Officials Bearing on the Free Negro
Settlement of Gratia Real de Santa Teresa de Mose, Florida," in The Journal ofNegro
History. 9 (1924), 150-153.
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Even though these rebels gave the excuse of running away to become
Catholic, it seems that they may have been using religion to cater to the
ongoing political and military struggle between Spain and Britain. In "A Free
Black Town in Spanish Colonial Florida," Jane Landers says, "Although the
Spanish crown preferred to emphasize religious and humane considerations for
freeing slaves of the British, the political and military motives were equally, if
not more, important."19 It seems most likely that Spain needed military allies
and sought to weaken its British enemy, but by 1693 the Spanish King, Charles
II, gave his answer to Governor Quiroga:
To the Governor and Captain-general of the city of St. Augustine...
It has been notified in different letters, dated 1688, 89 and 90, that
eight black males and two black females who had run away from the
city of San Jorge, arrived to that presidio asking for the holy water
of baptism, which they received after being instructed in Christian
doctrine. Later on, the chief sergeant of San Jorge visited the city
with intention to claim the runaways, but it was not proper to do so,
because they had already become Christians.... As a prize for having
adopted the Catholic doctrine and become Catholicized, as soon as
you get this letter, set them all free and give them anything they
need, and favor them as much as possible. I hope them to be an
example, together with my generosity of what others should do. I
want to be notified of the following of my instructions as soon as
possible.
Dated in Madrid, November 7th, 1693, I, the King.20
This order from Charles II ultimately became the foundation of Spain's
military and political policy in North America. Charles II became King of
Spain in 1665. This was only five years after the rebels of Jamaica were so
19 Jane Landers, "A Free Town.. ", 11.
20 King Charles n, Spain, Roval Edict of 1693. (John B. Stetson Collection, P. K.
Yonge Library ofFlorida History; Gainesville: Univ. ofFlorida, text-fiche) SD58-1-26.
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crucial in the balance of power between Spain and Britain and also it was 120
years since Sir Francis Drake was supported by the rebels in Panama.
The King waited five years to answer and had the chance to assess
their potential military and political significance. He got his first letter from
the Governor in 1688. Before his order of 1693 there were numerous
complaints by Carolina citizens. Governor Quiroga had promised these
Carolina officials that the King would compensate them for the slaves, but not
return them. However, the Governor did not fulfill his promise. This
prompted the St. Augustine notary to inform the King that the Governor was
jeopardizing the peace with Britain and threatening Florida's security. Also,
the King was informed that the British preferred the return of their slaves.
Presumably Charles II knew, therefore, that a policy of freeing the British
slaves could be just as militarily significant in Florida as it had been in
Jamaica.
The King implied that he wanted to encourage other Carolina slaves to
come to Florida to partake of his generosity and Catholicism. In a letter
regarding the manner in which Governor Quiroga handled the delicate
negotiations with the British, the Spanish Attorney General in Madrid
reprimanded the Governor: "The attorney estimates that the Governor did
break his promise and did not do right,. . . especially when religion was the
excuse given so as not to turn in the Negroes."21
It seems probable that the stated goal of Catholicizing the runaways
was only a diplomatic vehicle for Spain's effort to strengthen its security.
21 Irene Wright, "Dispatches," 156
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Perhaps Catholicism played some part in the King's political policy goals but
there does not seem to have been any better "excuse." The role of the
Jamaican rebels may have been fresh in the minds of both nations. Spain could
not bluntly say that they were undermanned in Florida and that the 1693 edict
could serve the dual purpose of weakening Britain and strengthening Spain.
In spite of the Spanish excuse for using religion, the British seemed to
realize the military implication of the new Spanish policy. Surveyor General
Randolph in 1698 informed the Board of Trade in London that the new order
prohibited the return of runaway slaves.22 Also, Spanish Governor
Laureanode Torres y Ayala yielded to British demands and returned six Blacks
and a Native slave in 1697.23
The Governor disobeyed the order of his King. In the wake of the
1693 order, the actions of both nations seems to acknowledge that its impact
would transcend the sphere of religion. The Florida Governor yielded on
policy to avoid conflict and the Carolinians apparently were prepared for
conflict pursuant to British policy. Ultimately, the King of Spain's Edict of
1693 established a political-military policy which would draw rebels from the
Southeast to freedom and as a key element in Florida's defense. Though the
King, and Governor at St. Augustine spoke of spiritual justification, it seems
obvious both sides had no illusion about the reality of the edict.
Between 1714 and 1716, the Yamasee War took place. This war
demonstrated the utility of a united Black and Native military force as Spanish
22 Salley, Narratives. 205.
23Landers, "AFreetown..." 15, Note 29.
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allies. Also, it perhaps cemented a bond between the African and Natives
which would last until at least the 1840s. The Spanish had previously
supported guerrilla forces in hit and run attacks upon Carolina. Some
Carolina runaways participated in the guerrilla attacks. But the Yamasee War
was a coordinated effort to destroy the British presence in the Southeast. The
Apalachees had been Britain's primary target in its Indian trade. They and the
African slaves were escaping into Florida. The Yamasee and Creeks had been
assisting the British in capturing slaves. Creeks and Yamasee were paid guns
and other goods in exchange for slaves. The Yamasee developed a habit of
going into debt with British traders. On one such occasion the British traders
seized Yamasees as slaves to repay the debt. This act by the traders began the
Yamasee War. Yamasee, Creek, and Apalachees attacked the colony of South
Carolina.24
In addition to the united stand by the Natives, African slaves entered
the war. According to Landers:
Blacks outnumbered Whites in the colony.... When many slaves
joined the Yamasee Indian War against the British, they almost
succeeded in exterminating the badly outnumbered Whites. Indians
loyal to the British helped to defeat the Yamasee, who with their
black allies headed for St. Augustine. Although the Carolina
Assembly passed harsh legislation designed to prevent further
insurrections and control the slaves, these actions and subsequent
negotiations with St. Augustine failed to deter the escapes or effect
the reciprocal return of slaves. British planters claimed that the
Spanish policy, by drawing away their slaves, would ruin their
plantation economy.25




Landers also says that the Yamasee Chief Jorge, who led the attack
upon the British, says that he made alliances with African slaves prior to the
Yamasee war.26 There was a constant flow of Africans into St. Augustine
even before the Yamasee War, and both Britain and the Spanish saw the
impact of the policy. Both African and Native slaves who fled Carolina played
key roles in this attack. For the Spanish it seemed to demonstrate the
successful execution of political goals. Spain claimed the territory at least up
to Virginia. Even if it was unrealistic to believe that Britain could be removed
from the land, past actions demonstrate the utility of the goal of harassing the
British to deter expansion. This was perhaps one of the most deadly attacks
upon Colonial America. Therefore, though technically the British won the
war, it seems Spain successfully used war to achieve a political goal. The war
also demonstrated positive aspects of the 1693 edict, which probably enhanced
Spain's general goals for the region.
Also, parallel to Spain's policy success, Yamasees and Apalachees
nearly succeeded in ending the Native slave trade as a direct result of the war.
This was a political goal which probably could not have been successfully
negotiated away. Black slaves had been fleeing to Florida with Apalachees;
this resulted in the 1693 edict. Both the Red and Black slaves can be defined
as "cimmarones." But perhaps the genesis of what would become the
Seminole people can be detected during the war in the alliances of the
Yamasee and the South Carolina slaves.
26 Ibid., 17, Landers explains in the text ofnote 38.
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Though African slavery would continue in the Carolinas, the edict
provided a convenient escape. Through the edict and Yamasee War a durable
Spanish, Native, and Black military alliance was forged which bolstered
Spain's position in North America. At the same time, Black and Red Seminole
became aware of their potential in the British-Spanish conflict. In the
Yamasee War, both groups opposed slavery but the primary assault was upon
Native slavery. However, the Red and Black military bond established would
hold in its resistance to African slavery for almost ISO years.
The South Carolina government directed most of its wrath at the St.
Augustine government instead of at the Yamasee Natives. They blamed Spain
for starting the war and they were critical of the 1693 edict's impact upon
their slave industry. In a 1715 letter to Lord Townsend, the Colonial
Governor of South Carolina said that the Yamasee were primarily supported
by St. Augustine. Also, he noted that one year before the war, the Yamasee
had warned the traders of their intent.27 In 1716, two agents for the Commons
House, Joseph Boone and Richard Beresford, wrote to the London Board of
Trade and Plantations and listed numerous grievances against St. Augustine.
One major complaint was the Spanish support of the Yamasee War, but also
London was informed that the Yamasees and others still were attacking and
preventing the resettlement of plantations. Additionally, they stole African
slaves and refused to return them. Boone begged London to declare war upon
St. Augustine, and he said that many assembly agents had gone to St.
Augustine to negotiate with the Governor for the slaves but that they had had
"Fortescue, Calendar, vol. 28, 227.
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no success. Boone stated that the Spaniards were repaying South Carolina for
capturing their Natives.28
Between the Yamasee War and 1740, the general political objective of
the British in the Southeast was to build successful colonies. Within this
political context, St. Augustine and its allies were the primary threat. The
legislative records are full of complaints against Spain's policy of providing
freedom for South Carolina slaves. Special desertion committees were formed
in the assembly to find solutions to the problem of runaway Africans.
Assembly men notified the London proprietors that the survival of the British
colonies required the destruction of St. Augustine. The desertion committee
sent a petition to the King of England requesting a declaration of war and
reminded them that the King of Spain's edict had been posted throughout
South Carolina, and that this violated the treaty between Spain and Britain.29
Britain wanted to see the plantation economy of South Carolina thrive.
Spain sought to undermine the growth of the colony. The Spanish policy drew
many slaves into Florida. In spite of the edict drawing slaves and stating the
policy of providing freedom, initially their position in St. Augustine was
ambiguous. In 1725 the Florida Governor, Benavides, informed the King of
Spain that because of the 1693 edict, Negroes and Apalachees were still
arriving.30 By 1738, a group of runaway Carolina slaves had to petition the
28 Ibid., 215-226.
29 J.H. Easterby ed, The Colonial Records of South Carolina. The Journal ofthe
Commons House ofAssembly 1736-39 (Columbia: The Historical Commission of South
Carolina, 1951), 590-96, 673-708.
30 Wright. Dispatches. 164.
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King for clarification of the 1693 edict because they had been either re-
enslaved upon arriving in St. Augustine or were made to serve indentures. In
1738, Governor Montiano informed the King that in violation of orders some
of the runaway slaves had been sold to local citizens of St. Augustine.
Montiano stated that he had received a 1733 order which clarified the order of
1693. In this new order the King said that under no conditions should any
money be paid to the British, nor should any more British slaves be re-
enslaved.31
One of the Carolina runaways who had petitioned the King of Spain
was Francisco Menendez, a Mandingo.32 Menendez was an ally of the
Yamasee Chief Jorge. Both had fought against South Carolina and had fled
together into Florida. Menendez had been re enslaved through trickery, but it
seems that his condition was more indentured than enslaved. He was the
leader of a Negro militia in St. Augustine. In his position Menendez had
helped defeat the British in a 1728 attack. It was Menendez who initiated the
petition of "The Runaway Negroes from English Plantations to the Crown." In
1738 Governor Montiano established the free Carolina Blacks on a site 2-3
miles north of St. Augustine, situated on Mose Creek. Mose was a presidio or
Fort which housed up to 200 people. Menendez was designated as the ruler of
Mose by the Governor.33
31 Ibid., 58-1-29, #84; 58-1-31, #59, #62, 164, 173-75.
32 The Mandingos were a key tribe ofthe Great Mali Empire, located in West Africa
from approximately 1100 AD to 1400 AD. They were at the forefront ofAfrican
continental resistance to European conquest, E. Jefferson Murphy, History ofAfrican
Civilization. (New York: Crowell, 1972) 114-122,266-62, 308-10.
33Ibid, 176; Landers, "African Presence...", 321-22; Landers, "Freetown...," 15-19.
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The new Edict of 1733 clarified the status of all British slaves arriving
in Florida. Though they fled slavery in South Carolina, their status in St.
Augustine was ambiguous. It seems that some had complete freedom while
others were indentured, or enslaved. However, even the most illustrious rebel,
Menendez, was perhaps enslaved, yet he could petition the King. It seems that
this special status was based on their military value. After being set up in
Mose, the rebels had some territorial integrity. Their survival was facilitated
by the Spanish, yet the Spanish prevailed against the British with the help of
the Mose rebels. Therefore, the freedom of those rebels was assured only
through military force.
In 1727, the Tribunal of the Indies informed Madrid that the British
considered the 1693 Edict an attraction to their slaves, and felt it was
designed to help Spain and hurt them, and that warfare was eminent.34 By
1739, in a letter to the King, Montiano first informed the King that Mose was
established because the Edicts of 1693 and 1733 said to favor them as
Catholics, but in the same letter Montiano said St. Augustine would soon fight
a war with Britain. He said the runaways were needed in the army and the
Fort would attract more of them. Also, he informed the King that twenty-
three more had just arrived.35
In 1740 the Spanish Government in St. Augustine received the heaviest
assault that would come from the British. In 1739 the South Carolina
legislature had received a declaration of War from the King of England. The
34 Wright, "Dispatches," 173-76.
35 Ibid, 176.
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legislature provided 2,000 Native troops, 2,200 White men, Negro laborers,
with enough White men to guard them, and seven warships. This force was
led by Georgia founder, Colonel James Oglethorpe.36 Oglethorpe declared,
"as his majesty had ordered... Spare no personal labor nor danger towards
freeing Carolina of a place from whence their Negroes were encouraged to
massacre their masters and were openly harbored after such attempts.37
Oglethorpe warned the Government of South Carolina that troops had
to move quickly and the fleet had to blockade St. Augustine so that Spanish
reinforcements could not come in from Havana. He completely surrounded St.
Augustine. When he arrived at Fort Mose (the British called it Moosa), it was
deserted. Nearly two hundred British troops were stationed here. Day and
night, from land and sea, the British cannons bombarded St. Augustine. The
only way to assault St. Augustine on the ground was through Fort Mose, and
likewise any Spanish defensive assault had to encounter Mose. At four a.m.,
15 June 1740, three hundred rebels and Natives captured Ft. Mose; eighty
British were killed and twenty-five were taken prisoner. Most of the British
casualties came in this encounter. Oglethorpe's scattered forces were afraid of
being picked off by the rebels. Within three weeks, the British forces
evacuated. According to a Spanish prisoner, the White Spanish forces stayed
within the St. Augustine fort during the war.38




Menendez and the militia kept track of the British forces as they began
their invasion of Florida, and he led the attack which devastated the British.
Governor Montiano asked the King to give Menendez a special commendation
for his leadership. Montiano depended on the Mose militia to a greater extent
than did any other Florida Governor. Oglethorpe would initiate several more
attacks upon St. Augustine but none were on the scale of the 1740 War.
Menendez exploited the Spanish-British rivalry to obtain concessions from
Montiano. The White Spanish military forces were few in Florida. The Mose
militia were used on land and sea campaigns against South Carolina and
Georgia. Montiano refused to launch Corsair naval raids without the Mose
forces. Due to British attacks in the 1740's, Mose was destroyed and the
militia was evacuated into St. Augustine. However, by 1752 Mose was rebuilt
and reoccupied.39
It seems that Spanish Florida was overwhelmingly dependent upon
auxiliary forces for its survival, and so, as the British Empire in North
America grew, Spanish authorities made certain that Mose was prepared. In a
letter from Don Alonso Fernandez to Father Don Julian de Arriaga, in 1756,
the following comments were made:
The village of Mose, close to this city, is habitated by the fugitive
Negroes from the English colonies who arrived here to be baptized
and were freed... and have organized a company with a Captain,
Lieutenant and Sargeant. The city works now as an advanced post.
The Negroes have their lands to cultivate and support themselves
without costing you any money. I sent an engineer out to plan and
construct defenses and canyons. I also assigned a Franciscan Frier
39Landers, "Freetown...," 18-25.
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to teach them religion. I asked the Viceroy of Mexico to give him
the same salary other missionaries make among Indians.40
These comments indicate the extent to which the rebels were vital to
Florida. Though the British had managed to destroy Mose, it was rebuilt and
fortified. More attacks were expected. Mose was the first line of defense. If
Mose fell, eventually St. Augustine could too. Mose's significance is further
underscored in a 1759 letter to the Governor of Florida from Madrid, "One of
your requests from August 20, 1758, was to assign financial aid to the
Negroes of Mose, for several reasons. The King wants you to assign whatever
you consider necessary to help them... make arrangements to distribute aid
between the Negroes of the Village of Mose."41
The position of the Spanish authorities towards the British runaways
by 1759 contrast sharply with the hesitance and ambiguity displayed between
the 1680's and the 1740 British invasion. Though Spain never dropped its
insistence on the use of the religious "excuse," at least by the 1750's the
records indicate that Mose was militarily essential as an advanced post.
Ironically, though the Spanish successfully defended Florida from military
conquest, by 1763 in the Treaty of Paris which ended the Seven Years War
and the French and Indian War, the British would be granted Florida.42
However, in the 1783 Treaty of Paris which ended the American Revolution,
'•"Wright, "Dispatches," 193.
41 Ibid., 195.
42 Bailey, The American Pageant. 59.
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the British came to terms with the United States and many other nations in a
world war. Spain then reoccupied Florida.43
During the British occupation, the Seminole population was no longer
centralized near St. Augustine. Their settlements were scattered from St.
Augustine to Pennsacola.
After the American Revolution, the return of Florida to the Spanish
meant the continuation of the King's Edicts of 1693 and 1733. John Jay as
Secretary of State for the Continental Congress, informed Thomas Jefferson of
the devastation the Seminoles had brought upon the State of Georgia.
Jefferson was told that the edicts must be repealed and that Spain should be
punished.44 Though the edicts were in fact repealed, the Spanish made no
efforts to return slaves as also promised.
As in the previous century, the Florida problem became so intense that
in 1811 President Madison called a secret session of both Houses of Congress.
After thirty-one votes were taken, a resolution was passed which authorized
President Madison to use military force to seize Florida.45 This venture was
known as the Patriot War because Madison attempted to plant patriotic
Americans in Florida and then overthrow the St. Augustine government.46 But
the same pattern of events occurred as in 1740. By 1811 Spain was even
43 Ibid.
44 John Jay, The Correspondence and Public Papers ofJohn Jav. vol. HI, 1782-1793,
ed. Henry P. Johnson, (New York: J.P. Putnam's Sons, 1891) 259, 357.
45 Joseph B. Smith. The Plot to Steal Florida (New York: Arbor House, 1983), 112-115.
46 Ibid., 188-89.
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weaker in Florida than in the 18th Century. As the United States laid siege to
St. Augustine, the Spaniards held fast in the fort. Florida's Governor Estrada
sent word to the various Seminole camps. The Seminoles launched guerrilla
attacks upon the U.S. forces and eventually forced them to retreat back into
Georgia. The settlements of the patriots were also driven out. Also, as was
the case in 1740, the Spaniards were able to keep Florida without leaving the
well-constructed fort of St. Augustine.47
According to Covington, former Georgia Governor Mathews
unsuccessfully sought the Seminoles1 help in seizing Florida.48 Though the
efforts initiated by Madison ended in 1813, the State of Georgia continued to
try unsuccessfully to seize Florida. In The Plot to Steal Florida. Joseph B.
Smith comments on the U.S. forces as they stopped at the ruins of old Fort
Mose, "They were taking possession of a place that was a symbol of what their
operation was finally to become—a racial conflict." Smith discusses the
historical destruction and rebuilding of Mose and its prominence as "the
northern bastion of the colony's outer defense ring."
Also, he says that Florida Governor Estrada attempted to reconstruct
Mose in 1811 when he learned of the U.S. plans to invade but the Americans
arrived too soon.49
The Patriots War demonstrated to the U.S. government that Spain was
essentially powerless in Florida. In spite of Spain's prevailing over U.S.
47Ibid., 244-269.
48 Covington, Seminoles. 28.
49 Smith. The Plot. 211-12.
96
forces, key American government officials were cognizant that the Seminole
were the military might behind the victory. The commander of U.S. forces
notified the Secretary of State, James Monroe, that the principle military
strength in Florida consisted of rebel slaves who bolstered the Spanish.30
United States military initiatives subsequent to the Patriots War
ignored the Spanish presence except to scorn its weakness. Indeed, members
of Congress and James Monroe as President observed that Spain's political
authority was confined to the city of St. Augustine. U.S. officials declared the
Seminole to be a sovereign force unto themselves and chastised Spanish
ineptness for the Seminole autonomy.51 In military activities subsequent to
the Patriots War the Spanish Governor Zuniga informed the American
commander Andrew Jackson that the runaways:
As rational beings, may be subjects of the king, my master, are deemed by
me insurgents or rebels against the authority, not only of his Catholic
Majesty, but also of the proprietors for whose service they have withdrawn
themselves.52
After more than 300 centuries of ascendancy in the Western
Hemisphere, the Spanish Empire was falling. With more important colonies in
revolt, Spain had no desire to challenge the ascending U.S. Just subsequent to





the Patriots War, U.S. forces led by General Jackson made a special effort to
capture or destroy Spain's African rebel allies in the First Seminole War.53
Jackson's campaign failed to capture rebel warriors, but a few non-
combatants were taken. As a consequence of the Spanish weakness and the
relative strength of the Seminole, President Monroe notified the Congress in a
State of the Union address that he was pressuring Spain to relinquish Florida;
partially as a quid pro quo for millions of dollars in slave property which had
found refuge there for decades.54
According to Monroe, Spain had not abided by the tenants of the 1795
Treaty of San Lorenzo, which required the return of runaways in Florida.
Spain would indemnify the U.S. government. The government would indemnify
the slave masters.55
The First Seminole War resulted in Spain finally leaving Florida. Spain
had perhaps been concerned that the British would seek to obtain Florida,
since Governor Ysassi of Jamaica voiced that opinion. Politically, Spain
sought to maintain the New World lands it had obtained in the 15th century.
53 Mathew St. Claire Clark and Walter Lowrie, eds, American State Papers. Class I.
vol. IV, (Washington DC: Gales and Seaton, 1832) 556.
54 Congress, House and Senate, President Monroe gives a State ofthe Union Address
to both Houses ofCongress, 15th Congress, 2nd Sess., vol. 3, Annals of Congress
(January 1820), 2037; Giddings, Exiles. (Columbus, OH: Follet, Foster and Company,
1858)38.
55 President Monroe, "State ofthe Union Address to Congress," Debates and
Proceedings in the Congress ofthe United States. 15th Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 3,
2037; David Hunter Miller, ed. Treaties and Other International Acts ofthe United States
of America, vol. 3. 1776-1818.fWashington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office 1931)
3-12,318-23.
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North America was included in this geographic claim. When Britain continued
its expansion in North America, the conflicting policy goals were addressed on
the battlefield.
Spain had obviously been undermanned in Jamaica. With that also
being the case in Florida, Spanish attempts to destabilize British settlements of
North America were heavily dependent upon the assistance of Apalachee
Natives. The British countered these Spanish offensives with its own Native
allies, the Creeks and to some degree the Yamasee. It seems that the British
had greater success with the use of Native allies. The British initiated a
Native slave trade which nearly exterminated the Apalachees. In responding
to the British, Spain may have reviewed its prior experiences with British
encroachment on its territory. In the cases of Panama and Jamaica, the British
were able to execute its policy goals by forming alliances with runaway
Spanish slaves. The Spanish Edict of 1693 not only urged British slaves to
escape to Florida, but also assured them as military allies. With these runaway
African slaves as the foundation of their Florida defense strategy, Spain's
ability to hold Florida was greatly enhanced. With this new defense strategy,
Spain was able to execute the policy of harassing British settlements. Perhaps
most important though was the enhanced defensive capability which the
Carolina runaways contributed to Florida.
The greatest symbol of Spain's dependence upon the rebels was Ft.
Mose. The proof of the utility of the Black troops to Spain's survival is the
defeat or stalemating of every British or American offensive against Florida
from 1714 to 1819. During this period the rebels displayed a tenacity toward
99
their enslavers, which won them some territorial integrity and some political
representation through Menendez.
Spain and the British sought to settle conflicting policies about
possession of North America. The rebels only sought freedom. If we view the
battlefield as a legislative arena, the rebels were major political players,
achieving their goals while hindering Britain and helping Spain. Their political
impact can be corroborated by the actions, policies, and responses of Spain's
political leaders, ranging from the king to the governors of Florida. The
formation of this Spanish-Rebel military alliance not only impacted Spain's
Colonial politics but also helped facilitate at least 130 years of MLR.
Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight will review some of the key military
and political events which were formed or responded to by Spain. However,
the following chapters will review these same events from the perspective of
British and United States political institutions.
In Chapter Six, some responses in the British Parliament, and within
the colonial governments of South Carolina and Georgia are revealed. These
responses provide a foundation for the analysis of British political reaction to
the rebels.
CHAPTER VI
BRITISH COLONIAL POLITICS AND THE FLORIDA REBELS, 1693-1763
When the British began settlement upon the North American Continent
in the 17th century, the African slave industry evolved into the economic
foundation of this colonization effort. This was overwhelmingly true in the
plantation economies of Maryland, Virginia and the Carolinas. The Southern
Carolinians initially thrived on an Indian slave industry, though African slavery
existed simultaneously. However, in general, the colonists were most
dependent upon the Africans.
The London proprietors who held the founding charter of the Carolina
colony wanted the colonists to be financially self reliant as soon as possible.
They needed to expand acreage, plant, clear, and settle. African slaves
facilitated settlement. However, as slaves ran to Florida and became allies of
the Spanish, the British colonization effort in Carolina was jeopardized .
Between 1693 and 1763 the Blacks, Natives, and Spanish kept the colonies of
the Southeast on the defensive. This was the basis of the political relationship
between the British and rebels. The political activities and policies of officials
often were directly or indirectly in reaction to the rebel presence. The British
response to the rebels first was diplomatic, and after the failure of diplomacy,
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a military solution was attempted. Within the framework of this two-step
process, various political activities occurred which demonstrate the
relationship between the British and the rebels. Ultimately, the rebels would
help the Spanish achieve its goal of slowing down and even reversing the
development and expansion of the British colonial effort in the Southeast.
By 1662, King Charles II had granted a charter to eight proprietors to
establish the colony of Carolina. These men were politicians who sought to
profit by overseas investments. By 166S Charles II extended the boundaries of
the Carolina colony all the way to St. Augustine. Up to this time Spain had
not officially acknowledged the presence of the British in North America on
land which they claimed. But shortly after this extension, the Spaniards
accepted the presence of Britain as far south as what would become
Charleston.1 All proprietors had invested much of their own money in
Carolina. To insure returns on their investments and the overall safety and
prosperity of the colony, they needed peaceful relations with the Natives and
Spain. However, instead of leaving the British to peacefully develop Carolina,
Spain launched attacks upon their settlements. From St. Augustine they
enlisted the help of their Native allies, the Apalachees.
1 Alexander Hewatt, History of South Carolina and Georgia, vol. I (London:
Alexander Donaldson, 1779), 42-45; Weir, Colonial South Carolina. 47-50.
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The charter granted the proprietors extensive control over the colony.
They controlled all royalties and privileges. They made laws and wrote its
constitution with the advice of colonial freemen, under conditions which they
set. Also, they appointed a governor and determined the manner in which the
legislative body and all administrators were selected.2 Ultimately, the
proprietors and colonial politicians were forced to react to the Spanish attacks
and the resulting impact upon Carolina's development. By 1670, Governor
Sayles had notified the proprietors that the Carolina militia and its Creek allies
were battling the Spanish and their Apalachee allies.3 It is difficult to say with
certainty, but either the proprietors or the colonial politicians initiated a policy
of enslaving the Native allies of the Spanish in Florida. This move resulted in
a prosperous "Indian slave trade." Also, the Creeks supplied the British with
thousands of deer skins. The Carolina colonists involved in the Indian slave
trade were the first to prosper. This Indian trade had the dual benefits of
generating profits and eliminating the chief ally of the Spanish. These Indian
slaves were generally sold out of Carolina to the West Indies.4
2 Ibid., 42-43.
3 Salley, Narratives. 122.
4 Salley, Narratives. 134; Corkran, Creek Frontier. 49-53; Daniel F. Littlefield, Jr.,
Africans and Creeks (Westport. CT: Greenwood Press, 1979) 5-6; Sirmans, Colonial
South Carolina. 23-25.
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In 1674, Dr. Henry Woodward wrote to a proprietor, the Earl of
Shaftesbury, regarding the initiation of Native slavery: "Very well satisfied,
dispatched them homewards that evening, whom I again expect in March with
deerskins, furs and younge slaves."3
On another occasion in 1680, the proprietors instructed the governor
and council of Carolina to set up a board for handling "disputes between
colonist and Indians and stated that no friendly Indians were to be enslaved or
sold out of the colony.6 These comments indicate the possibility that the
proprietors may have approved of the trade. They were notified of its
beginning and later they distinguished between Natives that were to be, and
those that were not to be enslaved.
On other occasions however, the comments of the proprietors seem to
place the blame for the dualistic Indian trade upon the colonial politicians. In
a letter to the Carolina Governor, the proprietors wrote in 1684:
Some evil men have of late made a trade of enslaving and sending away
the poor Indians, for which purpose unjust wars have been made on
them.... We did not mean . . . the parliament should license the
transporting of Indians bought of other Indians . . . for it is only an
encouragement to keep those poor people at war with each other.7
5 Salley, Narratives. 134.
6Fortescue, ed., Calendar, vol. 10, 524-526.
7Ibid.,vol. 11,645.
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This comment from the proprietors indicates that somehow the trade
was initiated, regulated, and controlled by the colonists. At any rate, this
trade was an integral part of the economy and it seemed to be in the interest of
Carolina's defense strategy. Carolina political leaders prospered and competed
for control of the lucrative trade. In the process some were removed from
power by the proprietors specifically for engaging in the trade.8 Vigorous
pursuit of the trade according to John Oldmixon was the sole reason for
Governor Moore to enter politics. Oldmixon says Moore rigged legislative
elections, even allowing Mulattos, and Negroes to vote. In 1702, Moore
finally launched a slave-catching expedition against St. Augustine in the guise
of an offensive war.9
The efforts of the Carolina politicians nearly resulted in the
extermination of the Apalachees.10 This was a setback for Spain. Whether the
trade was sanctioned by the proprietors or not, this two track policy in effect
worked in the interest of Britain, extending prosperity and growth and
eliminating an ally of its enemy.
From another perspective though, the policy contributed to future
instability in Carolina. Apalachees who were fortunate enough to escape from
8 Salley, Narratives. 328.
9Ibid., 334-40.
10 Covington, The Seminoles. 3-4.
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the British perhaps naturally went back to Florida. Before 1700, Carolina had
an African slave population at least four times as great as the White
population. It seems that African and Indian slaves fled slavery together, and
went to Florida." Carolinian Edward Randolph notified parliament that in
1686 a Spanish invasion force included Natives and Blacks. They had carried
away thirteen slaves and refused to return them.12 In response, by 1689 the
proprietors notified Governor Seth Sothell, "y°u must take care to prevent
servants and Negroes from running away to the Spanish at St. Augustine."13
The zealous exploitation of the Indian slave trade both neutralized and
placed oppressed Apalachee slaves in the Carolina colony. Oppressed Indians
and Blacks were naturally opposed to serving as the foundation of the British
colonial development strategy. They were natural allies as oppressed people.
Their presence in Carolina as slaves was indeed initially positive for colonial
expansion. However, the Appalachees had been significant in the Spanish
effort to destabilize the British Southeast Colonial effort. Consequently,
perhaps they were also at the core of the British economic, political, and
military, initiatives in the region. The African slave industry in Carolina, if
not equally important initially, certainly provided the balance of the colonies'
11 Weir, Colonial South Carolina. 31.
12Fortescue, Calendar, vol. 17,104-107.
13 Ibid, vol. 13,187.
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economic foundation. When Apalachees fled slavery and returned to Florida,
they were accompanied by Africans. Therefore, the loss of valuable property
and labor was doubled.14
The Spanish edict of 1693 would drastically destabilize African slavery
in the Southeast. However, the Yamasee War, 1714-16, would for all
practical purposes destroy the "Indian trade."13
The Yamasee War was perhaps the most critical event in the history of
colonial Southern Carolina. It inaugurated a period of formal reaction to the
African, Native and Spanish assaults upon the colony. Prior to 1714, nothing
quite so alarming and destabilizing to the colony had occurred. Until the war
the British seemed to be more on the offensive than the defensive. Colonial
development and expansion had never really been so threatened. This new
challenge came directly as a result of the growing factor of Native and African
runaways rebelling against their role in the British economy.
In 1715 Lt. Governor Spotswood of South Carolina wrote the Virginia
colonial legislature seeking military assistance and telling them that South
Carolina faced the greatest army of Natives assembled since the English had
arrived. He said they were encouraged by Spain. A very dismal set of
"Landers, "African Presence...." 321; Wright, "Dispatches..." 144-93, 164.
"Landers, "AfricanPresence," 321; Landers, "AFreetown," 15; Fortescue, Calendar.
29, 227, 299-300.
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circumstances was projected. Spotswood questioned whether South Carolina
would survive, because he said 1,500 White men were talking of leaving. The
Carolina proprietors sought money and weapons from the Parliament, and
asked for help from all other colonies. Parliament wanted to know how the
proprietors would pay back the money, if they'd surrender their charter to the
King, and whether or not they'd be self-supporting in the future. The
proprietors responded that this was the first time in fifty years that support
was requested from the King.16
Though Lt. Governor Spotswood spoke in the heat of war, modern
reflection reveals that the colony was truly in a crisis. Never before had there
been such cause for alarm. Besides the questioning of their charter, perhaps
the most telling comments are the proprietors' revelation that they had never
had to get money from the King before. Also, placing requests with other
colonies reveals the state of desperation which the political leaders of Carolina
felt themselves to be in. Clearly these comments by Spotswood demonstrate
that the colony's development was severely at risk..
After the Yamasee War, the Carolina proprietors and colonial
politicians were able to make a good general assessment of how they were
affected. By this time they had gained some perspective on the 1693 edict,
and its overall impact on colonial development. In 1716, Joseph Boone and
l6Fortescue, Calendar, vol. 28,226-232.
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Richard Beresford, agents for the Carolina House of Commons, wrote to
Parliament. They first pointed out that the Governor of Virginia had done too
little to assist Carolina and that they would remember him in his time of need.
Also, they said, unless London sent help, the colony would have to be
abandoned; in addition, it was pointed out that the Spanish believed they
would soon capture Carolina. Boone and Beresford also said that because of
the nearness of hostile forces, the abandoned plantations could not be
resettled.17
Parallel to their political reaction to the war in general, the Carolinians
complained about their great loss of Africans to the Spanish. Major James
Cochran was sent to St. Augustine to negotiate for the return of slaves. The
Carolina assembly reported that the Spanish had a policy of granting freedom
to all English slaves who arrived and revealed numerous affidavits from
individuals who observed the Spaniards arming and sheltering the Carolina
runaways. Boone told the proprietors that the Spanish Governor said he
couldn't release British slaves who become Catholic without the King's order.
Carolina Governor Johnson reported to Parliament of an unsuccessful attack
upon St. Augustine in 1719 for the purpose of recovering slaves. In 1716 the
"ibid, 29,215-21.
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Carolina Committee of Assembly expressed the belief that the Spanish were
repaying the British for what they did to their "Indian allies."18
For the next decade after the Yamasee War, the British struggled to
defend themselves from the constant attacks by the combined Florida forces.
What had once been a thriving two-tract policy for British colonial
development was now indirectly on the verge of setting back Carolinian
development 50 years. The Native slave trade came to a virtual standstill in
the years after the Yamasee War, and the African slave industry grew at a
fantastic rate. According to one estimate, within fifteen years after the end of
the Yamasee War, South Carolina had only 2,500 White men capable of
bearing arms and an ever increasing slave population of over 40,000.19
Carolina's two-tract development cycle yielded profits, development, and
struck a blow at Spain, but a corollary of that cycle was rebellion. The King
of Spain quickly moved to utilize the runaway British slaves. Perhaps filling
military slots vacated by their almost extinct Apalachee allies. All this to the
utter horror of Carolina proprietors and colonial politicians.
"Ibid, 30, 207; Ibid, 28, 218.
19Littlefield, Africans and Creeks. 9; James E. Oglethorpe, Some Account ofthe
Design ofthe Trustees for Establishing Colonies in America, unpublished manuscript
1732. (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1990) 14-22.
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By 1728, the Carolina colony had split into North and South Carolina.
South Carolina Assembly President Middleton wrote to the British Foreign
Minister, the Duke of Newcastle:
I am sorry we are obliged so often to represent to the government the
difficulty we labor under, from the new situation of St. Augustine to this
place who, without any regard to peace or war, do continually annoy our
southern frontiers... We formerly complained of their receiving and
harboring all our runaway Negroes, but since then, they have found out a
new way of sending our own slaves against us, to rob and plunder us...
We are not only at a vast expense in guarding our Southern frontiers but
the inhabitants are continually alarmed, and have no leisure to look after
their crops. The Indians they send against us are sent out in small parties
headed by two, three or more Spaniards and sometimes joined with
Negroes, and all mischief they do is on a sudden, and by surprise, and the
moment they have done it, they retire again to St. Augustine... so that
our plantations, being all scattering, before any men can be got together,
the robbers are fled, this trade they have followed for twenty years...20
In addition to attacks on land, the Spanish government of Florida,
equipped a fleet of small ships manned by Spaniards, Blacks, and Natives.
This naval force known as the Coast Guardes launched destructive raids upon
British coastal settlement in Carolina and later Georgia. The governor insisted
that the ships could not be launched without the participation of the Black
rebels.21 South Carolina officials clearly believed their survival was at stake.
If their goals were to limit the development of British colonization in the
South East, then it seems that the years following the Yamasee War was
20Fortescue, Calendar. 36, 131.
21 Ibid., 133; Easterby, Colonial Records. 291; Landers, "Free Town," 22.
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successful for Spain. Middleton's letter indicates that the 1693 edict
facilitated the flow of runaways into Florida, with the reciprocal result of
swelling the Spanish forces. This resulted in vast military expenses for a now
struggling colony. Not only did this halt the frontiers of settlement, but it
seemed to have caused retraction. Also, even on land which the settlers
continued to inhabit, their production was crippled by the threats of attacks
from St. Augustine. According to Middleton, this had been the case since
before the Yamasee War.
The proprietors and colonial administrators were put in a defensive or
reactive posture. To the extent that their development strategy depended
upon slavery, it was failing. There was talk of abandoning the colony.
Diplomatic overtures to St. Augustine were unsuccessful. Therefore, it seems
that expansion of the colony was no longer an issue, only its very survival.
Also, to the degree that runaway Africans now bolstered Spain's military
power, it seems that South Carolina now targeted those slaves in a manner
similar to its former concentration on the Apalachees. The South Carolina
government signed treaties with the Creeks and Cherokee Indians. In the
treaties, they were paid a bounty for live runaways or a lesser amount for each
scalp.
However, the primary reaction of South Carolina to St. Augustine was
to intensify its own military effort. A major British military assault came in
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1728. Colonel Palmer attacked St. Augustine by land, and Captain Mounjoy
by sea, but this invasion by South Carolina was not successful. Furthermore,
Palmer's lack of success was assured by the strong effort of a Black militia
which was led by South Carolina runaways. The Carolina Assembly blamed
Palmer's failure on a lack of support form London. In communications with
the proprietors, they said that Palmer did not have proper orders for attacking
St. Augustine Fort.22
In the wake of Palmer's unsuccessful raid, an air of frustration could be
detected in communication between London and Charleston. As plans were
being made to launch some strikes upon Spanish colonies in the West Indies,
the Carolinas were seen as not being available:
We must not hope for much assistance from either of the Carolinas; I
believe the Spaniards will probably find them business enough at home; a
proclamation lately published at St. Augustine has drawn many of their
Negroes from them, in hopes of being enfranchised; and the rest are ripe
for rebellion; so that it is really now come to pass that either the people of
Carolina must take St. Augustine or St. Augustine will take them.23
The efforts of the Carolinians to utilize the military for the
achievement of political policy had not been successful. London officials
seemed to have contemplated making some military strikes against the
Spanish. However, these plans apparently did not include an invasion of
^Easterby, Colonial Records. 291; Fortescue, Calendar, vol. 36, 134; Landers,
"Freetown," 15.
23 Fortescue, Calendar, vol. 36, 291.
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Florida commensurate to the goals of the South Carolinians. Being unable to
dislodge the Spaniards, retrieve runaway slaves, or curtail the guerrilla strikes
by force or diplomacy prompted both Charleston and London to take other
action.
As early as 1716, Carolina Assembly agents Boone and Beresford
notified Parliament that one way to encourage strength and development was
to allow settlement on the Yamasee lands, between Florida and Carolina.
However, in the same letter they added, "But we cannot expect that any
person will come to settle there 'till the Yamasees be removed from
Augustine..." By 1716 the Assembly did pass an act encouraging settlement
upon Yamasee lands for defensive purposes. However, by 1718, the
proprietors repealed this Assembly act.24 It is probable that the proprietors
believed that in the wake of the war, confiscation and settlement of Yamasee
lands could reignite intensive warfare.
It seems that between 1718-28, consistent depredations by St.
Augustine and the failure of Colonel Palmer's invasion helped to convince
London that a change of policy was needed. Within two years of Palmer's
invasion, James Oglethorpe proposed to establish a new colony which would
incorporate the Yamasee lands. He suggested that Georgia be established as a
24Ibid. vol. 29, 220; ibid. vol. 30, 322..
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fortification between Florida and South Carolina, under the command of the
South Carolina governor.25
James Oglethorpe was one of several trustees who were granted a
charter for the establishments of the colony of Georgia, in 1732. In Some
Account of the Design of the Trustees for Establishing Colonies in America.
Oglethorpe explained the purpose of the new colony. He said that before the
Yamasee War, English settlers lived dispersed among Natives as if it was a
conquered nation, but after the war all settlements were moved north of the
Edisto River. The region south of Edisto and Port Royal, Oglethorpe wrote,
would be the Georgias.26
As Oglethorpe took measure of the prevailing political-military
predicament between Britain and Spain in the south east, he suggested the
following:
The District intended for a new colony whilst it lies uninhabited will
facilitate the Invasions of the Indians upon South Carolina. But a number
of towns established along the Rivers Savannah and Alatamaha would
prevent any future massacre and make a stronger barrier to the present
settlements and keep the Negro Slaves of South Carolina in awe who are
now so numerous as to be dreadful even to their masters.27
25
Ibid, vol. 37, 358, 385.




Also, the Georgia Charter forbade slavery or even the presence of
Blacks. The proprietors reasoned that any Blacks spotted could be
apprehended as runaways from South Carolina, or soldiers of St. Augustine.
Perceivably, the battlefield success of the Florida allies in the decade since
Boone and Beresford suggested the settlement of Yamasee lands helped
convince the London political leaders that this strategy was worth trying.
Oglethorpe had been elected to the House of Commons at age twenty-six in
1722. Because some of the South Carolina trustees were also members of the
House of Commons, he was well aware of their defense needs. But it seems
that Oglethorpe's desire to shield South Carolina was secondary. In 1728, a
friend of his who was an architect, was sent to debtors' prison where he died
of smallpox. Oglethorpe responded by conducting a Parliamentary
investigation into unhealthful conditions in debtors' prisons. His investigation
led to the release of over 10,000 debtors from the prisons. By 1730 he and
other London humanitarians petitioned the King for a charter to set up a
charity colony. In 1732, the charter was granted. All trustees for Georgia
were forbidden from owning land in the colony or profiting from office.28
Oglethorpe arrived in Charleston in 1733. Though aware of his
mission to fortify the South Carolina frontier, it seems that he was most
28 Kenneth Coleman, Colonial Georgia (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976) 13-
17; Merrill Jensen, ed., English Historical Documents to 1776 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1962) 493-94.
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concerned about his philanthropic effort. However, from the beginning,
Governor Johnson of South Carolina made certain that the colonists realized
their place in the military strategy of the region. Other than Oglethorpe, he
forbade any colonist from disembarking in Charleston, for fear of them not
wanting to go on to the challenges of Georgia.29
Even as the Georgia colony was being established there was no relief
for South Carolina. In the mid-1730's, the South Carolina assembly stated
that slave desertions were directly caused by the Spanish policy of granting
freedom to all South Carolina slaves. One South Carolina slave holder,
Captain Caleb Davis, wrote to the Assembly saying that nineteen of his slaves,
and fifty belonging to other Port Royal planters had run off to St. Augustine.
Davis went to St. Augustine and demanded that the Governor return the
slaves. But the Governor informed him that he was commanded by the King to
free the English slaves. Davis recommended that London send a high official
to negotiate with Spain. A joint committee was set up to deal with
desertions.30
The committee decided the Spanish encouragement of slave deserters
and their incorporation into the guerrilla militia of St. Augustine would have
29 Ibid., 24.
30Easterby, Colonial Records of South Carolina. 1736-39. 590-597, 673.
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"fatal consequences to the safety and welfare of the province."31 The
committee's continued offer of rewards to Creeks for the capture of slaves
proved ineffective. The Assembly notified London that South Carolina would
not survive unless the King acted to negotiate Spain's violations of existing
treaties or provide military assistance. Additionally, the Spanish Edict of 1693
had been distributed throughout South Carolina. It was determined by the
House of Commons in 1739 that no efforts attempted against St. Augustine
had been successful.32
A considerable quantity of correspondence between the South Carolina
government and Parliament dealt with St. Augustine; and as well, much of the
South Carolina Colonial Records of the time were concerned with the same
problem. The colonial political leaders believed that only military force could
prevent the Spaniards from destroying their colony. The founding of Georgia
was indeed a calculated military gesture, but even this was proving to have no
effect on the prevention of runaways and Spanish aggression.
James Oglethorpe maintained his seat in Parliament until 1743, even
though he was in Georgia. During this time as a member of the House of




progress of the colony. The Earl of Egmont (the first president of the Georgia
Board of Trustees), received the following correspondence from Oglethorpe:
On the 10th November, 1738, Colonel Oglethorpe wrote me the
disagreeable situation he was in, a great number of debts, empty magazine,
no money to supply them, numbers of people to be fed, mutinous soldiers
to command, a Spanish claim, and a large body of their troops not far from
him. That debt could not be avoided, since no one could dare dismiss the
militia, or reduce the garrisons 'till the King's troops arrived to relieve
them: and this had forced an expense of 20,000 pounds in a year, when
only 8000 pounds was granted... there must be a vigorous application to
Parliament to pay those debts...33
Even though Georgia was chartered in part as a defensive barrier
between Florida and South Carolina, it seems that the proprietors
underestimated just how extensive the military expenditures would be. By
1738, the colony's expenses were almost 300 percent higher than had been
projected. Because Georgia was chartered on an almost non-profit basis, the
Parliament was more directly involved in its fate, and its role in the struggle
with Spanish Florida.
Many of the Georgia colonists consistently complained to London
because slavery was prohibited. As a result of these complaints, there were
numerous efforts to remind the proprietors of the critical role slavery would
have in Georgia. In 1739 Robert Williams wrote the Earl of Egmont about a
request for slaves. He said, it would "ruin the colony, it being impossible to
33 The Earl ofEgmont, "The Journal ofthe Earl ofEgmont," in The Colonial Records
of Georgia vol. V (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1970), 74.
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prevent Negroes deserting to the Spaniards our near neighbors, who give
freedom, land, and protection to all runaway Negroes."34 The issues of
defense and the request for slaves seem to have been the dominant issues of
correspondence between Georgia and London. Georgia proprietors not only
had to develop a strategy for coping with St. Augustine, but also they had to
battle fellow members of Parliament, essentially because of the high defense
expenditures. One leading member of Parliament, Sir Robert Walpole,
questioned Georgia's annual budget over runs because he assumed the current
treaty between Spain and England would be sufficient to keep the peace. Bills
for defense expenditure, boats, and other essentials regularly arrived in
London from Georgia. One Parliamentarian, Mr. Tower, a trustee, believed
there would be peace with Spain if the Georgia-Florida border were moved
north, because he said there was no legitimate English title to the colony. In
response to Tower, the Earl of Egmont said that perhaps Parliament would
vote for additional aid if the proprietors could forge a title.35
In 1738 and 1739 the lifeline between Georgia and London consisted of
defense expenditures. A scandal occurred in 1739 when the Georgia records
keeper, Mr. Causton, was accused of improper expenditures, but he blamed all




Oglethorpe and requested more. Copies were made for each trustee in
London, for the purpose of lobbying Parliament to approve of additional
expenditures for Georgia. Sir Robert Walpole was seen as an enemy of the
colony. He believed that England did not have a legal title and that in the
current round of treaty negotiations it was likely that Spain could present a
legitimate title. Many in Parliament believed it was futile to spend so much to
back a lost cause. However, the trustees promised to vote against the interest
of those members who abandoned Georgia. The Earl of Egmont lobbied both
Houses of Parliament, winning the influential support of Lord Baltimore and
the Earl of Chesterfield. Finally, Walpole announced that he had secured the
King's consent for money and fortifications for Georgia, while Lord Bathhurst
declared the King would rather part with the Indies than Georgia. In
response, Georgia trustee, Mr. Tracey, announced that he was informed by the
Spanish minister to England, Giraldini, that the King of Spain would rather
part with Madrid than Georgia, and also that they would fight England for
twenty years before letting go of Georgia.36
In general, the Georgia trustees and colonial politicians were fighting
against Spanish interest and the interest of macro-rebellion. Their colony was
conceived as a defensive barrier to those allied interests. However, the




quest to confront the external enemy in Florida, therefore, required
confrontations with internal foes in Parliament to secure defense expenditures.
Political diplomacy was conducted between London and Madrid as well as
Charleston, Savannah, and St. Augustine. Diplomacy had its limits. Both
Spain and Britain finally decided that war would be the political determinant in
their colonial competition. The conflict had reached the highest levels of
government. The Spanish were prepared to fight for twenty years, and the
King of England ordered defensive preparations for Georgia.
In 1739 a diplomatic mission from St. Augustine made several stops in
both Georgia and South Carolina. However, colonial officials of these
colonies decided St. Augustine was using this cover of diplomacy to shield its
true mission. Oglethorpe arrested them, and charged the party with spreading
news of a new 1733 Spanish edict of freedom, and with inciting slaves to run
to Florida and rebel. The Stono Rebellion of 1739 was blamed on this group.
This rebellion occurred in South Carolina. Dozens of Whites and Blacks were
killed in it. The new edict and the rebellion which it incited were considered
to be unpardonable crimes and prompted the colonists of Georgia and South
Carolina to seek a declaration of war from the King.37
Oglethorpe informed the Earl of Egmont that he had received the
King's command to attack St. Augustine, and that he would need additional
"ibid., 164-67; Easterby, Colonial Records. Southern Carolina 1741-42 83.
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expenditures to pay for the allegiance of 1,200 Creek and Cherokee Indians.
Also, he said that he had to strike first before reinforcements arrived from
Havana because Georgia and South Carolina had more troops than St.
Augustine. He reminded Egmont, "it is impossible to keep the province of
Carolina without destroying Augustine, or keeping rangers and scout boats to
restrain their nimble parties."38
Oglethorpe went before the South Carolina Legislature as the
commander of what became known as the "War of Jenkins1 Ear." This war got
its name from an incident in which Robert Jenkins, an English pirate, had his
ship seized and his ear severed by a Spanish captain in the West Indies. In
1739 Jenkins held his ear up in Parliament to help spur on a vote for war with
Spain.39
In an address to the legislature, Oglethorpe reminded the South
Carolina Assembly of the King's orders to destroy St. Augustine. He said it
was the source of refuge for murderous bands of runaway slaves who, with
Spanish and Indian allies, plunder British Southeast colonies.40
38 Earl ofEgmont, "Journal," 231, 256; Easterby, Colonial Records of South Carolina.
83-85.
39 Herbert E. Bolton and Mary Ross, The Debatable Land (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1925)77-80.
40
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Most of the military supplies and expenditures were supplied by the
South Carolina legislature. However, support for the campaign arrived from
as far away as Rhode Island. Oglethorpe marched to St. Augustine with 2,000
Indians, 2,200 White troops, and Negro laborers with additional Whites to
guard them. The expedition cost 120,000 pounds but South Carolina
determined they could save 10,000 pounds annually in defense if the mission
succeeded. Men and ships arrived from England to complete a seven-ship
blockade of St. Augustine.41
St. Augustine was a large fort with thick walls and a moat. According
to Captain Mark Carr it was the only place of strength in Florida. He said it
had fifty cannons and could house all the inhabitants of Florida. Carr noted
that within one league of the fort was a village of 200 armed Negroes and nine
villages of Indians with S00 armed men.42 Oglethorpe was unable to bombard
St. Augustine into submission. The only route to a land invasion was through
Fort Mose. Mose was constructed and inhabited by escaped Carolina slaves
for the specific purpose of shielding St. Augustine from invasions.
When Oglethorpe arrived at Mose he found it deserted. He ordered
Colonel Dussen and Captain Palmer to occupy Mose while he proceeded to lay
siege to St. Augustine. On June IS, at four a.m., Palmer and Dussen were hit
41 Ibid., 87-92; Egmont, "Journal," 229.
42Ibid., 293.
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with a surprise attack by 300 Blacks and Indians. Eighty British soldiers were
killed in the attack and twenty-five were taken prisoner: Almost half of the
British troops in the Fort Mose attack survived by running into the
surrounding forest and swamps, but Colonel Dussen was mortally wounded.
The Blacks and Indians reoccupied Mose until 30 June, then again vanished
into the forest.
After the losses, Oglethorpe had his troops dispersed, but did not
attempt a frontal assault upon St. Augustine. British forces all feared that the
Black and Indian forces would surprise them with guerrilla attacks one by one.
The British naval blockade had to be lifted because bad weather was setting in.
Therefore, the bombardment of St. Augustine by land and sea proved to be not
enough to induce a Spanish capitulation, and with the Black and Indian
guerrillas at their backs, Oglethorpe evacuated his forces on 5 July.43
Other than the casualties at Fort Mose, the British forces sustained few
deaths, but the losses at Mose demoralized them. Some of the Mose corpses
were decapitated, and others were mutilated. The South Carolina Assembly
appointed a special committee to investigate the result of the campaign. Their
published account, "Report of the Committee appointed to Inquire into the
Causes of the Disappointment of Success in the Late Expedition Against St.
43Easterby, Colonial Records of South Carolina. 100-136; Smith, Plot to Steal Florida.
211.
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Augustine," revealed that the British were defeated by numerically inferior
forces. It was determined that White Spanish forces never left the St.
Augustine fort and that only Blacks and Indians had attacked the British on
the ground. Oglethorpe reported that British forces at Fort Mose were lost
only because they disobeyed his orders.44
Frequently, the official correspondence between Charleston, Savannah
and London expressed the belief that British Colonial expansion and
stabilization in South Carolina and Georgia demanded the conquest of St.
Augustine. The British government amassed one of the largest European
armies ever seen in North America up to that time. The military conflict with
St. Augustine forced the proprietors and colonists to respond militarily, and
not only increased defense expenditures but also sparked intra-Parliamentary
confrontations over Georgia's survival.
Oglethorpe's campaign in Florida perhaps cannot be called a defeat
because other than the major battle at Fort Mose, there were very few real
battles. The Spanish did not leave St. Augustine, and after the Fort Mose
attack, the Blacks and Indians primarily remained out of sight. But it is
Oglethorpe's lack of success which seems to be most important politically.
The proprietors and colonial politicians were still faced with a powerful, even
44
Ibid., 115, 116, 120, 147, 157, 194.
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rejuvenated foe in St. Augustine, now ready for revenge. Also, Georgia's
Parliamentary foes had to be confronted.
Prior to Oglethorpe's defeat, the Earl of Egmont believed the War of
Jenkins Ear provided a good opportunity to gain full Parliamentary
endorsement of Georgia. He felt that a British victory would eclipse the
Spanish claims and certainly secure additional funding, but defeat brought the
intensification of Spanish attacks and continued destablization of South
Carolina and Georgia. In 1741, Parliament reported that a Spanish force of
over 2,300 troops, including at least 800 Black and Indian troops, were poised
to invade South Carolina and Georgia.43
By 1742, a British prisoner, Alexander Perris, who had been held in St.
Augustine since the War of Jenkins Ear, gave a deposition to the South
Carolina assembly. Mr. Perris reported that a Spanish force which included
500 Blacks, had just invaded South Carolina and Georgia. In "A Free Town in
Spanish Colonial Florida," Jane Landers writes that in the decade following
the War of Jenkins Ear, St. Augustine sent militias of separate and combined
groups of Blacks and Indians into British territory. The Black militia of Fort
Mose was led by a South Carolina runaway, Captain Francisco Menendez.
The Blacks were sent into Georgia and South Carolina to arm slaves and
prepare them for a Spanish counter attack following the War of Jenkins' Ear.
4S Egmont, "Journal," 280, 553.
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Also, the Spanish launched numerous Corsair ships against the British coastal
settlements in the 1740's.*5
Though unsuccessful in 1740, Oglethorpe eventually managed to
defend Georgia and perhaps fight the Spaniards to a draw. In 1741
Oglethorpe complained to the Earl of Egmont that the Spanish Corsairs
"swarmed the Georgia coast," and he notified Sir Robert Walpole of what his
plans were for a second invasion of Florida. In 1742 Oglethorpe led a second
invasion of St. Augustine which had only limited success but he managed to
inflict extensive damage on the Spanish forces after retreating into Georgia
and staging several defensive battles. The Earl of Egmont reported that a
1742 Spanish force of 3,000 men was led by the Governor of St. Augustine.
In this attack Oglethorpe defended Georgia on land and sea. As a result of his
defensive maneuvers, Oglethorpe was promoted to the rank of General in
1743.47
The 1740's was a decade of intensive warfare between the British and
Spanish in the Southeast. Both sides launched raids and counter raids upon
each other. The Spanish were not able to push the British from Georgia, and
the British could not conquer St. Augustine. It seems that the South Carolina
political leaders began to give fewer accounts of Spanish penetration of their
46 Ibid., 553; Colonial Records of South Carolina. 235; Landers, "A Free Town...," 21-25.
47Egmont, "Journal," 525, 553, 611, 631.
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territory; and to the extent that this is accurate, perhaps the strategy of
making Georgia a barrier was starting to succeed. However, decreased
penetration of South Carolina did not seem to limit criticism of the Georgia
colony in Parliament, nor did Oglethorpe's apparent defensive success
facilitate expansion or development of the colony. Oglethorpe's lack of
success in the War of Jenkins Ear seemed to bring a new source of conflict,
this time in America.
As Oglethorpe retreated in 1740, the Earl of Egmont reported:
The Council and Assembly of South Carolina signed a petition and
representation to His Majesty expressing their miserable condition, their
apprehensions of the Spaniards, upon the ill success of ye siege of
Augustine which they impute to Colonel Oglethorpe's bad conduct, their
danger from their own Negroes, and that their expectations and hopes
arising at first from the settlement of Georgia were now vanished and
gone.48
The South Carolina Assembly investigation reported that after the
attack upon the British at Fort Mose, their Creek allies accused Oglethorpe of
being afraid of the Spanish.49 Lt. Colonel Cockran reported after the war, "in
Carolina they cannot hear the name of Colonel Oglethorpe, but they fall into
such a rage as sets the very dogs a barking."50 The Carolinians' deaths at the
hands of the Blacks and Indians in particular probably contributed heavily to
48 Ibid., 394.
49Easterby, Colonial Records of South Carolina 1741-42. 119.
50 Egmont, "Journal," 499.
129
the South Carolina Assembly's embitterment over the outcome in St.
Augustine. Numerous survivors of the 1740 campaign criticized Oglethorpe's
leadership. The South Carolina Assembly even sent pamphlets to both houses
of Parliament critical of Oglethorpe but Governor Glen of South Carolina
managed to block their distribution. He feared it would discourage
expenditures for a second expedition. Several members of Parliament
requested that Governor Glen lead the next expedition. The enmity of the
South Carolina Assembly towards Oglethorpe was not limited to words.
Oglethorpe reported to the Earl of Egmont and British foreign minister, the
Duke Newcastle in 1742 and 1743 respectively, that during major invasions
from Florida, the South Carolina Assembly refused to lend any assistance.51
The conflict with South Carolina seemed to have been only a limited
corollary of the British confrontation with Spain and its allies. Nevertheless,
it resulted from the consistent military instability in the region. The inability
of Oglethorpe and other proprietors to resolve their development problems
through war continued to provide their enemies in Parliament with the
resources to attack the colony. In late 1740 the proprietors requested a 25
percent increase in the defense spending for Georgia. In the parliamentary
debates which followed, several members requested that Georgia be abandoned
because it was too expensive to defend. They proposed that the colonist
51 Ibid., 572, 645, 676.
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should join South Carolina, and strengthen that colony. Lord Gage stated that
he regretted having voted 129,000 to Georgia. Mr. Thomas Christie argued
that during this debate he had signed a petition to allow Negroes in Georgia,
but upon learning of the Spanish edicts which freed British slaves, he and
several others in Parliament would have preferred to wait until St. Augustine
was conquered. Other members complained that Parliamentary debates on
Georgia only encouraged the Spaniards to attack.52
Though Georgia was partially founded as a haven for debt prisoners,
the nature of Parliamentary debates indicates that it was more important as a
military barrier for South Carolina. The conflict between South Carolina and
Georgia was rooted in military issues also. The Spaniards used runaway
Carolina slaves to limit Carolina's growth. Because the colony's growth was
dependent upon the slave industry, it was believed that Georgia would protect
slavery and ensure growth. In fulfilling this defensive role for South Carolina,
Georgia was a far more expensive project than was planned. As Parliament
debated the cost effectiveness of maintaining this garrison state, ultimately
alternative funding sources had to be considered. The only real alternative
was the introduction of slavery. Georgia's colonists insisted that the problems
of hunger and trade could only be solved with slaves, and that the colony
could function as a garrison without inhabitants. Oglethorpe insisted that St.
32
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Augustine stirred malcontents to demand slaves so that Spain could have new
allies. Also, he said that the Spaniards hoped to make Parliament grow tired
of funding Georgia.53
While Parliament debated continued funding of Georgia, one of the
colonies administrators, Mr. Thomas Stephens, sent the following comments:
Your chief aim is to introduce Negroes, but its demonstrable that is a thing
not to be ventured. You say that without them no exportable commodities
can be raised, why none ought to be expected yet. Georgia is a frontier
province, and not to be considered yet a while as a region profitable in a
commercial way, but as a garrison defense, and the inhabitants as soldiers
with arms in their hands, not spades. But when rendered secure, then is the
time for them to apply themselves to such produces...54
Stephens' comments shed light upon the complex political reactions of
colonial politicians to the military force from St. Augustine. Though Georgia
was originally put in place to safeguard slavery in Carolina, the expense of this
policy led to a demand for slavery in Georgia. The words of Oglethorpe and
Stephens reflect a British colonial predicament in the Southeast, using slaves
to secure development, but also furnishing the Spanish with handy guerrilla
recruits.
Gradually, some members of Parliament accepted demands from





Georgia must accept slavery or risk losing funds from Parliament.55 Finally, in
1750, slavery was allowed in Georgia but until that time the Parliament
trustees and Georgia colonial leaders continued to debate the issues of slavery,
development, and the Spanish encouragement of runaways. To the extent that
several members of Parliament tired of the continued military expenditures,
steps were taken to consolidate Georgia and South Carolina. By 1750, the
Parliament had even disbanded Oglethorpe's military regiment. The Georgia
colonial government was instructed to direct their request for military
assistance to the Governor of South Carolina. Nevertheless, by 1752 the
Parliament forced the trustees of Georgia to surrender their charter. By this
time, slavery was allowed and Parliament decided to keep troops in Georgia.56
In deciding to allow slavery in Georgia it seems that Parliament and the
trustees opted for the strategy of seeking development and minimizing the
number of slaves escaping to St. Augustine. The records indicate that the St.
Augustine forces continued to limit the extent of development and expansion.
"Ibid, 642.
56 "Trustees Letter Book," Colonial Records ofGeorgia. 1745-1752. vol. 31,207,
254,266.
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In 1752, the freeholders of southern Georgia reported increased Spanish
attacks since the reduction in Oglethorpe's regiment.57
The conflict between Britain and Spain was dramatically altered in
1763. In that year the Treaty of Paris gave Florida to the British. Spain,
however, recaptured Florida in 1783 during the American Revolution. In 1763
Georgia Governor James Wright wrote to Parliament:
I most sincerely and heartily congratulate your lordships on the peace
which his majesties wisdom and equity has so happily concluded... by the
cessation of Florida, not only of the settlements of St. Augustine and
Pennsacola and now that your lordships are pleased to inform me that this
province will be freed from every obstacle that has obstructed its growth
and prosperity, and be no longer checked and cramped, I have no doubt of
its making great strides, and very soon becoming useful to the mother
country...38
Wright underscores the historical plight of Georgia's development.
The Treaty of Paris had yielded an objective to the British which decades of
war could not. Wright expressed optimism that guerrilla attacks would cease.
Also, no longer would a Spanish edict draw British slaves to Florida.
Nonetheless, in spite of the absence of the Spanish, by 1766 Wright reported
that slaves still ran off to Florida. By 1771 the Georgia Assembly passed
57 Governor John Reynolds, "Original Papers ofGovernor John Reynolds," Eds.
Kenneth Coleman and Milton Ready, Colonial Records of Georgia 1754-56. vol. 27
(Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1977) 33,47.
58 Kenneth Coleman and Milton Ready, eds., "The Original Papers ofGovernor
Reynolds, Ellis, Wright, and Others," in the Colonial Records ofGeorgia vol. 28, 1757-
63, Part I (Athens: Univ. of Georgia, 1977) 445.
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legislation which was designed to prevent runaways. Also, in this same year
Governor Wright reaffirmed agreements with the Upper Creeks to, pay them
for the capture of runaways.59
The political leaders of colonial Georgia and Parliament were aware of
the risks of admitting slaves. But development was dependent upon the slave
industry. In particular, the Spanish efforts to enforce its claims on the South
East and macro-rebellion limited the expansion of colonial South Carolina and
Georgia. First, the Spanish utilized the Apalachees as allies to harass British
settlements. As a consequence, the British established a Native slave trade
which enriched South Carolina while, nearly rendering the Apalachees extinct.
For a while the Carolinas were able to prosper and expand. Conversely, the
Spanish were weakened by the attacks upon its Native allies. In the midst of
this struggle between the two colonial powers, the African slave industry
became a factor. In 1693 the King of Spain strategically issued an edict which
granted freedom and security to any British slaves which escaped to St.
Augustine. This policy in effect reciprocated the effect of the British Native
slavery.
The 1693 edict, however, drew a growing source of British economic
stability to St. Augustine. The edict, combined with the effect of the Yamasee
War, retarded British Colonial development and expansion. Ultimately, the
59Ibid, Part H, 191, 342, 368.
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edict compensated Spain for its Apalachee allies which vanished in British
slavery.
From the Yamasee War until the Treaty of Paris in 1763, the 1693
edict helped to undermine the foundation of British colonial development. At
the same time it tended to rejuvenate Spanish colonial stability in Florida. As
a consequence of Spain's policy of destabilization, British politicians, both
colonial and in Parliament, were forced to adjust policy goals and objectives.
The very conception of colonial Georgia was perhaps the ultimate reaction of
British politicians to this de stabilization. It was intended to protect
Carolina's slave industry, and perhaps it did ultimately achieve this objective.
Governor Wright of Georgia believed that a diplomatic settlement of
British-Spanish disagreements would allow peaceful expansion of the colony.
Wright nonetheless failed to account for the continuity of rebellion. Without
its Spanish ally, the scope and context of macro-rebellion was altered, but as
the records indicate, rebellion was sustained. Consequently, growth and
expansion of the colony continued very slowly. This was a problem with
which the new United States government would have to contend.
Chapter Seven will document the reactions of the founding fathers to
the presence of rebel slaves in Florida. In particular John Jay, George
Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe all left written responses to the
Seminole rebels which will be analyzed.
CHAPTER VII
UNITED STATES REACTION TO SEMINOLE BLACKS, 1788-1814
Between 1763 and 1783, British colonists had gone from being
subjects of the crown to independent citizens of the United States of
America. During those same years Florida had passed from the hands of
the Spanish to the British and then back to Spain. As a result, the political
policies in regards to runaway slaves variously went from the enforcement
of the 1693 Edict during Spanish occupation, to non-enforcement under the
British. During the American Revolution the British did encourage
Georgia slaves to run to Florida as potential allies. Georgia's fear of this
threat caused the assembly to require one-third of the militia to guard
slaves.1 Officially, however, British colonial Florida provided no haven for
runaway slaves because slavery had increased since Spanish occupation.
During British occupation it seems likely that some of the Black and Indian
allies of the Spanish were incorporated among the Lower Creek Indians,
who had migrated into Florida. The Lower Creeks, the rebels, Apalachees
and Yamasees, all became known as the Seminoles during the British
occupation.2
It was among the Seminoles that Georgia slaves ultimately found
refuge after 1763. With the return of the Spanish occupation after the
1 Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolution (New York, London: W.
W. Norton and Company: 1961) 118, 126, 151.
2 Chapter two gives a detailed explanation ofthe creation of a Seminole people.
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Revolution it seems that runaways could have been received under terms of
the 1693 edict, as well as among the Seminoles.3 One factor which
remained constant during both Spanish and British occupation of Florida
were the complaints of Georgia. Rebel slaves were at the core of Georgia's
complaints.
This chapter will discuss the political relationship between the
Florida rebels and the U.S. government. In general this relationship
occurred within a framework of interaction already established by the
British. First diplomatic solutions were attempted, then military. In this
context, this chapter will show activities and initiatives from politicians
which demonstrate the political relationship. A key diplomatic effort
culminated in the repeal of the Royal Edicts of 1693 and 1733. The
ultimate American initiative against the Florida threat would be a secret
war launched by James Madison.
With Britain's expansion into Florida in 1763, their colonial growth
and development continued. Georgia's Governor Wright complained about
runaways and made agreements with the Upper Creeks to capture them.
Therefore, in spite of British colonial expansion in Florida, it seems that
runaways and Seminole attacks still hampered the colonies' growth. As
early as 1785 a Georgia delegate to the Continental Congress, William
Houston, served on a congressional committee which made
recommendations to the entire congress on how to deal with the Southern
3 John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., Journals ofthe Continental Congress 1774-1789 vol. 28
(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing OflBce, 1933) 118; Continental Congress vol
34,326,430-31.
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Indians. This committee suggested that U.S. Indian Commissioners in
Georgia be required to demand that Indians, (Lower Creeks or Seminoles)
return all fugitive slaves who resided among them.4
Apparently, efforts of the commissioners in 1785 did not result in
return of Georgia's slaves. By 1788 the Georgia governor and delegates
pushed the Congress to take stronger measures. They issued the following
resolution:
It is represented to Congress by the delegates of the State of Georgia
that the ... frontiers of that state have been for several years past
invaded and kept in a state of alarm by Creek Indians . . . instigated by
refugees and fugitive traders, who had formerly escaped from these
states and taken refuge among them as to keep up constant and bloody
incursions on the different parts of that frontier, and that the
settlements of four of the exterior counties are almost entirely broken
up.5
It is apparent that the settlement of the State of Georgia was limited
by the attacks of the Blacks and Natives in the Georgia-Florida region.
Also, it is important to remember that the U.S. government acknowledged
two groups of Creeks. The Upper Creek were the main body of the nation.
They resided primarily in Georgia. They had been traditional allies of the
British since before the Yamasee War. It was these Creeks whom
Governor Wright paid to capture runaway slaves. The Lower Creeks
resided in Florida and generally became incorporated into a Seminole
conglomerate. These were the notorious Creeks referred to by the
Congress. Here we see that the Seminoles were operating independently of
4 Continental Congress vol. 28. 119.
5 Continental Congress vol. 34, 326.
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the Spanish government in St. Augustine. The congress ordered the
Secretary of War to make plans for war against the Seminole.6
From the Office of Foreign Affairs, Secretary of State John Jay
reported in 1788 on the Congressional resolutions. Jay noted that slaves
from Georgia were escaping to St. Augustine and were being freed and
sheltered by Florida Governor Zespedes. Jay reported that the Governor
said he could not return any slaves without orders from the King of Spain.
As early as 1787 in a letter to Thomas Jefferson, Jay acknowledged that the
Georgia frontier was under attack. He also implied that Spain should be
punished. Jay also sent a letter to the U.S. envoy in Madrid, William
Carmichael. He instructed Carmichael to negotiate for an end to the
Spanish policy of freeing and sheltering runaway slaves.7
For nearly a century, first the British then the Americans were
forced to grapple with the effects of the Spanish edict of 1693. This policy
had been reasserted several times over the century. Its impact upon first
colonial and then U.S. expansion can be seen in the pattern of reaction by
government officials. The policy bolstered the Spanish militia in Florida.
As a result, frontier settlements could be easily attacked. This caused
political reactions in Parliament and in the colonial assemblies of South
Carolina and Georgia. Then later, political responses occurred in Georgia
State politics as well as in the Continental Congress. Under the
Americans, efforts to obliterate the edict intensified.
6 Ibid, 327.
7 Ibid, 430-31; John Jay, The Correspondence and Public Papers ofJohn Jav. vol. 3.
1782-93. Henry P. Johnston, ed (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1891) 259, 357.
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As a member of the Continental Congress, James Madison made
these comments:
We learn from Georgia that the State is threatened with a dangerous
war with the Creek Indians. The alarm is of so serious a nature that
law martial has been proclaimed, and they are proceeding to fortify
even the town of Savannah. The idea there is that the Indians derive
their motives as well as their means from their Spanish neighbors.
Individuals complain also that their fugitive slaves are encouraged by
East Florida. The policy of this is explained by supposing that it is
considered as a discouragement to the Georgians to form settlements
near the Spanish boundaries.8
Madison clearly addresses the impact of the Seminoles and Spanish
upon the expansion of the State of Georgia. He also makes reference to
the natural reaction which echoed so many colonial political leaders.
Madison's talk of war replicates the reactions of many legislative officials
in former times. The Continental Congress pushed its Spanish envoy and
the Florida governor for a repeal of the Edict. As a congressional
delegate, Madison was fully informed about the subject.
Under the new constitution of 1788, Thomas Jefferson replaced
John Jay as Secretary of State. By 1790 Jefferson continued to push
Carmichael and the governor of Florida for changes in the Spanish policy.
He sent transcripts and affidavits from Georgia slave holders which had
been received by Secretary of War Henry Knox. Jefferson told Carmichael
that the problems in Georgia were growing worse.9 Finally in 1790,
8 James Madison, The Papers ofJames Madison 1787-88. Volume 10,. Robert A.
Rutland, ed. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press:) 219.
9 Thomas Jefferson, The Papers ofThomas Jefferson vol. 16, Julian P. Boyd, ed.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961) 329,450; Jefferson vol. 17,472. '
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Florida Governor Quesada informed Jefferson that the king had rescinded
the nearly century-old Edict of 1693.10 Jefferson wrote Quesada in 1791
thanking him for the change of policy, but also Jefferson assumed that the
Spanish would assist Georgia residents in rounding up runaway slaves. He
informed Quesada that Indian Agent James Seagrove would negotiate with
him for a return of the slaves. In 1791, George Washington wrote
Seagrove to clarify his objective. Washington informed him of a
confidential aspect of his mission:
Your first care will be to arrest the further reception of fugitive slaves,
your next to obtain restitution of these slaves who have fled to Florida
since the date of Governor Quesada's letter to Mr. Jefferson, notifying
the orders of his Catholic Majesty. And your last object, which may
demand the greatest address, will be to give a retrospective force to the
orders of the Court of Spain, beyond the date of that letter, and to
procure the Governor's order for a general relinquishment of all fugitive
slaves, who were the property of the United States.11
Under the Continental Congress, Jay had demanded a repeal of the
Edict. The Congressional Committee on the State of Southern Indian
Affairs demanded that Creek Indians secure the return of all slaves,
prisoners or fugitives. Under the Washington administration, Jefferson had
successfully completed the efforts begun by Jay to repeal the 1693 Edict.
Though the Edict had been at the core of the Spanish defensive strategy,
perhaps its relinquishment in the 1790s was a sign of the lessening of the
Spanish desire to fight wars for Florida. In March of 1791, Jefferson




May, Washington secretly pressed Seagrove to secure an order from
Governor Quesada for the "general relinquishment" of fugitives.
Washington's letter to Seagrove was essentially the blueprint of
America's strategy for confronting the Florida allies. He demanded
payment to American slave holders for their losses in Florida. Also, he
sought the repossession of all Blacks claimed by Americans. The pursuit of
Washington's objectives would follow the well-worn paths of first
diplomacy, then war.
Washington and Jefferson had, in a very short time, used diplomacy
to accomplish a goal which alluded the British Parliament, proprietors of
South Carolina and Georgia and their colonial administrators. Both Britain
and the U.S. knew that historically the edict was at the core of Spain's
strength in Florida. Washington and Jefferson, however, did not draw
parallels between the end of the policy and the current weakness of Spain
in Florida. During the years of British occupation, the power base of the
Blacks and Indians had shifted from St. Augustine itself to the Florida
countryside. This was now the heartland of a new people, the Seminoles.
Most likely, "Seminole country" was the primary destination of runaways
from Georgia. To a great extent, the Seminoles were a consequence of the
edict's 100 year history. Spain could not have marched into the
countryside and delivered them to the U.S. Therefore, though the
Washington administration had eliminated the edict, they were attempting
to accomplish another goal which had eluded the British—the return of
slaves.
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Negotiations with Creeks and other Natives for the capture of
runaway slaves was a process begun by the British. Creeks had assisted
the British in the capture of Native and African slaves. Even before the
Washington administration, the Continental Congress had stipulations in
treaties with at least thirteen tribes for the return of African slaves.12 The
Continental Congress had been negotiating with the Creeks for a treaty
which would incorporate the return and apprehension of Georgia slaves.
Finally, in 1790, Secretary of War Henry Knox negotiated a treaty with the
Creeks. The Treaty of New York was specifically worded to include all the
Creeks, Upper, Lower, and Seminoles. Even a middle group of Creeks was
mentioned. Article III of the treaty stated the following:
The Creek Nation shall deliver as soon as practical to the commanding
officer of the troops of the United States, stationed at the Rock-
Landing on the Oconee River, all citizens of the U.S., white inhabitants
or Negroes, who are now prisoners in any part of the said nation. And
if such prisoners or Negroes should not be so delivered, on or before
the first day of June ensuing, the governor of Georgia may empower
three persons to repair to the said nation, in order to claim and receive
such prisoners and Negroes.13
There were some secret articles within the Treaty of New York.
The Washington administration agreed to pay the Creek Chief McGillivray
$1200 annually and to make him a Brigadier General. Lesser chiefs were
12 Charles Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs. Laws and Treaties vol. n, (Washington DC,
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1904)4-8, 14, 16.
13 Ibid, 26.
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paid $100 annually.14 The secret articles were possibly unconstitutional.
In The Exiles of Florida. Ohio Congressman Joshua Giddings expressed the
belief that Washington was secretly spending the nation's tax dollars in
support of slave catching.15 The public articles of the treaty clearly stated
that the Creeks agreed to return runaway slaves. The secret articles do not
specifically say that any payment is for the return of slaves. However,
specific payment of Creeks as slave catchers was a tradition which was
more than a century old. Under the British it was a practice that was not
controversial; but for the United States, the issue of spending federal tax
dollars in support of slavery was potentially explosive.
Many objectives between the U.S. and the Creeks were stated in the
treaty. Whether Washington intended to secretly pay the Creeks to catch
slaves or rather for some other purpose stated in the treaty, the end result
followed patterns set up during colonial days. The Creeks were expected
to go into Florida and gather slaves. Instead of being paid by the British,
they now were paid by the United States, to accomplish some technically
unspecified objective.
By 1791, the Washington administration had established policies
which were designed in response to the problems of the Georgia slave
holders. Specifically, they hoped that the flow of slaves into Florida would
14 David Hunter Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts ofthe United States of
America 1776-1818. vol 2 (Washington DC: United States Government Printing OfBce,
1931)344.
15 Joshua Giddings, Exiles ofFlorida. (Columbus, Ohio: Follet, Foster and Company,
1858) ch. 1
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cease and that those present would be captured either by the Spaniards in
St. Augustine or the Creeks of Georgia and Florida.
In Congress, funding for Washington's Indian treaties was initially
voted down, but James Madison maneuvered passage on a subsequent vote.
The Georgia delegation assured Congress that war continued with the
Creeks.16 Though Washington and Jefferson were using diplomacy to
address the problems in Florida, it seems that they ultimately planned to
gain possession of it. In 1791, a few months after negotiations were
completed with the Creeks and the Spanish, Jefferson notified Washington
that Governor Quesada of Florida had issued a new order which allowed
U.S. citizens to settle in Florida with their slaves. Jefferson believed that
the Spanish hoped to weaken the border states by luring debtors. In spite
of the Spanish ploy he believed the U.S. could eventually fill Florida with
enough Americans to annex it without a war. Shortly afterwards, Jefferson
received a letter from a U.S. Diplomat in Paris, William Short. Short told
Jefferson that the Marquis de la Fayette said that if the U.S. annexed
Florida, the French would not fight a war in support of its Spanish ally.17
Jefferson's correspondence implies at least that the U.S. was
considering a military response to the activities on the Florida-Georgia
border. His letter to Washington perhaps weighs a covert response rather
than overt action. It is possible that the Washington Administration was
sounding out the French response to a hypothetical war to annex Florida.
16 Congress, House, GARep James Jackson sought treaties to end war with Indians in
Southern GA, 1st Congress, 1st Sess., vol. J, Annals ofCongress (8 August 1789) 724-730.
17 Thomas Jefferson, Papers vol. 20, 97, 530.
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During a congressional recess in 1791, Jefferson sent a letter to Madison
which directly addressed the issue:
Spain is unquestionably picking quarrel with us. . . .The inevitableness
of war with the Creeks, and the probability. . . of it with Spain (for
there is not one of us who doubts it) will certainly occasion your
convocation. At what time I cannot exactly say. But you should be
prepared for this important change in the state of things.18
Most likely Jefferson was informing Madison that if the Seminole
invaded Georgia, the congress would have to be brought back to consider
war. The following year, Washington warned the senate of trouble on the
border with Spain which could lead to war. Senator Jackson of Georgia
introduced a bill which would authorize defense expenditures if the state
was invaded during recess.19
In spite of treaties between the U.S. and the Creeks, and the
elimination of the Spanish edict, border troubles persisted. The political
situation for the Washington administration was in many ways similar to
the colonial days. If Parliament had been able to convince Spain to revoke
the Edict of 1693, perhaps colonial development would have proceeded,
costly wars might have been avoided, and debates over defense
expenditures would have been unnecessary. However, the United States
had succeeded in revoking the edict, but in the interim between 1763 and
1783, a strong and relatively autonomous Seminole people had emerged.
"Madison. Papers vol. 15, 37.
19 Congress, House, GA Rep. James Jackson sought military expenditures for GA, 3rd
Congress, 2nd Sess., Annals of Congress (20 May 1794), 102.
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The Seminoles were not really consulted in Washington's two-tract strategy
for solving the political crisis on the Georgia-Florida border.
In all probability it was in the interest of a weaker Spain to concede
to U.S. demands on the edict. Washington had made generous concessions
to the Creek chiefs. One Seminole chief was even present at the signing of
the Treaty of New York. In general, though, the interests of the Seminoles
were not considered. By the 1790's it was highly probable that a
disproportionate percentage of the Seminole military strength was African.
Washington was prepared to negotiate with Indians among the Seminole,
but for Africans he offered only slavery. During colonial days the British-
Creek agreements directed Creeks to go into Florida and capture
Apalachees for the slave industry; but by now there may have been 600 to
1000 Africans in total, not to mention their alliance with the Red
Seminoles.
It seems that George Washington himself realized this was the crux
of the problem. During treaty negotiations with the Creeks, he gave
instructions to the Indian commissioners to find out how many Seminoles
were in the Creek nation.20 As Washington discussed the treaty with the
Senate, he said, "I flatter myself that this treaty will be productive of
present peace and prosperity to our southern frontier."21 A few years after
20 George Washington, The Papers of George Washington Presidential Series vol. 4,
W. W. Abbot, Dorothy Twohig, eds. (Charlottesville, VA and London: University of
Virginia Press, 1993)559.
21 Walter Lowrie, Mathew St. Clair Clarke, editors. American State Papers. Class H
Indian Affairs vol. I (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832) 81.
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the treaty was signed, Washington informed both the House and the Senate
that it was impossible for the Creeks to comply, specifically with the part
of the treaty which required the return of slaves.22
There appears to have been a lot of uncertainty concerning the
identity of the people at war with Georgia. Parallels to the pre-1763 allies
of St. Augustine were apparent. Jay, Washington, Jefferson, and Madison
all acknowledge a relationship between the former Spanish offer of freedom
to slaves, their escape from Georgia, and later attacks upon the U.S. Both
Washington and Jefferson believed that this complex situation would lead
to war, but they were unsure if most of the blame belonged with Spain or
Lower Creeks. Nevertheless, neither man went so far as to blame the ex-
slaves. Only third parties were blamed. Washington told the Senate that
the Creeks could not execute the return of slaves. He and Jefferson once
believed that the African slaves resided among the Lower Creeks or
Seminoles and assumed that turning them over to the U.S. would be only a
formality.
References to the Seminole began during British occupation of
Florida. By the time of the Washington Administration, the nation seemed
to be coming to an understanding about who the Seminoles were and what
their exact role might have been in the border region. Even the
congressmen from Georgia seemed to be uncertain of which Natives to
blame for their troubles. Both the Treaties of New York and San Lorenzo
underscore state and federal efforts to secure the slave industry.
22 Ibid, 546.
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Washington instructed Indian Agent Seagrove to make a special
effort to obtain all slaves. Early in the Administration, Jefferson and
Washington discussed affidavits from the Florida-Georgia border about the
parties of Blacks and Natives who invaded and took away slaves while
spreading havoc. Also, now Washington had to admit to the congress that
his apprehension about the treaties with Creeks was justified. They could
not get any slaves.23
In 1794 Washington again told the congress that the treaty with the
Creeks was not effective and that the nation was closer to war with Spain.
Congressman Carnes of Georgia also in 1794 requested an end to the policy
of giving presents to the Creek chiefs, because they were not executing
their part of the treaty. Both Washington and Carnes exhibited new
documentation which showed that the Creeks had continued the practice of
attacking Georgia.24
There is ambiguity in the statements of Washington and Carnes. It
is unclear if they are referring to Seminoles, Lower Creeks, or Upper
Creeks. In all probability it is the Seminoles and Lower Creeks who
continue to attack, while the Upper Creeks are unable to fulfill their
promise to return the Black Seminole to slavery. In 1795 the Washington
administration negotiated the Treaty of San Lorenzo with Spain. This
treaty formalized the end of Spanish edicts which advertised freedom for
American slaves. Spain agreed to return all slaves among the Seminole to
23 Ibid.
"Congress, Senate, President Washington informs the Senate that Creek treaties do
not work, 3rd Congress, 1st Sess., Vol. I, Annals of Congress (20 May 1794) 102, 117.
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their U.S. masters. Also, they agreed to prevent the Seminole from
attacking the U.S. frontier.
The Treaty of San Lorenzo overlapped the provisions of the Treaty
of New York. Both Spain and the Upper Creeks were given the
responsibility for subduing the Seminole and capturing the rebels.23
Though not official, it seems that in the words and actions of
Washington and Jefferson, the genesis of U.S. policy to obtain Spanish
Florida can be seen by this time. Already, neither the diplomatic
negotiations with Spain in the wake of the revocation of the edict, nor the
objectives stated in the Treaties of New York and San Lorenzo, had
yielded success for the nation. As long as the institution of slavery was
threatened in Georgia, the Governor and representatives would be
demanding war. The administration's acknowledged failure not only meant
that the Georgia frontier was ravaged but also that political pressure
continued from the state. The failure of the administration's policy also
meant that the Georgians were not able to fully open up their lands for
development. Madison had already stated that by attacking Georgia Spain
hoped to prevent settlers from getting too close to Florida. This fact alone
provided ample grounds for complaining to the administration. But,
additional debates arose in Congress over Georgia's defense expenditures.
Georgia's congressional representatives spearheaded the battle for its
citizens.
"Miller, Treaties, vol. 2, 318-323.
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In the fifth congress, 1796-97, Georgia Congressman Milledge
stated that the House knew the state was under fire, and he demanded that
a provisional army be created to protect the state. Mr. Baldwin of Georgia
pointed out that in 1785, Georgia had signed a treaty with the Creeks in
which extensive territory was given to the state. However, in the treaty
negotiations of 1790, the administration gave the land back to the Creeks.
Baldwin attributed this action simply to Creeks' hostilities.26
Even greater debates arose over Georgia's claims for general
defense expenditures against the attacks from Creeks, most likely
Seminoles. On this issue the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
during the 7th congress, presented correspondence between the Governor
of Georgia and the Secretary of War, Henry Knox. This correspondence
covered the years 1792-95. It showed that Knox authorized Georgia to
incur militia expenses for self defense. In addition, the governor of
Georgia claimed Knox had authorized assistance from South Carolina, too.
Certain members of Congress argued that the Georgians exceeded Knox's
allowances. The Georgians demanded full payments for lands given to the
Creeks and for militia expenses.27
In consideration of the British colonial expenses in Georgia and
Carolina, State of Georgia expenditures are very predictable. In fact, the
26 Congress, House, GA Rep. Milledge discusses attacks from Seminoles and Creeks,
5th Congress, 2nd Sess. vol. VII, Annals of Congress (5 January 1800) 1949; Congress,
House, GA. Rep. Baldwin discusses a treaty with the Creeks, 5th Congress, 2nd Sess.,
vol. m, Annals of Congress (10 October 1800) 2547; Congress, House, House Speaker




entire political strategy of the Washington administration closely parallels
the British experience. The Georgia demands upon Congress for defense
expenditures were preceded by colonial South Carolina's request to
parliament after the Yamasee War, as well as Oglethorpe's consistent
demands. The British colonial politicians were resolved to a simple
solution. Because colonial expansion was limited by the Spanish attacks,
St. Augustine had to be taken by force. Parliament, the colonial leaders
and Oglethorpe all agreed to this. War did not solve the problems, but the
peace treaty of 1763 did.
During the Washington administration, the genesis of this same
solution was evident. Both Washington's and Jefferson's acknowledgment,
that Florida had to be obtained, was implicit. Though there was ambiguity
as to whom to blame for policy failures, ultimately the administration
seemed to blame Spain. Therefore both Washington and Jefferson believed
war with Spain was inevitable if not imminent. Washington stated this to
both houses of congress. Jefferson discussed this with Madison, too.
Jefferson also notified Washington that Spain's strongest ally, France,
would not interfere if the U.S. seized Florida by force. But Jefferson also
notified Washington of a peaceful strategy to obtain Florida. He discussed
covert measures through Spain's willingness to allow American settlers.
Therefore, in observing the Washington administration's policies and
responses we can see the genesis of the American goal not only to settle
disputes, but to obtain Florida, by war or peace. The British had opted for
war, but the solution came through peace. Washington set America upon
the path to get Florida by either means. During the days of colonial
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Georgia and South Carolina, various politicians, including James
Oglethorpe, expressed the belief that Florida threatened the existence of
British colonialism in the south east, and that either the Spanish would take
Georgia and South Carolina or they must take Florida. By the time of the
Jefferson administration, the acquisition of Florida by war or peace was a
dominant issue.28
In The History of the United States. Henry Adams wrote:
During the administrations of Jefferson and Madison, the national
government was in the main controlled by ideas and interests peculiar to
the region south of the Potomac, and only to be understood from a
Southern standpoint. Especially its foreign relations were guided by
motives in which the Northern people felt little sympathy. . . . Among
the varied forms of Southern ambition, none was so constant in
influence as the wish to acquire the Floridas. . . yet the Northern public,
though complaining of Southern favoritism, neither understood nor
cared to study the subject. . .as if this were a local detail which in no
way concerned the North. If Florida failed to interest the North, it
exercised the more control over the South, and over a government
Southern in character and purpose. Neither the politics of the union nor
the development of events could be understood without treating Florida
as a subject of first importance.29
Adams observed that Jefferson's "overmastering passion" was to buy
or take Florida by force.30 In the above comments he also shows that the
issue of Florida was more relevant to the South than the North. Implicit in
28 Henry Adams, History ofthe United States ofAmerica. During the First
Administration ofThomas Jefferson vol. II (New York: Charles Scribners1 Sons, 1921)
245-46.
29 Henry Adams, History ofthe United States ofAmerica. During the Administration
ofJefferson and Madison, vol. I (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963) 113.
30Henry Adams, History ofthe U.S., vol n, 245.
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his comments also is the conclusion that the Southern obsession with
Florida primarily emphasizes legitimate competition between the U.S.,
France, and Britain. Jefferson sought to include all Spanish territory lying
along the Gulf of Mexico and east of the Mississippi in the Louisiana
purchase. The territory was known as East and West Florida. The British
did not want to see East Florida granted to the United States. Adams
seems to place these foreign policy considerations as paramount
justification of the American obsession.31
In "Jefferson and an American Foreign Policy," Walter Lafeber
attributes Jefferson's outlook on Florida to the goal of "enlarging the
empire of liberty through the purchase or if necessary the seizure of the
Floridas." He also emphasizes Spanish interference with American settlers
in Florida. However, he does note:
The Floridas, moreover, were too loosely governed by a disintegrating
Spanish empire that could not, or would not, control clashes between
Indians and advancing white settlers.32
LeFeber does not mention runaway slaves in the border clashes
between "Indians and settlers." But his reasoning does illuminate Seminole
interference with the economic development of Georgia. According to D.
W. Meinig's Shaping of America, the Jefferson administration wanted to
keep Florida from falling into the hands of France or the British. Meinig
31 Henry Adams, History ofthe U.S. 1801-09 (New York, NY: Literary, Classics of
the United States, Inc., 1986) 271-279.
32 Walter LeFeber "Jefferson and an American Foreign Policy," in, Jeffersonian
Legacies. Peter Onuf, ed.(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993) 382.
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believed that the national policy under Jefferson was that Florida should
and would by one way or another become an American territory. Having
stated the general apprehension with the French or British goals, Meinig
asserts that the primary drive to acquire Florida came from slave holders of
Georgia, Tennessee, and other nearby states. Meinig writes of the official
rationale of Southern leaders:
Its very existence was intolerable to influential Americans' interest ....
Florida was a back country out of control: Its Black villages were a
standing enticement to American slaves; its Black militia was an open
inflammatory threat to the order and safety of American society . . . .33
Though it is apparent that the United States had legitimate fears of
Florida somehow being transferred to Britain or France, Adams, LeFeber,
and Meinig help underscore what appears to have been the primary
concerns: the Southerners' close proximity to Florida, dependence upon the
slave industry, and a long legacy of fighting Florida guerrillas were more
ominous than any possible threat from Europe. Jefferson continued to seek
the annexation of East and West Florida by diplomacy, but it was
impossible for the French to include the Floridas with the Louisiana
Purchase.34
The American justification for obtaining Florida was an ancient
colonial legacy, but perhaps the excuse of seeking to block the French and
33 D. W. Meinig, The Shaping ofAmerica vol. 2 (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1993)26-31.
34 Congress, House, Sec. of State Madison and House member try to include Florida in
the LA Purchase, 7th Congress, 2nd Sess., Annals ofCongress (March, April 1804) 1011,
1014, 1020, 1183.
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British provided a vague diplomatic cover. The colonial legacy was
essentially Southern. If the excuse of blocking the British and French was
critical to the U.S. interest, then Adams may have been able to count the
Northerners among those Americans obsessed with Florida. In 1803,
Senator Jackson of Georgia discussed Florida:
Whom, then should we have to contend with? With the bayonets of the
intrepid French grenadiers. . . or with the enervated, degraded, and
emaciated Spaniards? Shall we be told that we are no match for these
emaciated beings .... I again repeat, sir, that I do not believe that
Spain will venture war with the United States. I believe that she dare
not; if she does, she will pay the cost. The Floridas will be immediately
ours; they will almost take themselves. . . .3S
Senator Jackson's comments to the Senate were representative of
the Southern perspective on the need to acquire Florida. This occurred
during Jefferson's diplomatic efforts surrounding the Louisiana Purchase.
Jefferson had discussed covert measures for acquiring Florida. He advised
Washington in 1791 that it was possible to overwhelm Florida with such a
large number of American settlers that the U.S. may acquire it without war.
In the general scheme of getting Florida by any means, a variant of
Jefferson's concept was executed during the Madison administration.
On October 17, 1810, John Rhea presided over a convention of
United States citizens living in West Florida, near New Orleans. Lead by
Rhea, this convention of U.S. citizens requested that West Florida be
annexed to the United States. Madison then authorized the governor of
35 Congress, Senate, GA. Senator Jackson demands that the U.S. take Florida, 8th
Congress, 1st Sess., Vol. I Annals of Congress (12 January 1805) 39.
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Louisiana to occupy West Florida by October 27, 1810. A number of these
U.S. citizens then sparked a small rebellion against the Spanish government
in the region. By December, Florida's Governor Folch notified Havana that
he must capitulate because of the presence of the Americans, unless
military aid was sent.36
Though a French diplomat accused Madison of using the "rebellious
association of a band of desperados" for the purpose of "wrestling a
province from a friendly power," the secret American effort to possess all
of Florida was in progress.37
At the beginning of the 3rd session of the 11th Congress, January 3,
1811, Madison called both houses together in a secret session. He notified
Congress that he had received a letter of capitulation from Governor Folch
of Florida. Also, Madison asked for authority and expenditures to annex
both East and West Florida, to prevent British occupation. Madison
reminded the congress of the unending conflict along the Georgia-Florida
border. According to Madison, "taking into view. . . the intimate relation
of the country adjoining the United States, eastward of the river Perdido
36 Congress, House and Senate, President Madison tells both Houses ofthe plans to
annex the Floridas, 1 lth Congress, 3rd Sess. Annals ofConfess (October 1810 to
January 1811) 1251-59; Smith, PJot, 107.
37 Congress, House, A French diplomat, Mr. Mosier, protests the U.S. annexation
efforts, 1 lth Congress, 3rd Sess., Annals ofCongress (15 December 1810), 1261.
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(near Pennsacola), to their security and tranquillity, and the peculiar
interest they otherwise have in its destiny," the action was essential.38
By January 15, 1811, after thirty votes the congress passed a bill in
secret session which granted Madison the authority to use military force or
diplomacy to obtain Florida.39 Madison gave secret orders to former
Georgia governor, George Mathews, to execute the mission of seizing East
Florida. Mathews was directed to assemble a force which could prompt a
scenario similar to what had happened in West Florida. Americans already
living in East Florida were urged to declare themselves sovereign and then
request annexation to the U.S. Mathews1 job was to facilitate the effort.
But to assure a sufficient pretext for seizing Florida, Mathews was told to
immediately seize the territory if he suspected an impending British
action.40
By 1812 Mathews' expedition got underway. In The Seminoles.
Edwin C. McReynolds wrote, "Early in 1812, General Mathews planned an
uprising in East Florida, which he hoped would have the appearance of a
spontaneous revolt."41 Mathews encountered unexpected trouble when an
38 Congress, House and Senate, Madison addresses both houses in Secret Session,
1 lth Congress, 3rd Sess., Annals ofCongress (3 January 1811), 369, 370; Smith, Plot,
112..
39 Congress, House and Senate, After 30 votes Congress authorizes Madison to seize
Florida, 1 lth Congress, 3rd Sess., Annals ofCongress (15 January 1811), 377.
40 Congress, House, Sec. State Monroe authorized former GA Governor Mathews to
take Florida, 12th Congress, 1st Sess., vol. JJ, Annals ofCongress (26 January 1811),
1687.
41 Edwin C. McReynolds, The Seminoles. (Norman: University ofOklahoma Press
1957) 44.
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American commander refused to furnish him with gunboats in southern
Georgia. It seems that the commander was unaware of Mathews'
expedition. Also, it seems that information about this secret plan may have
leaked to the wrong sources, causing some embarrassment to the
administration. In order to disguise the overall plan, Mathews was
dismissed and accused of not following orders. By April, Georgia
governor Mitchell was put in charge. As with Mathews, his instructions
from Secretary of State Monroe were ambiguous. He was essentially
ordered to discover the best diplomatic pretext for acquiring Florida with
the help of the American rebels.42
Ultimately, by May of 1813, it was apparent that Madison's attempt
to acquire East Florida by both diplomatic and military efforts was a total
failure. Congress therefore forced a withdrawal of U.S. troops. In the
two-and-a-half year effort, though, the true nature of the American
struggle in Florida became more evident. By December of 1812, the
congress requested all facts relating to the Florida effort. Madison sent a
secret report to Congress which contained correspondence from various
officials. In the report, the leader of the American rebels complained about
overall U.S. support.
Our slaves incited to rebel, and we have an army of Negroes raked up in
this country and brought from Cuba to contend with. Let us ask, if we
are abandoned, what will be the situation of the southern states with
42 Congress, House, House Documents ofthe secret war for Florida, 12th Congress,
2nd Sess., Annals of Congress (4 April to 27 May, 1812) 1689-92; State Papers and
Publick Documents ofthe United States. Series T vol. 9, 3rd edition, (Boston: Thomas B
Wait, 1819) 161-162.
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this body of men in the neighborhood? St. Augustine the whole
province, will be the refuge of fugitive slaves; and from thence
emissaries can, and no doubt will, be detached, to bring about a revolt
of the Black population in the United States. A nation that can stir up
the savages round your western frontiers to murder, will hesitate but
little to introduce the horrors of St. Domingo into your southern
country.43
In this letter the rebel leader made clear that he believed he should
get more federal support. Though many congressmen believed the primary
source of opposition was the Spaniard, it seems that there may have been a
considerable degree of opposition from the Black Seminoles. In The Plot
to Steal Florida. Joseph B. Smith reaches a similar conclusion. Smith
comments upon the U.S. troops' occupation of the ruins of Ft. Mose.
According to Smith:
They were taking possession of a place that was a symbol of what their
operation was finally to become, a racial conflict . . . When James
Oglethorpe invaded Florida. . . a major battle took place at Moosa on
June IS, 1740. A force of three hundred blacks and Indians nearly
wiped out his army.44
Though Spain reinforced St. Augustine with Black Cuban forces, it
appears that the Black and Indian Seminoles were the principle opponents
of the U.S. Before initiating the attack upon Florida, Mathews had sat
down with the Seminole chief, Paine, and had convinced him to remain
neutral; however, while these negotiations were in progress, a Black envoy
arrived from St. Augustine and convinced the Seminoles to assist the
Spanish. In addition to Mathews the leaders of the Upper Creek Indians
43 Ibid, 156.
44 Smith, PJot, 211.
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tried to convince the Seminoles to stay neutral or all Creeks would lose
their land.45
In June of 1812 the new Spanish Governor Kinderlan sent a letter to
Governor Mitchell:
A number of seditious persons, who were disturbing the peace
of the country, occupied and fortified a house on Moosa from
whence they could overlook the operations of this place. . . . The
constant sight and proximity of them were very insulting to the loyal
inhabitants of this city . . . My predecessor decided on sending a
small party to dislodge the rebels as was done. . . .^
Mitchell responded indignantly to Kinderlan. He chastised the
Spaniards for fighting back with Black troops and said that the Spanish
actions at Moosa were unjustified. Mitchell complained:
There is however another subject which the candor that
characterizes the United States government requires me to present to
your consideration; I mean the Black troops which you have in your
service. Your certain knowledge of the peculiar situation of the
southern section of the Union, in regard to that description of
people, one might have supposed would have induced you to abstain
from introducing them into the province.47
Mitchell's response to Kinderlan is very ironic. He had just invaded
Florida. Ft. Mose was the most strategic location for invading St.
Augustine. It was only logical for the Spanish to attack. But Mitchell's
45 State Papers. 181-84.
46 Ibid, 193.
47 Ibid, 195; Kenneth Wiggins Porter, The Negro on the American Frontier (NY: Arno
Press and the New York Times, 1971) 192.
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position on Black troops reflects upon the Southern obsession with Florida
which Adams pointed out. It seems that the South placed the institution of
slavery above all else. In dislodging the Americans from Ft. Mose, Spain
used a force of Spanish, Blacks, and Indians from St. Augustine. Mitchell
estimated that there were 500 Black and 400 white soldiers there. But,
these statistics are very questionable when one considers other statements
made by Mitchell.
In a letter to Secretary of State James Madison, Mitchell comments
on the actions of Florida Governor Kinderlin:
The same governor has proclaimed freedom to every Negro who will
join his standard and has sent a party of them to unite with, and who
are actually at this time united with the Indians in their murderous
excursions. Indeed the principle strength of the garrison of St.
Augustine consists of Negroes, there being but a few militia of the
province in the place who adhered to the royal government when the
revolution broke out ... .An old battalion of regular troops whom it
is understood would surrender without firing a shot.48
If there were 900 soldiers in St. Augustine, it seems likely that
Mitchell could not have expected such an easy surrender. Also, though
they were expelled from Ft. Mose, U.S. forces had St. Augustine under
siege for five months and on the verge of starvation when an envoy was
sent to the Seminoles for help. This brought a force of 200-300 Black and
Red Seminoles into the struggle. Coming from their towns in the forest,
the Seminoles launched guerrilla raids upon those U.S. forces which
surrounded St. Augustine. Also, they raided the settlements of Americans
48 State Papers. 174, 178.
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living in Florida. Many of these Americans were also among those forces
laying siege to St. Augustine.
This two-phased attack broke the siege. Governor Mitchell notified
Monroe that Kinderlin had armed every able-bodied Negro in the province
and that he, Mitchell, had sent for reinforcements. From Georgia, Major
Newnan arrived with 250 volunteers, in August. The Seminoles used the
same strategy. They launched guerrilla raids upon Newnan, while sparking
slave revolts and raiding plantations in Georgia. Many Georgia volunteers
fled home to safeguard their families, homes, and slaves. Many of the U.S.
patriots and rebels who had originally started with Mathews in Florida
abandoned their plantations and fled north.49
The siege of St. Augustine was led by a Colonel Smith, who
reported to Governor Mitchell that his men were sick with fever from the
rains and that the environment was very unhealthy. Also, he noted that 105
of his 270 men were at all times on the sick list. He said his forces were
hit 20 miles north of St. Augustine by a "motley set of Red and Black
savages," 40-50 in number. Smith reported that the Seminoles were led by
a black man named Prince. Though they killed all horses on a U.S. wagon
train, many Americans escaped. Smith told Mitchell that he could not
attack St. Augustine without 300-400 more men. Mitchell told Monroe in
October that if troops were withdrawn, Georgia would be attacked and
only the entire military strength of the state could save her. While war
raged in Florida, Mitchell informed Monroe that, "Most of our male
49 Ibid, 164-5; Porter. The Negro. 192-4.
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Negroes are restless on the seaboard. . . and attempt to get to Augustine. .
. . Many have succeeded, . . .which renders it necessary to have constant
guards and patrols . . . ."50
In spite of Mitchell's fears, Colonel Smith was convinced by the
attack upon his wagon train to evacuate his forces to Georgia. He had help
from Major Newnan's forces. With the siege of St. Augustine lifted and a
continuous flow of alarming correspondence arriving from the frontier, any
hope of seizing East Florida may have been lost by August. By this time
also it was perhaps clear that the primary U.S. battlefield enemy was the
Seminoles.
In September, Major Newnan was sent on a search and destroy
mission against the Seminole villages. Newnan had 116 men, many of them
sick with malaria. Before reaching any Seminole villages, Newnan's troops
were ambushed by a force of 75-100 Seminole. The U.S. forces were kept
at bay without food for one week; however the Americans had far superior
weapons. Finally, the Seminoles allowed them to make a night escape.
Even though they had successfully evaded severe casualties, Newnan's
forces were hit by guerrilla attacks as they retreated back into Georgia.
Upon arrival in Georgia, Newnan remarked that "Negroes are the best
soldiers."51
With Newnan's failure, Mitchell notified Monroe, "Sir, the affairs of
East Florida have assumed, within a few weeks past, a very serious and
50 Ibid, 194; State Papers. 170-76.
51 Porter. The Neero. 195-98.
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alarming aspect." He told Monroe, "the Seminole within the Florida line
are determined upon war with us." Mitchell believed the Seminoles were
inspired by the Spanish, but he thought that if there had to be a war with
them it was better to chase them into Florida and destroy their towns.52
Between February and May of 1813, Colonel Smith led 400 men into
Seminole country on a search and destroy mission. The Seminoles were
outnumbered 2 to 1 on the battlefield. Therefore, they hid their women
and children in the swamps. Smith succeeded in the destruction of two
Seminole towns and confiscated 2,000 deerskins and 1,000 head of cattle.
Though Smith succeeded in destroying the towns, the Seminole continued
to wage a guerrilla campaign. Their persistence convinced Congress to
order U.S. forces out of Florida in May of 1813.53
The unsuccessful effort by the Madison administration to get Florida
was the culmination of efforts begun by the Continental Congress. The
U.S., like the British before them, had to first surmount the diplomatic
hurdles before they could seek a military solution. The Continental
Congress inherited an unsolved problem with extensive political
implications from the British. The records show that while Florida was
British territory between 1763-83, depredations along the Florida-Georgia
frontier, though diminished, continued as during the Spanish era. In the
wake of the American Revolution, the Continental Congress nonetheless
52 State Papers. 174-78.
53 Porter, The Negro, 199-201; Mulroy, Freedom 12; Covington, Seminoles. 28-29
James Monroe, The Writings ofJames Mnnroe. Volume 5. 1807-16 (New York- AMS
Press, 1969) 252.
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fixed the primary blame for the border problems on Spain. As Secretary of
State for the Continental Congress, John Jay alerted Madison, Washington
and Jefferson to the complaints of their fellow Southerners. Even during
the colonial days the problem of fighting Florida was to a degree a
sectional issue. Northern colonies had little interest in the far away needs
of South Carolina and Georgia. However, in Parliament the issue had
greater general relevance.
After Spain reestablished themselves in Florida, the Continental
Congress initiated a diplomatic strategy for solving the complaints of the
State of Georgia. First, efforts were made to end the Spanish policy of
freeing all slaves who escaped into Florida, and second, the congress
initiated treaties with the Creek Indian for the return of slaves. The
diplomatic efforts with Spain was a colonial legacy, but the Indian
diplomacy reflects the rise of a consolidated Seminole people. Though the
treaty negotiations essentially excluded the Seminoles, by the 1780s
America was aware of the existence of an autonomous group of Indians
who could wage war and facilitate freedom for their runaway slaves. Some
Seminoles were Lower Creeks, but it appears likely that early diplomacy
efforts didn't understand the true political distinction between the
Seminoles, Upper Creeks, and Lower Creeks.
Diplomatic efforts begun by Jay were inherited by the Washington
administration. The century-old Spanish edict was revoked and a
comprehensive treaty was signed with Spain and the Creek Indians, but
even before Washington left office it was apparent that neither aspect of
this diplomatic effort would yield success. Another colonial legacy which
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resulted from the border problems was that Georgia's development was
restricted. This benefited Spain, the Seminoles and Creeks in general.
Also, as in Parliament, defense expenditures became a source of friction in
the U.S. congress.
Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Jay, and Monroe all were
conscious of the issues surrounding the problem with the Seminoles.
Before the end of Washington's presidency, the notion of America's
acquisition of Florida by diplomacy or war was at minimum implicit in their
communications with each other and Congress. In particular, the Seminole
depredations threatened the slave industry. Therefore, it was a larger issue
to Southerners. During the Jefferson administration, efforts were made to
include Florida (East and West) in the Louisiana Purchase, but this effort
failed. Jefferson, however, had previously notified Washington of covert
methods to obtain Florida which could be facilitated by American settlers.
During the administration of James Madison, West Florida was obtained
covertly. In East Florida the covert plan did not work.
Madison's covert military effort was symbolically prophesied to fail
by the historic oracle of Ft. Mose. However, the correspondence between
Georgia Governor Mitchell and Secretary of State James Monroe, indicate
that the United States lost any pre-existing illusions it possessed about the
true nature of its enemy in Florida. The covert effort began with the goal
of forcing a Spanish capitulation in St. Augustine. However, history
reveals that this colonial legacy was attempted several times over the
previous century without success. The U.S. siege at St. Augustine ended
like many in the past, but with one important difference. In the past,
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besieged British forces, though defeated, still knew that the power base
which thwarted them was in and around St. Augustine. Now, though,
Governor Mitchell, Major Newnan, Colonel Smith, and others made it
abundantly clear that the enemy which defeated them was not the Spanish
in St. Augustine; it was rebels and their Seminole allies of the Florida
forest. This new realization is evident in the fact that the last phase of the
war was spent on search-and-destroy missions against the Seminole
villages.
The Washington administration passed on to its successors the
colonial legacy of the United States' acquisition of Florida by war or
diplomacy. The unofficial policy culminated in James Madison's secret war
to acquire the territory. The unsuccessful effort revealed a perhaps
unexpected power vacuum in St. Augustine, but more conclusively it
revealed the power of a lurking foe in the Seminoles of the countryside.
The nation was alerted to the prowess of a formidable foe and gained a hint
of the thirty years of warfare to come. The diplomatic card had been
nearly exhausted. Few options were left other than war.
Madison's failure leads to the First Seminole War. In Chapter Eight,
General Andrew Jackson will move to the forefront of the United States
policy making toward Florida. He will oversee a direct American response
to the rebels, and ultimately will become the territory's first U.S.
Governor. Additionally, the proximity of Jackson to Florida will decrease
the security of the rebels.
CHAPTER VIII
THE FIRST SEMINOLE WAR, 1817-18
The United States government had attempted to safeguard its slave-based
economy in the South by seeking to eliminate the Florida threat. Like the British
in the eighteenth century, diplomatic overtures were first attempted. With the
failure of diplomacy, military strategies were pursued. As with the British,
military efforts would proved to be the ultimate test of macro-level rebellion. If
the rebels and their allies prevailed, the MLR survived. It was victory, death, or
slavery. So far the Florida allies had withstood the U.S. military efforts. Rebel
freedom continued.
In the wake of the Madison administration's failed attempt to seize
Florida, the Seminole made an effort to go back to the life they had lived before
the war. In this context, the rebels in particular continued to facilitate the
runaways' evasion of slavery, in Georgia, Alabama and Tennessee. This was
consistent with the phenomenon of macro-rebellion. For one hundred and twenty
years, MLR had flourished in allegiance to Spain in Florida. Madison's Patriot
War had demonstrated to the United States that a large number of rebels were
now thriving in alliance with the Natives of Florida. The war began as an effort to
acquire Florida. At times the Seminole had the U.S. on the defensive with
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guerrilla campaigns. By the end, U.S. forces were in hot pursuit of the Seminole
and destroyed some of their villages. After the Patriots War, Americans knew
they were confronting a united force of Africans and Natives; however, the
policies and actions by U.S. political and military officials suggest a particular
effort to undermine the phenomenon of macro-rebellion. This conclusion can be
reached by analyzing U.S. policies, initiatives and treaties, before, during, and
after the First Seminole War.
This chapter will show an intensified American military assault upon the
Seminole which centers upon the rebels. They were the logical target because
MLR was the key threat to the Southern economy. Previous efforts to placate the
demands of the slave industry prompted Washington and Jefferson to target Spain
and Creeks as the vehicle for solving the crisis with runaway slaves. This was
made explicit in the initiatives to end the Edict of 1693 and the treaties at New
York and San Lorenzo. The Patriot War further targeted Spain.
However, in 1816, American policy makers once again decided to invade
Florida, this time to destroy the "Negro fort." This sparked the First Seminole
War. In conducting this war the U.S. seemed to target the Black Seminole. The
Washington treaty of 1819 ceded Florida to the U.S, as a quid pro quo for Spain's
inability to honor the Treaty of San Lorenzo, which required the capture and
return of rebels. In the 1821 Treaty of Indian Springs, the U.S. Upper Creek
allies were forced to pay Georgians an indemnity of land and money for
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uncaptured Black Seminole in Florida; additionally, under James Monroe and John
C. Calhoun, the United States government became the legal owners of the Black
Seminole.
Therefore, though U.S. authorities knew they confronted an allied force of
Africans and Natives, the war and policies indicate that they now realized that the
rebels represented the key opposition to the U.S. in Florida.
In 1819, Pennsylvania Senator Abner Lacock of the Senate Select
Committee on the Seminole War issued a report. Lacock reported that the war
was initiated by Upper Creeks who were dissatisfied with an 1814 treaty which
confiscated their land. The report states that these Creeks were spurred on by
two British agents, Robert Ambrister and Alexander Arbuthnot. Further it states
that the Creeks had launched numerous attacks upon settlers and that General
Gaines sought to apprehend them. Lacock says that the real war began when
Lieutenant Scott and about 40 other U.S. soldiers were massacred while serving
under General Gaines. Lacock does not mention the Negro fort as a cause of
hostilities.1 In The Seminole of Florida, James Covington cites another battle
prior to Scott's massacre as the spark which ignited the war. He says Major
Twiggs and 250 soldiers attacked a Seminole village and killed four men and one
1 Congress, Senate, Senator Lacock explains how the Seminole War began, 15th
Congress, 2nd Sess., vol 4, Annals of Congress (19 February 1819), 256-257.
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woman. Covington mentions the U.S. attack upon the Negro fort but he does not
connect it directly to the First Seminole War.2
In Freedom on the Border, Kevin Mulroy describes the destruction of the
Negro fort. Though he doesn't suggest that the fort's destruction began the war,
he shows continuous raids by the Seminole as a direct response to the fort's
destruction. However, Mulroy says the First Seminole War began when Africans
and Natives united in opposition to southern slave catching expeditions. Also
Mulroy does not mention Lieutenant Scott's massacre.3
Though neither Covington, Mulroy, nor Lacock's senate select-committee
report attributes the war to being a consequence of the fort's destruction, all seem
to show a series of responses and counter responses preceding the war's
beginning. Conceivably, the First Seminole War could be traced back to the
Patriot War, but it seems that the U.S. decision to destroy the Negro fort marked
the beginning of an effort to circumscribe the activities of the African Seminole.
The Negro fort originated in the War of 1812. British Colonel Edward
Nicholls attempted to rally disaffected inhabitants of Louisiana, including slaves
and Natives to the British cause. He issued a proclamation inviting all to join him.
Perhaps as many as one hundred Louisiana slaves accepted his offer. After British
2 Covington, Seminoles. 34-42.
3 Mulroy, Freedom, 14-16.
173
losses in Louisiana, Nicholls sailed into the Appalachee Bay of Florida where
again he sought allies among Africans and Natives, this time the Seminole.
Nicholls promised the Natives that he would help them regain the land stolen by
the U.S., and he promised some of the African Seminole that he would resettle
them as free citizens of Jamaica, Bermuda, or the Bahamas. Though the British
Government denounced Nicholls1 behavior, it seems probable that he acted in the
name of the government. With the help of the Seminole and other allies, Nicholls
built what became known as "The Negro Fort." The fort was located fifteen miles
north of the mouth of the Appalachicola River on the east bank.4 In February of
1815 after the War of 1812 had ended, Nicholls abandoned the fort and left it in
the possession of the Black Seminole. The estimates of the troop strength of the
fort ranged from 250-450 Africans plus a few dozen Indians.5
In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, Commodore Patterson wrote
about the fort:
It had become the general rendezvous for runaway slaves and disaffected
Indians. . . .The force of the Negroes was daily increasing; and they felt
themselves so strong and secure that they had commenced several plantations
on the fertile banks of the Appalachicola . . .'
4 American State Papers. Class I Foreign Relations, vol. IV, (Washington: Gates and
Seaton, 1832)547-51.
5 American State Papers. Class I vol. 4, 552-555.
6 Congress, Senate, Commodore Patterson's report to the Secretary ofthe Navy in
records ofthe Congress, 15th Congress, 2nd Sess., Vol. IV, Annals ofCongress (15
August 1816) 1981.
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It seems that the combination of security and food made the fort and the
vicinity a prime destination for runaway slaves. In The Florida Wars, Virginia B.
Peters says that as many as one thousand Blacks lived near the fort.7 Joshua
Giddings reported that they had fifty miles of plantations along the river, with
their cattle and horses roaming wild in the forest.8
Probably nothing quite as ominous to the interest of the American slave
industry had ever existed. The fort was erected by Nicholls in support of British
interest, but the African Seminole and recent runaways could see it served their
goals. The Negro fort to some degree facilitated the phenomenon of macro-
rebellion; but perhaps ultimately it worked against it. The problem of slaves
fleeing to and thriving in Florida had been addressed by George Washington's
administration using diplomacy which revoked the 1693 Edict and which
negotiated the Treaties ofNew York in 1790 and San Lorenzo in 1795. These
diplomatic efforts made third parties, Spain, and the Upper Creeks, responsible
for the behavior and ultimate capture and return of American claimed property,
i.e. slaves. The late Patriots War had blatantly alerted Americans to the military
skills of the Africans seeking to remain free or at least preserve their Spanish ally.
'Peters, The Florida Wars. 22.
8 Giddings, Exiles, 32-34.
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But in this war the Seminole Blacks were still more of an appendage of third
parties.
To the extent that macro-rebellion was best facilitated by obscurity and
indirect confrontation, the Negro fort would ultimately prove to be much too
conspicuous. With very few Indians in the region, and being far from the
jurisdiction of any possible Spanish authority, the fort became an obvious target.
Except for Nicholls, who had fled to London, there was no third party to focus
American attention upon. Military and political policies now had to focus upon
the Black Seminole almost exclusively. No diplomatic courtesy was offered to the
rebellious Africans.
In May of 1815, General Edmund Gaines notified the acting Secretary of
War A.J. Dallas of the fort's existence. Over the next year there would be
extensive correspondence between the War Department, General Gaines, and U.S.
Commander of the Division of the South, General Andrew Jackson.9
In April of 1816 General Jackson directed the following ultimatum to the
Florida Governor:
I am charged by my Government to make known to you that a Negro fort,
erected during our late war with Britain. ... is now occupied by upwards of
two hundred and fifty Negroes, many of whom have been enticed from the
service of their masters, citizens of the United States; all of whom are well-
clothed and disciplined. Secret practices to inveigle Negroes from citizens of
Georgia, as well as from the Cherokee and Creek nations of Indians are still
'ibid, 35-38; American State Papers. Class I. vol. IV, 551-56.
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continued by this banditti and the hostile Creeks. This. . . may endanger the
peace of the nation and interrupt the good understanding which so happily
exists between our governments. . . . The principles of good faith which
always insure good neighborhood between nations, require the immediate and
prompt interference of the Spanish authority to destroy or remove from our
frontier this banditti, put an end to an evil of so serious a nature, and return to
our citizens and friendly Indians inhabiting our territory those Negroes now in
said fort. . . .1 reflect that the conduct of this banditti is such as will not be
tolerated by our government, and if not put down by Spanish authority, will
compel us, in self defense, to destroy them.10
Jackson apparently expresses the policies of his immediate superior, the
Secretary of War. The U.S. reverted to diplomacy. Jackson gives a third party,
the Spanish, one last opportunity to take responsibility for the actions of an
apparently stateless people, the Black Seminole. No longer is their status
facilitated by others. Now, the rebels were projected in a manner which the U.S.
slave interest perceived as directly hostile and provocative. Also, Jackson's effort
to compel the Spanish to capture and return slaves reflects upon the past failure of
the previous administration.
Florida Governor Zuniga's response to Jackson also reflects upon past
Spanish policies. He informs Jackson that he is powerless to destroy the fort
unless ordered to do so by the King of Spain. In addition to this fact, Zuniga tells
Jackson that the Spanish do not have enough military might in Florida to go
10 Congress, Senate, Andrew Jackson's letter to the Florida Governor discusses events
leading to the First Seminole War; in Congressional documents, 15th Congress, 2nd Sess.,
Vol. IV, Annals of Congress (23 April 1816), 1828.
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against the Negroes. Zuniga further clarifies the American dilemma with the
Black Seminole:
It gives me pleasure to understand that, thinking as your excellency thinks with
respect to the necessity of destroying the Negroes, the fort at Appalachicola
occupied by them was not constructed by orders of the Spanish government;
and that the Negroes, although in part belonging to inhabitants of this
province, and as rational beings, may be subjects of the King, my master, are
deemed by me insurgents or rebels against the authority, not only of his
Catholic Majesty, but also of the proprietors for whose service they have
withdrawn themselves; some seduced by the English Colonel NichoUs, Major
Woodbine, and their agents, and others from their inclination to run off.11
Here it appears that the MLR phenomenon has transcended the facilities of
third parties. Before directly confronting the Black Seminole in the fort, the U.S.
seemed to make a final effort to allow Washington's diplomatic strategy to
function. As stipulated by the Treaty of San Lorenzo, Jackson demanded that the
Spanish destroy the fort, capture the Africans and return them to slavery.
Zuniga's declaration of "lacking orders from the king," seemed to be a return to
the dilemma already solved by Jay, Washington, and Jefferson. However, his
statement of Spain's apparent impotency in Florida was all too familiar to the
Americans. Also, though the U.S. theoretically could have only been seeking
those slaves recently removed by NichoUs from Louisiana during the war, Zuniga
made it specifically clear to Jackson that a wide variety of Africans were
assembled in the region of the fort. Therefore, any American effort to return
11 American State Papers. Class T vol. IV, 556.
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slaves to their masters implicitly incorporated the provisions of Treaties with
Spain and the Creeks, which specified that same objective.
Before the direct American confrontation with the Black Seminole, a
diplomatic legacy of the Washington Administration was attempted. In June of
1816 General Jackson and Indian Agent Hawkins ordered Creek allies to go to the
fort, capture and return the Black Seminole to their masters. But the Creeks
notified them that this task was not possible.12
Though not specifically stated, Jackson's orders to the Creeks and his
ultimatum to the Florida Governor was a final American effort to enforce specific
provisions of treaties signed by George Washington. With this final diplomatic
effort proving no less unsuccessful, direct confrontation was eminent. In June of
1816, Jackson notified Secretary of War Crawford, "there can be no fear of
disturbing the good understanding that exists between us and Spain, by destroying
the Negro fort, and restoring to the owners the Negroes that may be captured."13
By July, Jackson ordered Colonel Clinch and Creek Chief Mclntosh to go
and destroy the Negro fort and return the slaves. A few Americans were killed in
skirmishes with the Seminole while holding the fort under siege. But on July
"Congress, Senate, In Senate records, Andrew Jackson orders Creeks to go to
Florida and capture Blacks, 15th Congress, 2nd Sess., Vol IV, Annals ofCongress (15
June 1816), 1974.
Congress, Senate, Andrew Jackson discusses the effort to destroy the Negro fort,
15th Congress, 2nd Sess., Vol IV, Annals ofCongress (15 June 1816), 1973.
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27th, a heated cannonball struck the powder magazine of the fort. A great
explosion threw pieces of bodies high into the surrounding pine trees. Two
hundred and seventy men, women and children died in the explosion. There had
been approximately 334 rebels and thirty-four Native Seminole in the fort. These
thirty-four Natives were present because they had intermarried with the Africans.
From the sixty survivors, Colonel Clinch selected one African and one Indian as
symbolic chiefs of the fort. They were then tortured to death by the Creeks. The
rest of the survivors were handed over to Georgia citizens, some who claimed to
be descendants of original slave masters dating back to the colonial days.14
Previous American incursions into Florida were either targeting Spain or
the Native Seminole. This direct confrontation with the Black Seminole rebels
now brought the nation face to face with the key issue of confrontation—the
interest of the slave industry. The Negro fort threatened slavery and its survivors
were recycled back into the industry. Perhaps also for the first time in U.S.
history the objectives of the Washington Administration were at least partially
achieved. This partial success, however, was based upon U.S. troops being used
as slave hunters. The destruction of the Negro fort can be seen as the beginning
14 Congress, Senate, Report sent to Congress on the attack upon the Negro fort, 15th
Congress, 2nd Sess., Vol. IV, Annals of Congress (13 August 1816), 1978; Giddings,
Exiles. 37-42; Peters, Florida Wars. 23-25.
180
of the First Seminole War, or as the spark which initiated a chain of events which
led to the war. Giddings wrote:
This commencement of the First Seminole War was . . . undertaken for the
purposes stated in General Jackson's order, to blow up the fort and return the
Negroes to their rightful owners. Historians have failed to expose the cause of
hostilities, or the barbarous foray which plunged the nation into that bloody
contest which cost the people millions of treasure and the sacrifice of hundreds
of human lives."
Giddings' perspective underscores the viewpoint that the First Seminole
War was indeed an effort of Americans to come to grips with a problem which had
plagued the nation for years. One that had defied the efforts of Presidents since
Washington, and the nation since the days of the Continental Congress. This
perspective of Giddings is underscored by John Quincy Adams' writing in his
memoirs as Secretary of State:
A full exposition of the causes and origin of the war in Florida would be given
in a dispatch to our minister in Spain, together with all the vouchers
supporting the statements of facts; that the war would be traced to Nicholls
and his Negro fort and that Arbuthnot will be shown to have been the cause of
the renewal of the war.16
The statements of Giddings and Adams reflect upon the event which
initiated the war. Adams seems to suggest that ultimately the British agent
Arbuthnot coaxed the Seminole to continue hostilities. Such a perspective would
"Giddings, Exiles, 38.
16 John Quincy Adams, Memoirs ofJohn Ouincy Adams. Charles Francis Adams,
ed.(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott and Company:, 1875), 179.
181
suggest that the deaths of at least 270 men, women and children would be less of
a cause for war among the Black Seminole.
By 1817, numerous reports were flooding into Washington of Seminole
hostilities. American citizens on the Georgia-Florida frontier were abandoning
their farms and fleeing north or to forts. Cattle and hogs from American
plantations poured into Florida as confiscated possessions of the Seminole.
George Perryman reported to Lieutenant Sands that Seminole spoke of Americans
with contempt and swore to get even for the destruction of the Negro fort. Other
reports came in, of hundreds of Black Seminole troops drilling in Florida. The
major counter response to the destruction of the fort came in November of 1817.
The Seminole allies attacked a party of U.S. troops escorting women and children.
This group was commanded by Lieutenant Robert Scott. There were forty
soldiers, seven women and four children. Ironically, the attack occurred as
Scott's party traveled up the Appalachicola River in a boat. Two soldiers escaped
and one woman was taken prisoner. The rest were killed.17
In the months between the massacres at the Negro fort and Lieutenant
Scott's party, several confrontations had occurred between Americans and
Seminole. None, though, were on such a significant scale. Also, it seems that any
of the previous attacks by the Seminole could be seen as counter responses for the
17 American State Papers Class V. vol. I, 681-7; Giddings, Exiles. 48; Caroline Mays
Brevard, A History ofFlorida. (Deland, Florida: The Florida Historical Society, 1924), 46.
182
fort's destruction. It was the attack upon Scott which prompted the U.S.
escalation.
President James Monroe blamed Spain for the attack, insisting that they
had failed to restrain the Seminole as required in a 1795 treaty. Monroe also said
the attack was unwarranted. Secretary of War Calhoun ordered Generals Jackson
and Gaines to pursue the Seminole.18 In December, before commencing full scale
attacks, Gaines notified Calhoun:
The Seminole Indians, however strange and absurd it may appear to those
who understand little of their real character and extreme ignorance, entertain
a notion that they cannot be beaten by our troops. They confidently assert
that we have never beaten them. . . . They have little or no means of knowing
the strength and resources of our country. . . .This error of theirs has led
them from time to time, for many years past, to massacre our frontier
citizens.19
It seems that General Gaines was not aware of the Seminole legacy.
Perhaps the Seminole referred to historical successes against attempts to re-
enslave them going back to the seventeenth century. Also, Gaines did not
understand the Black Seminole's will to resist slavery. It seems probable that this
comment to Calhoun was in particular reference to the Blacks. Gaines informed
the Seminole Chief Kenhagee, "You harbor a great many of my Black people
18 American State Papers Class 5. vol. I, 689; John C. Calhoun, The Papers ofJohn C.
Calhoun vol. JJ. 1817-18. W. Edwin Hemphill, ed. (Columbia: University of South
Carolina Press, 1963) 39; James Monroe, The Writings ofJames Monroe vol. 6, 78.
19 American State Papers Class 5. vol. I, 689.
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among you at Suwanee. If you give me leave to go by you against them, I shall
not hurt anything belonging to you."20
Gaines seemed, therefore, to believe it was futile for the Black Seminole
to resist American forces. His comments reflect a developing strategy to isolate
the Blacks. British traders or agents, Alexander Arbuthnot and Robert Ambrister
were charged by Jackson and Gaines with, being accomplices of Colonel Nicholls,
selling weapons to Seminole and inciting the war. Both were tried and executed
by Andrew Jackson after the war. Prior to his death Arbuthnot wrote a letter to
his son:
As I am ill able to write a long letter, it is necessary to be brief-under the
immediate command of General Jackson, eighteen sail of vessels off
Appalachicola. By a deserter that was brought here by the Indians, the
commandant was informed that three thousand men, under the orders of
General Jackson, one thousand foot and sixteen horse, under General Gaines,
and five hundred under another General, were at Prospect Bluff [the Negro
fort], where they are rebuilding the burnt fort; that one thousand Indians were
at Spanish Bluff, building another fort under the direction of American
officers; that so soon as their forts were built they intended to march. . . .The
main drift of the Americans is to destroy the Black population of Suwanee.
Tell my friend Boleck that it is just throwing away his people to attempt to
resist such a powerful force. ... So soon as the Suwanee is destroyed, I
expect the Americans will be satisfied and retire; this is only my opinion; but I
think it is conformable to the demand made by General Gaines of Kenhagee
some months since.21
20 Congress, Senate, Senate report on the First Seminole War, letter from General
Gaines, 15th Congress, 2nd Sess., Vol. m, Annals of Congress (27 January 1818) 2037.
21 Congress, Senate, Senate report on the First Seminole War, a letter from British
agent Arbuthnot to Seminole ChiefKehengee, 15th Congress, 2nd Sess., Vol. m Annals
ofCongress (21 February 1818), 2035.
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Arbuthnot reflects upon the great odds which were clearly set against the
Seminole in general but the Blacks in particular. Some of his final thoughts in the
midst of Jackson's invasion are further clues which suggest that the War
Department was developing a strategy to eliminate the thriving Black Seminole
towns. The existence of such a strategy is hardly perceptible and could not be
openly discussed in Congress because of the delicacy of the slave issue.22
The Red Seminole were the most numerous, but if they had been the
primary adversary of the U.S., Gaines would not have written Kenhagee. The Red
Seminole resided in a foreign country. If they were raiding the American frontier
settlements and otherwise posing a consistent threat to the nation, it seems
unlikely that Gaines would seek to exempt them from punishment. However, if
Gaines believed both Blacks and Red Seminole were guilty, then he shows a
discretionary reaction to the activities of the Blacks.
To the extent that Blacks were the primary target of the American troops,
MLR in North America was at stake. Certainly, if the total Seminole military
force was less than one thousand, then the Blacks probably never exceeded 200 or
300. MLR was sustained by strategic guerrilla warfare. Therefore, to engage
Jackson's formidable force was not in the best interest of any of the Seminole.
The Adjutant General of the Southern Division of the Army of the U.S. reported
22 Peters, Florida Wars. 51-52; Giddings, Exiles. 49, 50.
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to Congress that the Seminole never put more than S00 men on the battlefield
during the war.23 The Seminole objective was merely to survive physically, when
attacked by Jackson, but in some cases their guerrilla tactics were useful. They
had ambushed Lieutenant Scott's party on the Appalachicola. Also, according to
Major Muhlenburg, in the beginning of the war they had used the same tactics to
stop all American supplies shipped upon the Appalachicola.24 In general, though,
guerrilla tactics could not resist Jackson's two major campaigns of the war.
Jackson personally led the attacks. The first American assault came at
Lake Miccosukee, about ten miles south of the Georgia border or twenty miles
north east of Tallahassee today. Lake Miccosukee had several Black and Indian
Seminole villages, with plantations and herds of cattle. Knowing of Jackson's
approach, the Blacks in particular moved their families far away and prepared to
engage the U.S. forces. The Seminole forces divided into Black and Indian
regiments. As American forces advanced, the Seminole attacked from the most
strategic sites possible, when American reinforcements moved in, they fled in all
directions to prevent pursuit. At Miccosukee the American forces burned 300
23 Congress, Senate, Senate Records show the strength ofJackson's army during the First
Seminole War, 15th Congress, 2nd Sess., Vol. IV, Appendix, Annals ofCongress 2296.
24 American State Papers Class 5. vol. I, 691.
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homes and obtained 1,000 head of cattle for their troops plus a large supply of
corn.25
U.S. forces next captured the undefended Spanish fort at St. Marks, which
is situated on the Apalachee Bay. It was at this site that the British trader
Arbuthnot was apprehended. Just before his capture Arbuthnot had sent the letter
to Kenhagee warning of Jackson's approach. Leaving St. Marks, Jackson marched
10 miles southeast to attack the Seminole villages located upon the Suwanee
River, about 30 miles from its mouth. Here there was a Black settlement of 400
people with plantations, herds of cattle and hogs, and well-built houses. As at
Miccosokee, the American forces encountered separate regiments of Red and
Black Seminole. Initially the Seminole offered resistance, but outnumbered at
least 10 to 1, they had to scatter into the swamps and forest to avoid capture or
death. Again American forces burned the houses and obtained supplies of
livestock and grain. Also, the white woman spared at the ambush of Lieutenant
Scott's party was retrieved.26
It was at Suwanee that another British agent, Robert Ambrister, was
captured. Both Arbuthnot and Ambrister were accused of playing a role in events
since the War of 1812. Jackson hung Arbuthnot and Ambrister was executed by
25 i





firing squad.27 The fates of Arbuthnot and Ambrister symbolically signaled the
conclusion of the First Seminole War. Both had been charged by the U.S. with
considerable responsibility in its beginning. Now their deaths should bring it to a
close. But this false reasoning was soon obvious. If the Seminole had no other
cause of hostility, then the elimination of men who armed them and coaxed them
to attack frontier settlements would bring to a halt further depredations. But even
at the end of hostilities Jackson informed Secretary of War Calhoun that Blacks
were roaming about and reestablishing themselves.28
Jackson had conducted his campaigns between February and April of
1818. It was May when he informed Calhoun of the continued Black threat.
Nevertheless, by July, President Monroe informed James Madison that Jackson
still insisted the whole war could be blamed upon British adventurers and the
Spanish.29 Jackson's statements to Calhoun and Monroe seem to suggest
undertones of duplicity among American policy makers.
Because of British interest in Florida it was easily conceivable that they
would seek to prevent America's expansion. Also, because of Britain's relative
"Congress, Senate, Senate records reveal that Jackson executed two British agents
during the First Seminole War, 15th Congress, 2nd Sess., Vol. IV, Appendix, Annals of
Congress. 2029-35; Covington, Seminoles. 46-47.
28 American State Papers. Class V. vol. 1, 708.
29 James Monroe, Writings, vol. 6, 53.
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weakness there, perhaps they would seek Seminole allies, just as Spain had done.
Additionally, Monroe gave a State of the Union address in which he informed the
Congress that the Spanish government was bound by a 1795 treaty to prevent
slaves from entering Florida and to control Seminole depredations. Monroe
insisted Spain's lack of authority provided a legal basis for Jackson's invasion.30
Still, on the other hand Jackson eliminated the British and Spanish
problems. But his letter to Calhoun showed that key American policy makers
were extremely apprehensive about a Black Seminole resurgence. Therefore,
while Monroe and the Secretary of State Adams used existing problems with
Britain and Spain as the key excuses in Congress, and in diplomacy for the war,
more confidential documentation indicates parallel efforts before, during and after
the war to circumscribe MLR.
Though Jackson had publicly declared victory, he and Gaines warned
Calhoun to expect new attacks. In one letter to Calhoun, Jackson referred to
Florida's instability, "her territory will always prove an asylum to the disaffected
and restless savage as well as to a more dangerous population, unless some
energetic government can be established. . . ."31 Jackson's comment reflects the
dominant military perspective after the war. The Seminole problem especially
30 Ibid.
31 John C. Calhoun, Papers, vol. 3, 313.
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with the Blacks was not yet solved, and policy makers continued to grapple with
this, but Monroe believed the war presented a prime opportunity for American
acquisition of Florida. With her colonies in revolt throughout the hemisphere, he
reasoned Spain could little afford to squander her fleeting power in maintaining
Florida.
Monroe believed that this apparently unending problem with the Seminole
Blacks should be used to finally achieve an American objective, which he had
struggled with at least since assisting Jefferson and Madison negotiate the
Louisiana Purchase. In 1795 the United States and Spain signed the Treaty of San
Lorenzo. Under Article Five of this Treaty, Spain agreed to forcibly restrain all
Indians within Florida from attacking United States territory. Under Article Six,
Spain agreed to return all runaway slaves.32
In December of 1818, just after the Seminole War, Monroe gave a State of
the Union Address on the Florida issue:
If the embarrassments of Spain prevented her from making an indemnity to
citizens. . .for their losses by spoliation and otherwise, it was always in her
power to have provided it by the cession of this territory. Of this her
government has been repeatedly apprised. . .and would likewise relieve herself
from the important obligation secured by the treaty of 1795 and all other
compromitment respecting it.33
32David Hunter Miller, ed. Treaties, vol. 3. 1776-1818. 318-323. John C. Calhoun,
Papers, vol.. 3,313.
33 Monroe, Writings vol. 6, 77.
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The U.S. had long sought Florida and it seems that a combination of
circumstances convinced Spain to take Monroe's advise. In February of 1819, the
Senate ratified a Washington treaty in which Spain ceded all its lands lying east of
the Mississippi to the U.S. Spain added some amendments which were finally
ratified by the Senate in February of 1821. Article Nine of the treaty required
both nations to renounce all claims upon each other. In Article Eleven, the U.S.
agreed to pay American citizens five million dollars for claims against Spain for
property losses under the Treaty of 1795.34
Monroe seemed to express anger over Spain's need for amendments to the
treaty. In his State of the Union address in December, 1819, he said, "the
indemnity for . . .losses sustained, and now again acknowledged and provided for
. . . was nevertheless received as the means of indemnifying our citizens in a
considerable sum, the presumed amount of their losses."35
In the treaty by which the U.S. acquired Florida, Monroe used the
strength of the Seminole and the weakness of the Spanish to the advantage of the
U.S. Though Spain had agreed to return slaves and control the behavior of the
Seminole, the Patriots War re-established the African-Indian-Spanish alliance in
the interest of all parties. Since the 1795 treaty, American policy makers had
34Miller, Treaties, vol. 3, 3-12.
35 Monroe. Writings, vol. 6,106.
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reconciled themselves to the inability of Spain to enforce the agreement;
however, the realliance in the Patriot War left them frustrated. The Negro
fort provided a target which transcended the alliance and allowed the U.S. to
attack the core problem threatening the south. The persistent threats of MLR
however seemed to be the key factor or vehicle for Monroe's insistence upon
indemnity. MLR underscored the Spanish weakness in relationship to the
stipulations of the 1795 treaty. Though U.S. citizens had claims against Spain
for a variety of issues, the claims of the slave industry were projected by the
dominant industry relative to administrations since Washington. Therefore it
seems likely that the claims of the slave industry were the quid pro quo which
paid the price for Florida.
Florida's acquisition provided the Monroe Administration with the
long-sought opportunity to circumscribe the activities of MLR. The U.S. now
provided the firm energetic government of which Jackson spoke. Further
steps were initiated by the Monroe Administration, which technically increased
the control of the federal government over the lives and activities of the Black
Seminole.
In 1820 Calhoun appointed federal commissioners to assist Georgia
state commissioners gain possession of the Black Seminole for Georgia
citizens. These commissioners were seeking to gain possession of slaves
under the provisions of the Treaties of New York in 1790 and Colrein in 1796;
192
also under provisions of agreements between the State of Georgia and Creek
Indians.36
At Indian Springs in 1820 the commissioners negotiated with a group
of Creek chiefs. All of the past treaties had been negotiated by their leaders.
The Creeks were charged with failing to live up to the treaties because they
had not delivered the Black Seminole to their masters. Speaking for the Creek
Chiefs, Mclntosh said they had delivered the few Negroes as required, at
various intervals since the Washington administration. He said that the British
took many Negroes and gave them a fort, and "we helped you destroy the
fort." Also, Mclntosh said, he had marched with General Jackson and had
helped him catch Negroes in the Seminole War. He reminded the
commissioners that the Blacks were, among the Seminole, their mutual
adversary in the war. Mclntosh concluded by declaring that the Upper Creeks
had complied with all treaties.37
The Commissioners responded to the Creeks:
We are however sorry to find that you do not consider yourselves bound to
restore to us the property as well as the Negroes taken or destroyed by
your nation before the Treaty of New York. . . . Brothers: We, your friends
want nothing but what is right; but that we must insist upon. You were
bound to restore all property taken from us .... In the Treaty of Augusta,
thirty-seven years ago, you agreed to restore all Negroes, horses, cattle, or
36
American State Papers Class II. vol. II, 249-521; Giddings, Exiles. 63-67.
37 American State Papers. Class H vol.. 2, 252, 253. Ibjd, 249-521; Giddings, Exiles.
63-67.
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other property taken since the late war. By the treaty of Galphinton,
thirty-five years ago, you agreed to restore all Negroes, horses, or other
property. . . .In the Treaty of Shoulderbone, thirty-four years ago, you
made the same promise. . . .By the Treaty of New York, you promised to
restore all Negroes then in the nation belonging to the Georgians . . .By the
Treaty of Colrein you entered the same obligations . . . .Brothers: We
know or have heard of very few Negroes having been returned or paid for.
. . and our head man the Governor of Georgia has directed us to insist
according to the laws of our country, upon the restoration of, or payment
for, the increase of all such Negroes belonging to the people of Georgia as
have increased. ... As to Negroes now remaining among the Seminole,
belonging to white people, we consider those people a part of the Creek
nation; and we look to the Chiefs of the Creek nation to cause the people
there . . .to do justice.38
The commissioners decided that the Creek Nation was liable for
previous generations of slaves who had escaped from Georgia. It seems
probable that some claims went back as far as the colonial days. As
compensation it was determined that the Creeks would forfeit the vast
majority of their land holdings to the State of Georgia. Also, the Creeks owed
the slave masters up to $250 thousand. This sum was to be paid by the
Federal government to the Georgians, for the Creeks.39 The following
stipulation was added by Commissioners Daniel Forney of North Carolina,
David Meriwhether of Georgia, and the former Georgia Governor David
Mitchell, now U.S. Agent for Indian Affairs:
Whereas a treaty or convention has this day been made and entered into by
and between the United States and the Creek Nation, by the provisions of
38 American State Papers. Class II. vol. 2, 256; Giddings, Exiles. 63-67.
39Kappler. Indian Affairs, vol. II, 195-98.
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which the United States have agreed to pay, and the commissioners of the
State of Georgia have agreed to accept . . .for the discharge of all bona
fide and liquidated claims which the citizens of the said state may establish
against the Creek nation . . . and we do hereby assign, transfer, and set
over unto the United States, for the use and benefit of the said Creek
nation . . .all the rights, title, and interest of the citizens of the said state
to all claims, debts, damages, and property, of every description.40
The Treaty Of Indian Springs essentially gave the Monroe
Administration total legal control over all Blacks of Florida. Though the
treaty stipulated that the U.S. government was the legal owner of the Black
Seminole, for the benefit of their Creek allies, negotiations between Mclntosh
and the Commissioners suggest that the Natives had little real say in the
matter. Though the Upper Creeks had been faithful allies of the American
Government, their land was taken with impunity. Monroe declared that Spain
did not restrain its Indians as required under the 1795 treaty. These "Indians,"
of course were the Black and Red Seminole. Therefore, for the purpose of
indemnifying Georgians, the Seminole were the legal wards of Florida.
Nevertheless, when Mclntosh made the same point to show that the Black
Seminole were residents of Florida and not among the Upper Creeks, the
commissioners denied this. With such convenient duplicity being exercised in
diplomacy, it was not likely that Creeks could really claim millions of dollars
in slave property.
40
Ibid; Giddings, Exiles. 63-67; American State Papers Class TT, vol. 2, 256.
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Monroe declared the Black Seminole were under Spanish authority and
covered by the 1795 treaty to help provide the legal basis for the acquisition
of Florida. As such, the Seminole were to be controlled by Spain. But to
acquire the bulk of remaining Creek lands for Georgia, the Seminole were
declared to be governed by the Upper Creeks.
The failure of all past treaties with Spain and Creeks therefore became
the legal basis for the 1819-21 Florida treaty and the 1821 Indian Springs
Treaty.
In the span of five years the American quest to acquire Florida had
gone from the disastrous outcome of the Patriots War to stunning diplomatic
success. The ancient but dormant alliance of Spain, Black rebels, and
Seminole, was activated in the Patriot War. The Negro Fort provoked a
political effort to isolate MLR. Past American initiatives which challenged the
threat in Florida always sought to confront third parties. Therefore, Spain and
Indians were held responsible. The Negro fort transcended third party
complicity. Black Seminole rebels became the obvious target of U.S. policy
makers.
In the First Seminole War, the Monroe Administration seemed to make
the Black Seminole their obvious primary target, militarily. However,
politically and diplomatically, Spain and the Creeks were blamed and their land
was acquired as a result. The Florida Treaty, geo-politically circumscribed the
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Seminole in general but the Blacks in particular. However, perhaps the Indian
Springs Treaty was most revealing of what the conflict was to evolve into.
This treaty made the United States government de jure slave masters.
Therefore, a battle was to eventually commence between slaves and slave
masters.
The destruction of the Negro fort was specifically a confrontation
against Black Seminole. The comments of Gaines and Arbothnot suggest that
Black Seminole were the primary target of the war. These were two military
initiatives which were largely against MLR. The stipulations and diplomacy
surrounding the Treaties of 1819-21 suggest an effort to facilitate the control
of MLR. In spite of these efforts, American policy makers seemed to believe
MLR was resurgent. The military threat of the Seminole had not decreased in
spite of the geo-political efforts to facilitate this objective.
Andrew Jackson was appointed as the first Governor of Florida in
1821, just after the treaties of that same year were ratified. In May, Monroe
wrote Jackson, "I have full confidence that your appointment will be
immediately and most beneficially felt. Smugglers and slave traders will hide
their heads, pirates will disappear, and the Seminole cease to give us
trouble."41 This was only wishful thinking on the part of the President. By
41 Madison. Writings .vol. 6,185
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July, Mr. Penieres, the Sub-Agent for Indian Affairs in Florida, provided
Jackson with a territorial review of land and inhabitants:
We must add to this enumeration. . .fifty or sixty Negroes, or mulattos,
who are maroons, or half slaves to the Indians. These Negroes appeared to
me far more intelligent than those who are in absolute slavery; and they
have great influence over the minds of the Indians. It will be difficult to
form a prudent determination with respect to the maroon Negroes who live
among the Indians on the other side of the little mountains of Latchiove.
Their number is said to be upward of three hundred. They fear again being
made slaves under the American government and will omit nothing to
increase or keep alive mistrust among the Indians, whom they in fact
govern. If it should become necessary to use force with them, it is to be
feared that the Indians will take their part. It will, however, be necessary
to remove from Florida this lawless group of free booters, among whom
runaway Negroes will always find refuge. It would perhaps be possible to
have them received at St. Domingo, or furnish them the means of
withdrawing themselves from the United States.42
The comments of Penieres shows a general perception of instability in
Florida. It seems that the military and political initiatives of the previous five
years had done little to eliminate the threat which MLR posed to American
interest. Penieres said runaway slaves would always find refuge among the
rebels, consequently he saw no reason to believe that U.S. forces would
prevail over MLR in Florida.43 A U.S. conquest of this grand scale of
rebellion would have of course brought the scope of this phenomenon back to
a micro-level; and as such not requiring national forces to oppose it. This




macro-level of rebellion was facilitated by the alliance with the Red Seminole.
The U.S. inability to foresee a military solution is emphasized by discussion of
sending the Blacks to St. Domingo or other locations. Mr. Penieres believed
that the Red Seminole were governed by the Blacks. At the core of this
perception may have been an alliance which dates back to the Yamasee War of
1714, or even bonds established by Africans and Indians as fellow slaves and
Cimeroons before 1700. Another explanation of this perception could be the
diplomatic ability of a desperate people.
At any rate Penieres advice soon was factored into national policy
making. Jackson wrote Calhoun by September, "These runaway Negroes
spoken of by Mr. Penieres must be removed from the Floridas or scenes of
murder and confusion will exist and lead to unhappy consequences which
cannot be controlled."44
Removing those Blacks required the defeat of MLR. This was not
accomplished by U.S. forces. Therefore, Jackson's prophecies came true. In
the Second Seminole War U.S. policy makers would be led by Jackson as




ultimately ending the threat of the Black Seminoles. This time, U.S. policy
makers would seek to destroy the ancient Seminole alliance.
In Chapter Nine, President Andrew Jackson develops his Indian
Removal Policy. He orders native Seminole to be forcibly moved west of the
Mississippi River and the rebels to be returned to slavery. These orders by the
President will involve the United States in seven years of very costly warfare
against the Seminole allies. In this conflict the phenomenon of MLR emerges
as a significant force in the politics of the war.
CHAPTER IX
THE SECOND SEMINOLE WAR, 1835-42
The Second Seminole War occurred between 1835-42. It was a war
initiated by the slave industry. Every American President between 1788 and
1836 except John Adams and John Quincy Adams had been a slave holder.
Between 1836 and 1842, President Van Buren , though not a slave holder,
favored the interest of slavery regarding the Seminole war.1 Only slave-
holding Presidents had been in office for two terms. The Adams and Van
Buren tenures had been for one term each. Key policies concerning the
Seminole were shaped for slave holders, and in administrations dominated by
slave holders. Many slave holders held key offices in Monroe's administration,
but technically under the Treaty of Indian Springs, the United States
Government itself became a slave-holding institution. Therefore, between the
signing of the Indian Springs Treaty in 1821, and the outbreak of the Second
Seminole War in 1835, national policies on the Black Seminole were truly
dictated by the slave industry.
After 1821, President Monroe, Secretary of War Calhoun, and General
Jackson had voiced apprehensions over the military and social cohesion
between the Black and Red Seminole. Black Seminole particularly were still
seen as a major threat to the slave industry, even though the federal
government had technically become their masters, and Florida was a U.S.
[ Giddines. Exiles. 173.
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territory. Consequently, a policy was initiated to separate the Seminole. This
policy ultimately called for the re-enslavement of the Blacks. American
attempts to execute this policy resulted in the Second Seminole War.
However, the end result of this separation strategy was its general failure.
Therefore, MLR specifically continued to survive and the policy goals of the
Black Seminole were achieved. U.S. policy initiatives and failures, as well as
the success of the objectives of Black Seminole, can be traced by examining
the Fort Moultrie Treaty, the Treaty at Payne's Landing and the Articles of
Capitulation. In the Second Seminole War MLR became a dominant influence
in American government.
In 1821 the Florida Indian agent Penieres, Governor Andrew Jackson
and Secretary of War Calhoun communicated on the issue of the Black
Seminole threat to the slave industry. By 1823 the Fort Moultrie Treaty was
initiated. In this treaty the United States government officially acknowledged
the Seminole as an independent Indian nation. An effort was made to place
the Seminole on a Florida reservation. Article Seven of the treaty stated the
following:
The Chiefs and warriors aforesaid . . . stipulate to be active and vigilant in
preventing the retreating to, or passing through, the district of country
assigned them, of any absconding slaves, or fugitives from justice; and
further agree, to use all necessary exertions to apprehend and deliver the
same to the agent, who shall receive orders to compensate them agreeably
to the trouble and expense incurred.2
2 Sprague, Florida War. 21.
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The Ft. Moultrie Treaty began to shape the circumstances under which
the Second Seminole War would occur. As with the Creeks and the Spanish, a
third party was made responsible for the Black Seminole. Even though the
Indian Springs treaty had technically eliminated all claims on the Black
Seminole, the erratic nature of the slave catching system, could make any
Blacks in Florida a retrievable commodity. Therefore, all Black Seminole
were seen as suspect; and consequently the presence of numerous Blacks
brought request from the slave industry for compensation. The federal
government provided bureaucrats from the Department of Indian Affairs to
mediate between the claims of the American slave industry and those of the
Red Seminole who also claimed some Blacks as slaves.3
As the first American governor of Florida, Jackson was acutely aware
of the complexities of White and Indian claims upon Blacks living in Florida.
As governor, he informed Calhoun that the U.S. should not make treaties with
a subject people. Also, Jackson and Calhoun concurred in the idea of moving
all eastern Indians west of the Mississippi.4 In 1824 Monroe told both houses
of Congress that eastern Indians should be required to exchange their land for
equal amounts west of the Mississippi.3
Before becoming President, Jackson believed that the federal
government should not interfere with states' attacks upon Indian treaties. Up
3 Giddings, Exiles. 78-81.
4 Andrew Jackson, Correspondence ofAndrew Jackson. John Spencer Bassett, ed.
(Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1928) 132.
5 James Monroe, Writings. 88.
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to the Jackson Presidency, previous administrations grudgingly had
acknowledged Indian sovereignty. However, as President, Jackson executed
an Indian policy based upon ideas expressed during the Monroe
administration. In 1830, Congress passed the Indian Removal Act. This law
forced all Indians east of the Mississippi to exchange their lands for western
territory. Treaties were to be negotiated between individual tribes and the
federal government to accomplish this end.6
In 1832 the Seminole were forced to negotiate the Treaty of Payne's
Landing, which required them to give up their Florida homes and move to
Arkansas. They were granted two years to accomplish this task, but
complications developed. The Seminole refused to emigrate west. Article Six
of the Treaty stated:
The Seminole being anxious to be relieved from the repeated vexatious
demands for slaves, and other property, alleged to have been stolen and
destroyed by them, so that they may remove unembarrassed to their new
homes, the United States stipulate to have the same property investigated,
and to liquidate such as may be satisfactorily established, provided the
amount does not exceed seven thousand dollars.7
The Treaty of Indian Springs had theoretically erased the claims of
southern slave holders to the Black Seminole, but in the years between 1821
and 1832 an indefinite number had escaped to the Seminole from Florida,
Georgia, and Alabama. The slave industry was waiting to stake a claim and
forcibly apprehend the Blacks. Therefore, within the Seminole nation a
6 Edward Ressen, Jacksonian America (Chicago, Univ. of Illinois Press 1985) 296-99-
Florida Wars 87.
7 Sprague, Florida War. 75.
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decision was made to resist removal, as the only sure means of securing the
Black Seminole. President Jackson demanded that the Seminole be forcibly
removed and the Blacks be re-enslaved as stipulated in the Payne's Landing
Treaty. This erupted into the catastrophic Second Seminole War in 1835.8
By 1834 it was evident that the Seminole chiefs had decided not to be
removed. The Seminole Indian Agent, General Wiley Thompson, told
Secretary of War Lewis Cass that the chiefs said they wanted to be near their
ancestor's graves. Thompson, however, said their fear of losing their Black
slaves was the real reason and he informed them that they must part with them
anyway. Both Cass and Thompson believed that their refusal was the idea of
the Blacks. Thompson requested troops to protect friendly chiefs because he
believed Blacks and hostile Indians would kill any Seminole trying to
emigrate.9
One of the stipulations in the Payne's Landing Treaties was that the
Seminole, as Creeks, would be located on Creek land in Arkansas. In 1834,
Florida Governor Duval and Thompson informed the War Department that
Black Seminole knew Creeks would seek to claim them under stipulations of
the 1821 Treaty at Indian Springs. Additionally, they said crooked whites who
sold whiskey to the Seminole in exchange for their corn sought to prevent
their removal. Thompson wrote that:
A third cause of hostility to emigration is the influence which it is said the
Negroes, the very slaves in the nation, have over the Indians. The Negroes
are more provident than the Indians. They not only often feed the hungry
8 Ibid, 80-90; Mulroy, Freedom. 28-32.
9 American State Papers Class V. vol. 7, 68-69.
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Indian but having the means they introduce by stealth into the nation
sometimes considerable quantities of whiskey, which enable them while
they derive a profit from the sale of it, to gratify the vitiated and
intemperate appetite of the Indian. This gives them a controlling influence
over him.10
As early as 1821, another Florida Indian Agent, Penieres, informed
Governor Andrew Jackson that the Black Seminole "in fact govern" the
Indians, and should be removed to Africa. Jackson told Calhoun that if the
Blacks and Seminole were not removed, uncontrollable devastation would
occur.11 Also, Duval wrote the Department of Indian Affairs: "Slaves
belonging to the Indians have a controlling influence over their masters and
are utterly opposed to any change of residence. No treaty can be enforced as
long as these Blacks are present, every Indian who seeks to stay will run to
them."12
Even before he executed his Indian Removal philosophy into law,
Andrew Jackson was apprehensive about the presence of Black Seminole in
Florida. There was a perception in the U.S. Department of War that, though
many Blacks were slaves of the Indians, they nonetheless controlled the
Indians. The implication seemed to be that Blacks used this control to block
the execution of federal law and that they threatened to kill Red Seminole who
sought to cooperate with the government. Slavery and other relations between
Black and Red Seminole have been reviewed in the first chapter.
10 Ibid, 454.
11 American State Papers Class TT. vol. 2, 411, 414.
12 American State Papers. Class V. vol. 6, 458.
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The very notion of masters being ruled by slaves is contradictory,
nonetheless its documentation within the War Department was confirmed
thirteen years previous. If indeed Blacks were a controlling force in the
Seminole nation and were able to orchestrate death threats, then perhaps they
were not actually slaves.
Slavery required that complete subjugation of master over slave be
enforced. This prerequisite appears to be missing among the Seminole.
The primary rebel leader and one of the most dominate in general was
Abraham. He served as the interpreter for the Seminole during negotiations
for the Treaty of Payne's Landing. He had at one time been known as the
slave of the principle Seminole chief and acted as his prime minister. Abraham
accompanied the chiefs to Washington in 1825-26 as interpreter.13 One
American commander of the Florida war, General Jesup, described Abraham:
"The principle Negro chief, supposed to be friendly to the whites; said to be a
good soldier and an intrepid leader; he is the most cunning and intelligent
Negro we have seen; he is married to the widow of the former chief of the
nation."14
The Payne's Landing Treaty required Abraham and other Seminole
leaders to travel to Arkansas and review the Creek lands in which they would
share. Abraham made two memorable determinations in the treaty. The
Florida Indian agent had become financially indebted to Abraham; therefore,
Abraham added a stipulation to the treaty which required financial
"Porter, The Negro on the American Frontier. 305-308.
14 American State Papers. Class VT vol. 7, 852.
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compensation for interpreters. Second and most important, Abraham required
the Seminole to be granted land separate from the Creeks, because of their
claims upon Blacks.15 Regarding treaty negotiations, Sprague said,
The mischievous influences of the whites, through the Black interpreters,
operating upon the malignity and suspicions of the younger class of
Indians, nearly defeated the object.16
From the Seminole perspective the clauses stipulated by Abraham
were binding.
The Jackson administration insisted that the Seminole were required
to emigrate regardless of the desires of the chiefs and the people. The
Seminole leaders insisted emigration was only required if all Seminole were
satisfied.
The 24th Congress required President Jackson to submit a report
detailing the causes of the Second Seminole War. Secretary of War Cass
noted that all problems began when the Administration decided troops were
needed to enforce the Payne's Landing Treaty. In early 1834, ninety-four
prominent Florida citizens signed a letter to President Jackson demanding a
solution to the problem of 500 runaway slaves among the Seminole. Shortly
afterwards, federal troops moved in. Florida and Georgia slave catchers made
constant efforts to seize undefended Blacks. Clashes between settlers and
Seminole increased.17 By January, 1835, the War Department decided to
15 Giddings, Exiles. 84-87; Sprague, Origin. 72.
16 Ibid, 74.
17 American State Papers Class V vol. 6, 56-59, 465; Giddings, Exiles. 90-91.
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escalate its efforts of forced removal, and they wanted to provide increased
security for settlers; consequently General Scott was put in command of the
U.S. Army in Florida. Secretary of War Cass said, "General Scott was
directed to allow no pacification with the Indians while a living slave
belonging to a white man remained in their possession."18
As the situation in Florida intensified, Abraham gave the American
authorities the impression that he was in favor of enforcing the treaty, yet he
planned for war. From Havana fishermen he received shipments of gun
powder and other arms. Also, he secretly notified plantation Blacks to revolt
when war broke out. Even Major Dade, the greatest casualty of the war,
believed up to his death that Abraham was peaceful.19
General Scott demanded that the Seminole chiefs assemble their
people for emigration, but Abraham and the Native chief, Osceola threatened
to kill any chief who cooperated. When Chief Mathala assembled his people to
go, he was killed. In an effort to coordinate the military pressure upon the
Seminole for removal, 110 men under Major Dade sailed into Tampa Bay from
New Orleans. A plantation slave in Tampa, Louis Pacheco, was selected to
lead Dade 130 miles north to Fort King. Pacheco notified the Seminole of his
route, and Dade's entire command, except for two men who escaped, were
ambushed and killed. Abraham and eighty warriors were participants in the
attack along with approximately 120 other Seminole.20
18 Ibid, 58.
19Porter, The Negro. 311-12.
20 Ibid, 312-314; Giddings, Exiles. 99-106; M.M. Cohen, Notices ofFlorida (Univ of
Florida Press, Gainesville, 1964) 67-79.
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In the Second Seminole War the United States had approximately
1,500 soldiers killed. The federal government spent approximately $40 million
on the war. Giddings estimated that 300 to 500 mostly non combatants had
been captured, and he said the federal government spent $80,000 per slave
captured. Also, three white soldiers died to enslave each African.21
At about the same time that Major Dade met his fate, General
Thompson and several others were ambushed and scalped by Osceola and
about 20 warriors.22 The attacks upon Dade and Thompson formally
inaugurated the war. The Payne's Landing Treaty left one option to the Black
Seminole, prevail on the battlefield or return to plantation slavery. It was this
lack of options which spurred on Abraham's violent response. As a leading
member of the Seminole nation and a diplomat, Abraham had traveled to
Washington. He was well aware of the power and wealth of America. He
knew that ultimately the Seminole couldn't prevail. Nonetheless, his objective
was to wage such a protracted guerrilla struggle that American political and
military leaders would alter the treaty to provide better terms for the Blacks.
Abraham sought either the right to remain in Florida or free passage for all
Blacks to Arkansas and land separate from the Creeks.23
A few weeks after the massacre of Dade's forces, citizens of St.
Augustine gathered to prepare for defense of the city. They sent a message of
distress to the Congress, the President, and to southern newspapers, stating:
21 Giddings, Exiles. 310-16.
22 Ibid; Peters. Florida Wars. 107.
"Porter, The Negro. 314.
210
Our delegate requested to urge upon the Congress. . .and upon the
President the early consideration of calamities and ruin. . .by the ravages of
an unrestrained savage foe. Now just conceive their position—eight
hundred or one thousand warriors. . .with three or four hundred Negroes of
their own, better disciplined and more intelligent than themselves, to whom
there is a daily accession of runaway Negroes from the plantations. . . .24
Even though many Indians such as Osceola were violently opposed to
emigration, the treaty held out options for them which most seemed willing to
accept. The Second Seminole War was ultimately a war to preserve the
freedom of the Black Seminole. Abraham personified the struggle politically
and militarily. As the Spanish, then Indian, pretexts were removed by
diplomacy, the Federal government was able to legally and politically
circumscribe the Black Seminole. The Payne's Landing Treaty left them
politically and legally isolated. However, the United States was ill prepared to
confront the strongest aspect of MLR, which was its guerrilla military alliance
with the Indians. Equally important to the survival of MLR was the theater of
operations—the jungles, swamps, and forest of Florida.
As MLR transcended all pretext, in a mode of self-preservation,
Abraham stepped from the background to assume a dominant role both
politically and militarily. With the fate of all Black Seminole at stake, this was
only appropriate.
After the Dade massacre, full-scale military operations got under way.
General Scott was in command, assisted by Generals Clinch, Eustis, Gaines,
and Jesup. There were approximately 6,000 U.S. troops and 500 to 1,000
Seminole. General Gaines was ordered to proceed from Tampa and retrace the
24 American State Papers. Class V. vol. 16, 19.
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route of Dade with about 1,200 troops. En route, Gaines was attacked by the
Seminole on the Withlacoochee River. Gaines estimated that he was
confronted by 1,200-1500 Seminole. Several of his men were killed in an
assault that seemed to come from all directions. The Seminole burned the
forests to confuse Gaines. U.S. forces were pinned down for over one week.
They got low on ammunition and began to slaughter horses for food. Even a
dog was eaten. Gaines sent a rider for help. At last Abraham came forward
and called a truce. He requested brandy and tobacco and allowed the
Americans to fish in the river. In further negotiations, both sides agreed to
stay on their sides of the river. Fearing starvation and a massacre, as with
Dade, Gaines told the Seminole to beware because vast American forces would
arrive any day. Finally, General Clinch arrived and the Seminole fled. 25
Between December and June, 1835-36, numerous battles occurred
between the U.S. and the Seminole. In most instances the Seminole were
outnumbered 5 or 10 to 1. Though American generals sent reports of
victorious conflicts against the enemy and noted how the Seminole were
dispersed from the battlefield, little progress had been made. Florida citizens
were so fearful that they abandoned their plantations and sought refuge in
forts and towns. The lack of success for American troops of the battlefield
spread consternation from Florida to the White House. In Tallahassee the
Commander of U.S. Troops, General Scott, was burned in effigy by the
25 Sprague, Origin. 110-111; Giddings, Exiles. 118-24; Cohen, Notices. 83-103;
Porter, Negro, 315-16.
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citizens. Florida Congressman Joseph White demanded that Scott be removed
and that an investigation be held on the progress of the war.26
Captain Sprague was a participant in many of the Florida battles and
was in the theater essentially from beginning to end. Sprague described the
general situation in Florida in 1836:
The theatre of operations was a wilderness, and every hammock and swamp
a citadel for the enemy. . . They harassed the troops day and night, and
with the fleetness of the deer, retired to a more secluded spot. The men,
worn down with constant watchings, disappointments, and tedious
marches, still no nearer the enemy, struggled on in hopes they would
hazard a general action. Too wary for this [the Seminole] they knew their
strength consisted in moving in parties of 10, 15, or 20 men. Subsequent
events, and the experience of intelligent officers, as well as citizens, have
proved that a Florida campaign, however well timed, skillful and judicious
in its arrangements and progress, was not to result in the capture or
subjection of the Seminoles. 27
By mid 1836 it was apparent that the Seminole who had fought
removal, seeking better terms, were not defeated. Their guerrilla tactics were
successful at thwarting armies ten times their size. Their battlefield success
set off a chain reaction. Scott's orders from the War Department were to
remove the Seminole and offer no peace as long as slaves belonging to whites
remained among them. This policy was unenforceable. It was initiated by
slave-holding citizens pressuring Jackson, who then sent troops through the
Secretary of War to execute the policy. The utter failure of the policy
reverberated back to the Executive and Legislative branches of government.
26 Congress, Senate, Florida Congressman Joseph White demands the General Scott be
relieved ofthe command in the Second Seminole War, 25th Congress, 2nd Sess.,
Congressional Information Servine, (l l January 1836) S. Doc. 231, Fiche 378, page 6.
27 Sprague, The Origin. 114.
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General Scott was essentially accused of incompetence. In June of 1836,
President Jackson convened a court of inquiry as requested by the Senate, to
discover what was going on in Florida.28 Letters were circulating in the media
which cast blame on Scott's conduct. The President responded:
Who gave Genl [sic] Scott, Genl Jesup's letter will be a subject of Inquiry
when I return-however it is immaterial~the delay of Genl Scott at
Columbus, with his unaccountable order to Jessup [sic] to halt when near
the Indians, when one hour's delay may have been the cause of the Indians'
escape was sufficient proof of his want to capacity to fight Indians, and
was sufficient ground to call him from the command against Indians. . . .
Scott ought to have retired and not obtruded himself on the command
assigned to Jessup, but when he did he ought to have acted with
promptness and put this puny Indian war down in 10 days. General Scott
had ought to know, I had no hostile feelings towards him—the shameful
proceedings in Florida with the panic that pervaded everywhere, which has
tarnished the reputation of our army ought to have induced every military
man to have exerted themselves to have regained the army's lost military
character. The Inquiry will be, has Genl Scott so acted, if so, he will
stand acquitted, if not, he will stand condemned.29
The testimony presented in the Inquiry revealed how a policy which
was crafted in Washington became undone by guerrilla warfare. According to
General Gadsen the U.S. troops were not prepared to fight a guerrilla war. He
said, "the contest on our part degenerated, and therefore, from a war to a
hunt, in which the enemy had to be sought as you would seek the lion or the
tiger, with the hazard of being sprung upon from every jungle or thicket."30
Colonel Lindsay reported the U.S. forces had as little knowledge of
the theatre as they had of the interior of Africa. Also, he said that quicker
28 American State Papers Class V. vol. 7, 125.
29 Andrew Jackson, Correspondence vol. 5, 419.
30 American State Papers Class V vol. 7, 135.
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than U.S. troops could erect tents, the Seminole could construct a shelter from
Palmetto branches which kept out rain.31 General Eustis said he never
encountered more than SO Seminole. Said Eustis, "the enemy was gifted with
ubiquity, he was to be found everywhere and nowhere." Eustis reported that
one-third of his 1600 South Carolina volunteers contracted the measles.32
The Inquiry, testimony, and disputes centered upon Gaine's battle, and
subsequent negotiations with Abraham on the Witchlaoochee River. Captain
Thistle was pinned down with General Gaines at the battle of Withlacoochee.
His testimony was that he assumed they were confronted by 1,200 Indians and
Negroes. Thistle noted that they were out of food and were eating horse and
dog and were low on ammunition. He said, "The Negro Abraham hailed the
camp," seeking peace, tobacco, and brandy; but in retrospect he believed
Abraham only tricked Gaines. He only sought intelligence so the Seminole
women and children could be moved away from the war.33
General Scott felt indignant at even having to appear. Scott was sure
that Jackson, Gaines, and Jesup had some personal dislike of him and believed
the Inquiry was a waste of time while his men were still fighting. He resented
the term, "failure of the Seminole campaign," and quickly pointed out that no
one else had had any success in Florida.
The testimony of Scott and the Inquiry in which it was solicited are





According to Von Clausewitz, "war is not merely a political act, but also a
real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce."34 Considering
Von Clauswitz, it seems the battlefield is transformed by definition into a
quasi-legislative area. In the case of the Seminole War, the theatre with its
lack of success was an arena ripe for the conception of policy alteration. The
battle on the Withlacoochee seemed to symbolize the general failure of policy.
In defending his Florida command, General Scott was a representative from
this quasi-legislature. As such Scott was the first of many Generals who while
accounting for failure in battle ultimately became advocates or representatives
for the general Seminole goals. The goals of course were specifically tied to
Abraham's battlefield strategy and diplomatic forays. Abraham's personal
security was never in doubt, he therefore endeavored for the masses of the
Black Seminole.
Scott and the succeeding commanders and other generals would
ultimately be the representatives, or quasi-diplomats from the battlefield, who
could not enforce policy, and consequently convince U.S. policy makers to
change policy. The inquiry was the beginning of the documented failure of
U.S. policy goals, and the reciprocal documented reason, to yield to the
Seminole.
Scott defensively reviewed previous testimony:
I am persuaded that the total force of Seminole doesn't exceed 1,200.
We've never yet seen 130, and I don't think 500 exist within 10 square
miles, but parties of 10 to 30 are seen everywhere."35
34 Clauswitz, On War. 23.
35 Sprague, Origin, 131.
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Scott, sure Gaines had been tricked by the Seminole into revealing
valuable intelligence, observed:
How was I, Mr. President, to account for our not finding, three weeks
after General Gaines, any considerable body of the enemy? He supposed
himself to be surrounded in his breastwork, with his 1,000 or 1,100 men,
by 1,200 or 1,500 warriors. What had become of them? He certainly
killed but few and captured not one. Whence then the subsequent
dispersion?36
Gaines had reported subduing and dispersing the Seminole at
Withlacoochee, but Scott noted their request for brandy and tobacco was not
the talk of a subdued enemy. Contrary to Gaine's report, Scott declared the
Seminole victorious.37 Ultimately he concluded that non-success was caused
by heat, sickness, and geography, he said that he:
had not a guide that knew any intricacies of the "cove," a certain
labyrinth, held from the knowledge of white man, as the sacred groves of
the Druids were never entered except by the initiated. . . .Government
gave me no topographical information, nor had any to give; and the
booksellers' maps only . . .filled up with unlucky guesses.38
Scott endeavored to show that the fate of his campaign in Florida was
not so much in his control. His testimony suggests that Gaines may have been
pinned down for two weeks and nearly starved, by a force one tenth the size of





inquiry essentially cleared Scott and noted that U.S. forces were stalemated by
the season, geography, and poor transportation.39
Nonetheless, Scott was removed from the Florida command. General
Call temporarily replaced him, and by November of 1836 General Jesup would
be placed in command. Jesup zealously waged war against the Seminole and
sought to enforce the Payne's Landing Treaty, but ultimately this would lead
him to become the chief advocate of the goals of Abraham and the Seminole.
Upon receiving his orders to command, Jesup wrote to Acting Secretary of
Defense Butler:
If I should not succeed in dislodging Powell, I can on returning to this
place, strike Micanopy, Philip, and Cooper. . . each with from one hundred
and twenty to two hundred Indians and Negro warriors, the latter perhaps
the more numerous. . .this you may be assured is a Negro, not an Indian
war; and if it be not speedily put down, the South will feel the effects of it
on their slave population.40
Jesup served as Commander of U.S. forces in Florida from November,
1836, to July, 1838. During this period he had limited success. He was able
to reduce the total Seminole population in Florida by two-thirds after
negotiations with Abraham; however, he could not change the general pattern
which ultimately led to American failure. To the end, until the best terms
were achieved allowing all Seminole to freely emigrate, they would move in
deadly parties of three, four or five, eluding American forces ten or 20 times
their number.
39 American State Papers. Class V Vol. 7, 159.
40 American State Papers Class V vol. 7, 853.
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It seems that Jesup had no illusions about the nature of the Seminole
War. Though he did not specifically call it a slave-catching expedition or a
war for the slave industry, Jesup recognized the fact that slavery was the
central issue. His conduct in the theatre seemed to evolve from first
identifying the real issues to advocating a solution and then unilaterally
executing that solution.
Upon putting Jesup in command, President Jackson remarked:
It is true that the whole Florida War from the first to the present time
has been a succession of blunders and misfortune. . . .Everything at present
is wrong. . . .1 have tried all the Generals and as Genl Jesup is now there
and in command, he I hope will finish this unfortunate business.41
Jackson surprisingly seemed baffled by the tremendous difficulties in
Florida. Though he had commanded the First Seminole War, he was well
aware of the difficulties inherent in declaring victory in Florida.
With 8,000 men, Jesup chased the Seminole, from the Okefenokee
Swamp of Georgia to the Everglades of Florida, still unable to subdue them.
When tired or nearly cornered, the Seminole sometimes declared truces, only
as a ploy to regain their advantage. After months of heavy fighting, Jesup
received peace overtures from Abraham. He wrote the Secretary of War:
I am awaiting most anxiously the movement of hostile chiefs, many of
them prefer death to removal. In all the numerous battles and skirmishes
that have taken place, not a single first-rate warrior has been captured.
. The warriors have fought as long as they had life, and such seems to me,
to be the determination of those who influence their councils«I mean the'
leading Negroes. . . .We may conquer them in time, and may destroy them,
it is true; but the war will be a most harassing one. . . .1 am not disposed
41 Jackson, Correspondence, vol. 5, 434.
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to overrate the difficulties which surround me, but in communicating with
you, it would be criminal to underrate them. . . . Abraham has just come in
with a flag, accompanied by a nephew of the Indian Cloud, and a Negro
chief.42
Perhaps sensing that American forces may be ready to alter their
policy, Abraham and the key Seminole chiefs signed the Articles of
Capitulation in March of 1837. The Articles incorporated the Payne's Landing
stipulations except for one key change. Article 5 stated, "Major General
Jesup, in behalf of the United States, agrees that the Seminole and their allies,
who come in and emigrate to the west, shall be secure in their lives and
property; that their Negroes their bona fide property, shall accompany them
west."43
The Articles of Capitulation, viewed together with the above
statements of General Jesup, reveal a War Department which was growing
weary of the Seminole War. Jesup indicates that little progress had been made
towards success. It was by the utter frustration of every battlefield effort that
the Payne's Landing Treaty was repudiated. Jesup received unachievable
orders. Therefore, he was trapped between an unyielding federal government
and Seminole guerrillas who were apparently unbeatable. It seems that
Abraham negotiated a solution to the problem. In exchange for Jesup's sincere
efforts to enforce Article 5, Abraham tirelessly sought to end the war and get
42 American State Papers. Class V. vol. 7, 832-34.
43 Ibid.
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all Seminole to emigrate.44 This compromise ultimately was a victory for
MLR. The triumph of the guerrilla struggle had initiated a policy change.
Jesup wrote to the Adjutant General R. Jones that he would begin to
disband his troops and that settlers could begin to return and that the war was
over. However, he noted: "A trifling impropriety on the part of the white
population of the frontier might light it up again. The Negroes rule the
Indians, and it is important they should feel themselves secure; if they should
become alarmed and hold out, the war will be renewed."45
When news of Jesup's Articles of Capitulation reached the regional
planters, who claimed Seminole Blacks as their property, they wrote the War
Department, and their congressional representatives demanding that there be
no peace until their slaves were apprehended. Jesup hoped that the more
recent runaways would be surrendered by the Seminole. To this end the
wording of Article 5 may have been intentionally ambiguous. In all probability
Abraham hoped to give as broad an interpretation to the words "allies," and
"their Negroes their bona fide property," as possible, to include all Blacks
among the Seminole.
On the other hand Jesup was pressured by the slave industry through
the War Department, and by battlefield realities. He probably hoped to let
Abraham and enough of the other key Seminole go west to bring about a
beneficial effect on the battlefield. The slave holders feared Jesup might
somehow ignore orders from Washington and allow Blacks to emigrate. Jesup
"Giddings, Exiles. 139-150; Sprague, Origin. 177-81.
221
had designated certain forts as sites for the Seminole to surrender before
transport to Tampa and Arkansas. By May Jesup reported to the War
Department that the arrival of slave owners at the evacuation sites had caused
the Blacks to flee. He insisted that because the "Negroes rule them," the
Indians flee too. This was the cause of the war's renewal.46
Jesup had informed the War Department of the direct connection
between Black free emigration and the end of hostilities. In spite of this it
seems that no effort was made to prevent slave holders from jeopardizing the
freedom of the Blacks. In June, Jesup informed the Adjutant General Jones, "
I have the honor to report that this campaign, so far as relates to
Indian emigration, has entirely failed. The Seminole chiefs were, I
believe, sincere in their intentions of fulfilling the provisions of the treaty,
but they have no influence over their people. . . they were to have come in
again on the 2nd, but failed, and on the night of that day they were seized
by a force of armed warriors and removed to the interior. In the
meantime, I desire you to present my most earnest request to the
Secretary of War and the General in Chief that I be immediately relieved
from command of this army.47
General Jesup was frustrated by his dilemma. The Administration was
continuing to yield to pressures from American non combatants, who made his
orders impossible to carry out. Jesup informed General Jones in Washington:
As an act ofjustice to all my predecessors in command, I consider it my
duty to say, that the difficulties attending military operations in this
country can be properly appreciated only by those acquainted with them.
This is a service which no man would seek with any other view than the
mere performance of his duty: distinction, or increase of reputation is out
of the question; and the difficulties are such that the best concerted plans
"Giddings, Exiles, 144-148; American State Papers Class V. vol. 7, 830.
47Ibid, 838.
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may result in absolute failure, and the best established reputation be lost
without a fault. If I have at any time, said aught in disparagement of the
operations of others, in Florida, either verbally or in writing, officially or
unofficially, knowing the country as I now know it, I consider myself
bound, as a man of honor, solemnly to retract it.48
Jesup had sent a letter to the press critical of General Scott which
helped to spark the Court of Inquiry, but now after several months of
command and not really defeated but unable to win, he understood Scott's
quandary. All the pressures of an impossible task had fallen upon the military
officers. He had already attempted to end the war on terms that benefited no
one except the Black Seminoles. However, with the failure of this effort he
now had to take his men back into a quagmire.
In a letter to Secretary of War Poinsett, Jesup began to advocate for
the modification of the war policy:
From the facts that are daily coming to my knowledge, I doubt whether the
chiefs could exercise sufficient influence over their people to induce any
considerable portion of them to leave the country; and if they determine to
remain, it will depend upon themselves how long they will remain; they
cannot be driven out so long as they can obtain ammunition, unless we use
northern Indians and Spanish bloodhounds. We may harass them, and
ultimately destroy them, but it will cost as much time and treasure as the
war carried on by the British government against the Maroons. . .that war,
if I remember right, was terminated by the bloodhounds; and resulted not in
unconditional submission but in a treaty which secured both liberty and
property to the conquered. How far such a policy would be proper in the
present case I am hardly prepared to give an opinion. The question is
surrounded by difficulties, view it as you will. The two races, the Negro
and the Indian, are rapidly approximating; they are identified in interests
and feelings. ... At the battle of Wahoo, a Negro, the property of a
Florida planter, was one of the most distinguished leaders .... The
depredations committed on the plantations east of the St. John's were
perpetrated by the plantation Negroes, headed by an Indian Negro, John
48Sprague, Origin. 173.
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Cesar, since killed, and aided by some six or seven vagabond Indians. ... I
throw out these hints for the consideration of my official superiors, without
pretending to offer an opinion as to the propriety of adopting them.49
Jesup's frustrations are perceivable in the letter to Poinsett. He
underscores the impossibility of military victory. His plan of using
bloodhounds was attempted but was an utter failure.30 Jesup shows signs of a
battlefield political reaction though. After rejecting the propriety of
continuing to execute U.S. policy, he suggested freedom and land for the
Seminoles. These things had already been offered to the Indians in the Payne's
Landing Treaty. Therefore, he was advocating the interest of MLR. Also,
Jesup explained that the Blacks and Indians had the common bond of
oppression and were formidable as battlefield allies in Florida. He verifies that
Abraham's battlefield strategy of gaining the allegiance of plantation Blacks
had some success. The key point is Jesup's not so subtle advocacy here for
the ultimate goals of Abraham and MLR Parallels drawn most likely to the
maroons of Jamaica underscore the extent to which the Seminole War was a
"Negro War," as specifically stated by Jesup.
Jesup commanded U.S. troops in Florida longer than any other
General, between November of 1836 and July of 1838. General Scott's
inability to defeat the Seminole led to his dismissal. During his command
General Jesup succeeded in removing approximately 2,400 Seminole to
49 American State Papers. Class V. vol. 7, 876.
50Giddings,Exjles, 271.
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Arkansas.31 His success in this endeavor began only after he won the
allegiance of Abraham and the official concurrence of key Seminole Indian
chiefs. Once the Articles of Capitulation were signed, a ray of hope existed
for the key instigators, the Black Seminole. During the negotiations of the
Articles, Abraham's family and many other Indians and African Seminole
surrendered for removal. Jesup kept Abraham's family hostage. The white
planters caused most of the Seminole to flee and resume hostilities, but with
Abraham's family as hostages he consented to assist Jesup in an intensive
diplomatic effort. With Abraham as a guide and diplomat, many Seminole
were captured and convinced to surrender. Often women and children were
captured as a prelude to the surrender of the warriors.52
According to Porter, Jesup launched "a joint campaign of military
operations and peace-propaganda."53 Under this strategy perhaps 400 (mostly
non-combatant) Blacks were returned to slavery. Most of these seem to be
recent runaways. At times, whole Seminole villages were captured while U.S.
officers gained their trust under the white flag of peace. This tactic
corresponds to the Seminole tactic of raising the white flag under the guise of
peace, only to rest, move families, and get supplies from American
negotiators.
51 Congress, Senate, General Jesup's report to the Senate after retiring from command,
25th Congress, 2nd Sess., Congressional Information Service (7 July 1838) S. Doc. 507,
Fiche378-ll,pagell.
52 Porter, Negro, 317-321; Giddings, Exiles: Covington, Seminoles. 85-95.
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Nonetheless, though Jesup used tactics which violated truces and
otherwise were duplicitous, he must be credited with a battlefield conversion
which altered the course of history. He tried to first yield totally to Abraham's
goal; when this failed he enforced the original policy of the War Department
but modified the strategy. He sought freedom for the "bona fide property" of
the Indians but re-enslavement for the most recent runaways. This
modification grew into a policy which satisfied the fears of the Seminole and
eventually halted the war.
In spite of removing two-thirds of the Seminole, neither Jesup nor the
War Department felt any less apprehension over confronting the remaining
warriors. Jesup remarked in a letter to the War Department, "We have at no
former period of our history had to contend with so formidable an enemy. . .
.Governor Coppinger is said to have expressed the opinion many years ago,
that the Captain General of Cuba had not force enough to control the
Seminoles."54
During this period General Zachary Taylor confronted the Seminole in
probably the greatest battle of the war. Taylor, with about 1,200 men, faced
approximately 250 Seminole. Taylor chased the Seminole 140 miles into the
Everglades, where his men were forced to dismount and wade into a deep
swamp to continue pursuit. While American forces were in the swamp, the
Seminole poured a heavy barrage of fire upon them, after which they retreated
to the shores of Lake Okechobee. In his report to the War Department
Taylor's refrain follows those of Scott and Jesup before him:
54 American State Papers. Class V. Vol 7, 872.
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The action was a severe one, and continued from half-past twelve until
three PM, a part of the time very close and severe. We suffered much,
having twenty-six men killed and one-hundred and twelve wounded,
among whom are some of our most valuable officers. . . . And here, I
trust, I may be permitted to say, that I experienced one of the most trying
scenes of my life, and he who could have looked on it with indifference,
his nerves must have been very differently organized from my own-
besides the killed, among whom were some of my personal friends, there
lay one hundred and twelve wounded officers and soldiers, who had
accompanied me one hundred and forty-five miles, most of the way
through an unexplored wilderness. . . gallantly beaten the enemy, under
my orders, in his strongest position, and who had to be conveyed back
through swamps and hammocks . . . .Could the enemy be brought to
battle, even in his strong holds, the war would soon be closed, no matter
at what sacrifice of life on the part of officers and soldiers. . . .Fortunately
for them, however that such is the nature of their country that
concealment is found to be more efficacious than opposition, and they
leave the climate to fight their battles. . . if nature has so organized the
Indian that he is fleeter of foot than the white man, and given him a
country where no tracks are left when he flies; and if we have not
overtaken him, it is our misfortune, not our fault. And should the war be
renewed (which I sincerely hope may never be the case) the only way to
bring it to a successful issue, in my opinion, is to cover the whole country
so as to prevent the enemy from hunting and fishing."
In this communication, Taylor exhibits the same pattern of dispersing
the enemy, yet not defeating him, which Jesup describes. This was the war's
most direct confrontation yet only 11 Seminole were killed and none captured.
Like Jesup, Taylor appears exasperated by an impossible mission. However,
the boldness of his action prompted Jesup to pursue the Seminole. In early
1838, Jesup chased the Seminole into a swamp. He had 500 mounted men
against perhaps one hundred Seminole. Jesup's men sustained seven dead,
thirty wounded. Not one Seminole was left on the field, so it is unknown if
they sustained any dead or wounded. However, Jesup was severely wounded.
55 Sprague, Origin. 208- 226.
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Among his men, General Eaton, Colonel Twiggs, and others urged Jesup to
end the fighting and let the Seminoles live in peace. Jesup concurred and sent
a messenger to notify the Seminole of the truce.56
In February of 1838, Jesup made a final appeal to the War Department
to modify its terms of surrender to the Seminole. He sought a reservation for
them in Florida, because of the impossibility of prevailing on the battlefield
against them. According to Jesup the lands were not yet needed by Whites,
and they would never been able to inhabit the region because of its climate.
Also, Secretary of War Poinsett was notified that Southern Florida was not
worth the cost of the medicines needed in the campaigns. Jesup said:
As a soldier it is my duty, I am aware, not to comment upon the policy of
the government, but to carry it out in accordance with my instructions. I
have endeavored faithfully to do so; but the prospect of terminating the
war, in any reasonable time is anything but flattering. My decided opinion
is, that unless immediate emigration be abandoned, the war will continue
for years to come, and at constantly accumulating expense. Is it not then
well worthy the serious consideration of an enlightened government,
whether ... the object we are contending for would be worth the cost. . .
. I respectfully recommend the measure to your consideration, and that of
the President, as the only means of terminating, immediately, a most
disastrous war, and leaving the troops disposable for other service. I
desire a decision as soon as your convenience will permit, as by the middle
of April at farthest, the troops must be withdrawn from the posts in the
interior, to preserve their lives.57
Jesup was well aware of the Black Seminole quest to remain free and
of their strategy to wage guerrilla war until freedom was assured. He




hoped for. However, Poinsett notified Jesup that only a temporary truce could
be agreed to and that the Payne's Landing Treaty had to be enforced. Jesup
continued his dual strategy of war and negotiation, but by July he retired from
Florida, after which the Senate requested a report.58 In that report Jesup told
them that as Commander in Chief of the Army in the field he felt it was in his
power to establish policies which would be most successful ultimately, but that
he made sure the ultimate decision was left to his superiors. Here it seems
that Jesup was communicating a policy contradicting his superiors, one which
had been initiated by Abraham prior to hostilities but communicated to Jesup
in the quasi-legislature of the battlefield. Jesup told the Senate that without
his policy modifications it was doubtful if "twenty warriors could have been
killed or taken."59
Thus Jesup retired from Command of the Florida war. After having
helped to ridicule General Scott for his lack of success, Jesup finally
understood that the climate and geography of Florida, combined with the
guerrilla tactics of the Seminole, were more than a match for American forces
who outnumbered them ten to one and who possessed vast resources and
technology. After making these discoveries Jesup advocated for the interest
of the Seminole as a means of terminating an endless war. His key partner in
the modification of policy and battlefield diplomacy was the "intrepid"
warrior, Abraham.
58 Ibid, 201-202.
59 Congress, Senate, Congressional Information Service, page 9.
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As Jesup prepared for retirement, he sent Abraham, his family, and
approximately 90 other Black Seminole en route to Arkansas. Before his
departure Abraham had a letter sent to Jesup with his X:
I have the honor to present my best respects to you. Myself and
Tony Barnet have done everything promised by us, and expect the General
will do by us as he said at the beginning of this campaign . . . .We wish to
get in writing from the General, the agreement made with us. We will go
with the Indians to our new home, and wish to know how we are to be
protected, and who is to have the care of us on the road. We do not live
for ourselves only, but for our wives and children who are as dear to us as
those of any other men. ... I have charge of all the Red people coming on
to Pease's Creek, and all are satisfied to go to Arkansas. . . .Whoever is to
be Chief Interpreter we would wish to know. I cannot do any more than I
have. I have done all I can, my heart has been true since I came in. . . .1
hope Toskeegee is satisfied. All his Seminole Brethren are coming in. . .
.All the Black people are contented I hope. Your servant Abraham.60
After nearly three years of warfare the effort to enforce the Payne's
Landing Treaty was stalemated. But as Jesup and Abraham prepared to exit
the theatre there was room for optimism. By this time only the Washington
policy makers and the slave industry which spurred them on still insisted on
the re enslavement of Black Seminole and the removal of the Red. In 1837,
Jesup had begun to use Choctaw, Creek, and Delaware Indian soldiers of
fortune. He promised them and volunteer troops from the southern states a
share of Seminole horses, cattle, slaves, and other plunder as partial payment
for their services. On one campaign many Blacks, primarily women and
children, were captured. All the soldiers of fortune and other claimants from
the slave industry wanted a share of these slaves.
60 Porter, Negro, 332.
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Jesup allowed a few of these to be sent into slavery with the white
southern claimants. The rest were sent with Abraham to Fort Pike in New
Orleans. Jesup required the Creeks and other Indians to be paid a bounty of
$25 each, as their share for claims upon the Black Seminole. This policy was
endorsed by the Secretary of War and the President in 1837.61 As was the
case with the Treaty of Indian Springs, these Seminole became the property of
the federal government. In this single case Jesup uncovered the solution to
ending the Seminole War. Here he still executed the original policy and
initiated what would prove to be a permanent solution. He let 35 slaves be
sent into slavery but decided to purchase the claims of all others.
The Indian Springs Treaty of 1821 was negotiated by Georgia slave
holders. When they made slaves of the United States of the population of
Black Seminole, there was no apparent desire to free them from the slave
industry. Jesup indicates in his report to the Senate, that as Field Commander
and Chief, he felt that having the Army take custody of the Blacks and then
paying off claimants was the best military policy. It seems probable that Van
Buren and Secretary of War Poinsett only applied this policy modification to
this single case, but Jesup knew that this modification of policy must prevail
to end the war.
Just before the Court of Inquiry of 1836, Congressman John Quincy
Adams generally endorsed a similar policy in connection with the war. Adams
responded to critics who declared that the federal government had no right to
interfere with slavery. He noted that during the Revolution and the War of
61 Giddings, Exiles, 158-62.
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1812, it was the federal government which interceded on behalf of the slave
industry to make claims for slaves in the peace treaties with England. Adams
declared:
But the war power of Congress over the institution of slavery in the States
is yet far more extensive. Suppose the case of a servile war, complicated,
as to some extent it is even now, with an Indian war; suppose Congress
were called to raise armies, to supply money from the whole union, to
suppress a servile insurrection, would they have no authority to interfere
with the institution of slavery? The issue of a servile war may be
disastrous. By war the slave may emancipate himself; it may become
necessary for the master to recognize his emancipation by a treaty of
peace. . . .It would be equivalent to saying that Congress have no
constitutional authority to make peace. . . . They must and will interfere
with it—perhaps to sustain it by war; perhaps to abolish it with peace.62
Adams expounds a constitutional theory which had been applied in
previous wars with a foreign power. The notion that slaves could be liberated
to achieve peace directly applied to the Seminole War, and terms solicited by
Abraham. His concept of war powers is far reaching. Adams theorizes that
under war powers slaves can be liberated, not that they must be. However, his
ideas were rebuked by a Congress in which the slave industry was dominant.
Though the idea could have been helpful to MLR it also could have been used
to demand their enslavement; or if necessary the contingencies of war, and war
power, could have demanded a policy of enslavement for all Blacks and
Indians in the United States. Adams' view of war power could not be
executed from where he sat. In Washington the slave industry was dominant.
In the quasi-legislature of the battlefield, MLR had a forceful voice,
which initiated policy by its very success. Adams spoke of war powers in the
62 Congress, House, John Quincey Adams discusses the impact ofthe Seminole War
on slavery, 24th Congress, 2nd Sess., Congressional Globe (25 May 1836) page 4040-47.
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hands of the Executive and Legislative branches. The battlefield contingencies
had forced the commander in the field to co-opt extensive power and make
policy in the field—granting liberty, which could not have been done in
Washington of 1838.
When Abraham and 90 other Black Seminole arrived in New Orleans
along with Seminole Natives, immediately a lawyer representing an individual
slave holder got a court order to claim all 90 Blacks as his property. General
Gaines, the Commander of the Western Military District of the U.S., had been
fighting the Black Seminole since he had ordered Colonel Clinch to destroy
the Negro fort in 1816. General Gaines had been pinned down and nearly
starved by Abraham and other Seminole in 1836. But now Gaines ignored
orders from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to deliver the Blacks back into
slavery. Gaines resisted the court order and demands of the New Orleans
sheriff. Also, he went into court and argued that the Blacks were not nor had
ever been slaves of any whites; that they were all, men, women and children,
prisoners of war under the authority of the President only.
The judge rejected Gaines' argument, saying it was better to remove
such formidable foes from the hands of potential savage enemies in Arkansas.
Nevertheless, Gaines, who conducted this defense out of his own resources,
appealed to a higher court, at which time the slave holder dropped the case.
All the Black Seminole were sent on to Arkansas.63
The same lawyer for the claimant pursued the 90 Blacks to Arkansas
and made the same appeal to Governor Roane and to General Arbuckle,
63 Giddings, Exiles. 209-211.
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commander of Fort Gibson. He made the claim to the Blacks in the name of
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Both the governor and the general turned
him down on the grounds of public safety. Neither wanted the Seminole War
to erupt in peaceful Arkansas.64
By May of 1838 Jesup had retired and Generally Zachary Taylor was
in command of U.S. forces in Florida. Taylor made a zealous effort to move
all Seminole west, but he made it known to his superiors that he would not
execute the Treaty of Payne's Landing. From the beginning of his tenure as
Field Commander, Taylor treated all Blacks whom he captured, or those who
surrendered under the Articles of Capitulation, as prisoners of war; then all
were sent to Arkansas.65 When the War Department ordered him to assist in
obtaining the 90 Seminole Blacks in the company of Abraham, Taylor said the
following:
I know nothing of the Negroes in question, nor of the subject, further than
what is contained in the communication above referred to; but I must state
distinctly for the information of all concerned, that, while I shall hold
myself ever ready to do the utmost in my power to get the Indians and their
Negroes out of Florida, as well as to remove them to their new homes west
of the Mississippi, I cannot for a moment consent to meddle with this
transaction, as to be concerned for the benefit of Collins, the Creek
Indians, or any one else.66
According to Congressman Joshua Giddings, this language from a
Brigadier General, to the Secretary of War was, "received at the War





Articles of Capitulation, negotiated by Abraham and the Seminole Chiefs had,
to a very great extent, become the de facto law of the land. This was
underscored by the actions of Gaines, Governor Roane, General Arbuckle, and
Taylor. Finally, the slave industry pressured its legislators in Washington to
take up the matter with the War Department. Secretary Poinsett, through the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, declared that, "the Government held the
power and constitutional right to dispose of prisoners of war, whatever their
character may be. "67
The original goal of the Seminole, like all of the Indians, was to
remain in their homelands east of the Mississippi. Most knew they had no
realistic chance to remain. This was also the case for the Seminole. Only the
threats from Blacks and radical leaders such as Osceola and Wild Cat inspired
the great war. As it became apparent that the Articles of Capitulation were
being executed, the number of Seminole resisters began to dwindle.
Nevertheless, there were holdouts who either did not trust the Articles or who
simply wanted to remain in their ancestral home. Those Seminole who
surrendered or were captured, Black or Indian, were sent west by General
Taylor as prisoners of war.
The few remaining Seminole still kept the U.S. at full troop
strength.68 In spite of this, before his retirement from Florida, Taylor had
made tentative plans to divide Florida into districts, 20 square miles each.
Each district would contain forty soldiers and five topographical engineers.
67 Ibid, 227.
68 Sprague, Origin. 263.
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This plan would have required a troop strength of thirty- to forty thousand
men. Taylor retired from Florida in April of 1840. In his report to Congress
he stated, "the enemy in several instances had been found, chased, and some
killed, but they were far from being caught or subdued."69
General Armistead took command until May of 1941. Like Taylor, he
came no closer to military success, and he continued to send Black and Red
Seminole to Arkansas. Following Armistead, General Worth became the
Florida commander. Worth's command followed the same military pattern, in
spite of new tactics. U.S. forces normally would not attempt to fight between
May and October or November because of the threats of disease; however,
Worth attempted summer campaigns in an effort to interrupt the Seminole
growing seasons.
In July and August of 1841 Worth reported sixty soldiers dead from
illness and 5,000 men having reported to sick bay. In spite of his efforts, the
Seminole were not yet conquered. Their population had been greatly reduced,
but hostile Seminole still remained, continuing to inflict surprise attacks upon
troops and settlers. Worth continued to send Seminole to Arkansas.
By May of 1842 President Tyler instructed Worth to end the war.
Tyler estimated that no more than 240 Seminole remained, with perhaps eighty
warriors. He noted that it was impossible to catch those remaining and too
expensive to maintain the full troop strength. Tyler said the Florida settlers
would have to be armed to protect themselves.70 Hostilities with the
69Ibid,221,227.
70Ibid, 243, 247, 261-70, 475.
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Seminoles continued until 1858, but the Articles of Capitulation proved to be
the most effective factor which led to both political and military solutions.71
Jesup engineered the key military solution by providing the Blacks
with freedom in the west; but the political pressure in Washington originated
with the constituent slave holders. Before leaving office, Secretary of War
Poinsett had instructed General Armistead to once again attempt to end the
war under terms of "Payne's Landing and by the interest and feelings of the
people of Florida."72
The interest of the people of Florida were primarily the claims upon
the remaining Black Seminole. This fact, coupled with lingering
apprehensions of the Black Seminole, had been the primary cause for war.
Jesup had paid the claims of the Creeks to keep Abraham and others moving to
Arkansas. In 1841, abolitionist congressman, Giddings, noted:
Money was now offered certain influential men of the Seminoles and Exiles
[Blacks] to induce them to exert their influence with their friends to
emigrate. . . .It was therefore proposed that Congress should make an
appropriation for the purpose of purchasing such Exiles; yet the bill making
it was general in its provisions. . . . This money was to be expended to
purchase the pretended interest of certain white men to the individual
Exiles whom they claimed as property.73
Apparently, it was hoped that the resources expended would remove
all obstacles for the parties concerned. This tactic had been earlier used by
Jesup. The purposes of the expenditures were disguised in Congress, while
71 Peters, Florida Wars. 267.
72 Giddings, Exiles, 280.
73 Ibid, 280-281; Congress, Secretary ofWar Bell reports to Congress on methods for ending
the Seminole War, 27th Congress, 1st sess., Congressional Globe (June 1841) page 5057.
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voted upon and passed by Southern Congressmen. This was accomplished in
two separate bills for a total of $1.1 million.74
Later in 1842 the Congress requested a report from President Tyler on
the disposition of slaves captured in the war. In the report, the Secretary of
War Crawford listed seventy-eight captured slaves, but he denied having any
knowledge of, or means to gain knowledge of, any payment for those slaves.
By this covert means it appears that the dominant factors which caused the
war to begin and continue were satisfied.73
In Crawford's report it was stated that Captain John T. Sprague
helped deliver Seminoles from Florida to Arkansas. Sprague had been in the
war since 1835. Concerning the war's conclusion, Sprague wrote:
With the surrender of Indians in Florida, and their embarkation for
Arkansas, an important question arose in relation to Negroes in their
possession. . . . The independence and freedom so long enjoyed,
unchecked, had unfitted him for any usefulness to the claimant. . . . These
Negroes had learned to speak the Indian language, together with a
knowledge of English, and intimacy with the habits of whites, soon gave
them an ascendancy, when the slave becomes the master. The Negroes
from the commencement of the Florida war, have, for their numbers, been
the most formidable foe, more blood thirsty, active, and revengeful, than
the Indians. . . . The lives of citizens and their property, demanded that
they should be sent far beyond the country with which they were familiar. .
. . The swamps and hammocks of Florida could, for years, be made safe
retreats from bondage, where without labor or expense, they might defy the
efforts of armed men. . . . Ten resolute Negroes, with a knowledge of the
country, are sufficient to desolate the frontier, from one extent to the
other. To obviate all difficulty, the claimant of the Negro in possession of
74 Sprague, Origin. 250; Giddings, Exiles. 281-282.
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the Indian, was, upon identifying and proving property, paid a fair
equivalent, determined by a board of officers.76
Perhaps it is not incredible that a captain who sailed from Tampa Bay
to New Orleans, steamed up the Mississippi, then traveled in wagons with the
Seminole to Arkansas would have knowledge about appropriations and
expenditures, to the slave industry, which the War Department lacked.
It is probable that northern Congressmen and their constituents would
never have approved such expenditures. If the expenditures had not been
forthcoming, however, it is conceivable that the "Great Seminole War" would
have extended into the Civil War and perhaps northerners would have been the
allies of MLR. After traversing the Florida theatre for more than a decade,
Sprague indicates that the primary concern was that Spain or England would
further arm the Blacks and bring in more Black troops from the West Indies,
causing a general slave uprising. Though he was from Michigan, he believed
this was not an issue which could be "sheltered" in philanthropy, but that it
had to be addressed by North and South "in the forum or in the field."77
Sprague addresses a consistent theme in American politics«an
apprehension with Florida. Fears of slave rebellions had been expressed since
the days of the Continental Congress. Though the Second Seminole War had
been foretold by Jefferson and Jackson, the scope and dimension of the
conflict was probably unpredictable. During the Patriot War, Georgia
Governor Mitchell expressed concern over a general African slave rebellion,
76 Sprague, Origin. 309-10.
77Ibid, 310.
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centered in Florida, with help from the West Indies. Sprague's comments
perhaps underscore something unique about the African condition in America.
Given a reasonable opportunity of success, they would champion the cause of
personal and group freedom.
The Treaty of Moultrie Creek identified the Seminole as a people
separate from the Creeks, but it continued to deny that Black Seminole were
anything except property. They were only pawns of negotiations of third
parties. Also, this begs the question: Did Black Seminoles seek the status of
slaves for legal and diplomatic protection?
In the Second Seminole War the United States had approximately
1,500 soldiers killed. The Federal government spent approximately $40
million on the war. Giddings estimated that 300 to 500 mostly non-
combatants had been captured and he said that the Federal government had
spent $80,000 per slave captured; also, that three white soldiers had died to
enslave each African.78
By 1832, Jackson wanted to move all Natives west of the Mississippi.
To the extent that Black Seminole were their property, they had a legal
argument to be granted continued freedom in the west. The Black Seminole
leader, Abraham, representing himself as a slave and diplomat for the
Seminole, attempted to include stipulations which were in the interest of all
Blacks. Abraham rallied the whole Seminole people to project a united front,
in the face of Jackson's orders to apprehend Blacks and move Indians west.
Once united in war the Seminole were determined to show the U.S. that
78 Giddings, ExUes, 310-16.
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concessions or modifications to the Payne's Landing Treaty was the only
peaceful solution. American Generals therefore became the advocates for
MLR. In particular they advocated and enforced Abraham's Articles of
Capitulation which ended the war.
In Chapter Ten the Abolitionist Congressman Joshua Giddings
discovers the nexus between the Seminole War and the slave industry. Both
Giddings and fellow Abolitionist John Quincy Adams used this nexus to help
repeal the congressional Gag Rule which barred any mention of slavery on the
House floor. The repeal of this rule ultimately moved the nation closer to the
Civil War.
CHAPTER X
THE INDIRECT IMPACT OF MLR
During the Second Seminole War, Macro-Level rebellion (MLR) was a
political force which altered Federal policy. This can be directly observed in
Articles of Capitulation which were emitted from the battlefield. Additionally,
MLR was an indirect factor in both the failure of President Van Buren to be
reelected and the repeal of the Congressional gag-rule. The repeal of the gag-
rule was important because it was a legislative barrier which prevented
northern and southern Congressmen from engaging in the fatal debates which
helped bring on the Civil War. Therefore, macro-rebellion can be seen not
only as a co-conspirator of Congressional abolitionists but also as a catalyst of
the Civil War. American politicians in the federal government had been
responding to the presence of Black Seminole since John Jay and the
Continental Congress sought to convince Spain to repeal the Edict of 1693.
This effort was begun by Jay and completed by the Washington
Administration. It cannot, though, be said that these diplomatic efforts of
Washington and Jay initiated American knowledge of the Black Seminole.
During the previous centuries, American colonists had become acquainted with
the rebels.
Washington's urgent efforts to repeal the edict demonstrate America's
awareness and concern with the Black Seminole threat to the slave industry.
Georgia's documented claims upon Black Seminoles extended back to the days
of James Oglethorpe and continued to the days of John Jay and George
241
242
Washington. The continuity of claims and knowledge of Black Seminole
impact upon growth and development made the Edict an obvious target.
However, this also was certainly a clear indication that the threat to the slave
industry was facilitated by Spain. Between the repeal of the Edict and the
Articles of Capitulation, the primary American initiatives concerning the Black
Seminole dealt with third parties. With Spain, the Treaty of 1795 stipulated
that Spain would capture and return slaves. All treaties with the Creek
Indians had these same stipulations. The Creeks had worked with the British
and then the Americans for more than a century as slave catchers. The
Treaties of Colrein and New York were key treaties in which Creeks promised
the return of slaves. The Seminole were viewed as a part of the Creek nation,
but the Treaty of Moultrie Fort legally established the Seminole as sovereign
in the eyes of American policy makers.
The Treaty of Payne's Landing in 1832 continued to view the Black
Seminole as pawns in the hands of third parties. In the process of negotiating
this treaty, and the Seminole response to it, Abraham assumes a dominant role.
He was certainly the most prominent Black and perhaps was the most
dominant of all Seminole. This would seem to be a logical conclusion.
Fourteen years prior to the commencement of the Second Seminole War, the
Seminole Indian Commissioner Penieres informed Governor Jackson that the
Blacks were the rulers of the Seminoles, in spite of being technically classified
as slaves. Governor Jackson relayed this intelligence to the War Department,
with the warning that the Black Seminole must be removed or, "scenes of
murder and confusion will exist, and lead to unhappy consequences which
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cannot be controlled."1 Indian agent Thompson and Florida Governor Duval
made the same conclusions 14 years later, stating that the Black Seminole
would dictate war or peace for the Seminole. Additionally, in documents
transferred from the War Department to the Congress, General Jesup informed
policy makers that the Second Seminole War was a Negro war rather than an
Indian war. Therefore, Abraham could be rightfully viewed as the most
influential Seminole leader.
The commencement of the Seminole War during the presidency of
Andrew Jackson underscored the prophecy of peril made while he was
Florida's first governor. Abraham was the primary interpreter and diplomat of
the Seminole. In this capacity he appears to have been the architect of their
policy, rejecting removal unless Blacks were given free passage to Arkansas.
Also he most likely initiated the strategy of waging a protracted war to
achieve these terms.
General Scott was given orders to remove the Indians to Arkansas and
return the Blacks to slavery. These orders led to war. Von Clauswitz states
that war is only an extension of politics. Consequently, the battlefield is a
political arena or quasi-legislature, which is capable of initiating policies. In
the Congress, Parliament, or other variants in Republican government, policy
is influenced by a number of factors—money, votes, or reason. In the quasi-
legislature of the battlefield the throes of war can potentially become the
primary determinant of policy.
1 American State Papers. Class IT. vol. II. Walter Lowrie, Mathew St. Clair Clarke eds.
(Washington: Gates and Seaton 1832) 414.
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Correspondence from the battlefield indicates that the Seminole
conducted an inscrutable guerrilla campaign for at least a five-year period.
Within this context, Abraham and Jesup initiated peace talks. In the Articles
of Capitulation, the Treaty of Payne's Landing was enforced with one key
modification, Black Seminole, deemed as bona fide Seminole property, were
permitted to emigrate. Ultimately, Jesup expanded the scope of modification
in U.S. policy objectives to the point that he advocated the key Seminole
policy goals. The success of the Seminole is measured in the general
execution of their policy objective. They did not defeat the United States, but
they prohibited American commanders from executing their orders.
The U.S. sought the unification of master and slave; the Seminole
sought the separation of master and slave. The Articles of Capitulation
codified this, and Jesup eventually began to compensate those parties which
claimed to have been separated from their slaves.
Jesup believed that American troops could pursue the Seminole
throughout Florida for an indefinite number of years without successfully
achieving the stated policy goals. In conceding to the Articles, he accepted
terms which Abraham and other Seminole had been seeking since the Treaty of
Payne's Landing. Therefore, from the quasi-legislature, the policies of MLR
were emitted to Jesup. He and other generals executed these policies. The
policy of freedom for the slaves originated with the slaves. Eventually, with
all commanders executing the policy, the goals of the War Department were
superseded. Ultimately, the Executive Branch and the Congress and the slave
industry accepted the policy of MLR crafted exclusively through a successful

























Fig. 1. How policy goals moved to and from the quasi-legislature.
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America's Seminole War objectives were changed as a direct result of
MLR. Presidents Jackson and Van Buren in response to the slave industry
ordered commanders through the War Department to enforce the Payne's
Landing Treaty. Battlefield stalemates converted commanders into agents for
MLR. To this extent the chain of command was subverted. For four years
Van Buren presided over a failing policy. The policy was changed from the
opposing end of the command structure, and the slave industry which had
demanded the Black Seminole as property was compensated.
Under such circumstances it was perhaps impossible for Van Buren to
remain unscathed by that policy. In 1840, Martin Van Buren ran for re
election. Regarding the campaign Giddings makes these comments:
The Presidential election of this year was conducted differently from any
that had preceded it. The opponents of Mr. Van Buren arraigned him
before the people for his extravagance in the expenditure of public
treasure. . . . Among the subjects made prominent before the country, was
that of the extravagant expenditures in prosecuting the Florida War.
Speeches were made in Congress exposing the various practices by which
the people's money was squandered in that unfortunate conflict. . . . These
speeches were printed in pamphlet form and sent to the people in vast
numbers; but the real cause of the war, the deep depravity of that policy
which sought the enslavement of the Exiles, was not mentioned; nor does it
appear that any member of Congress was conscious, even, that such a
people as the Exiles was living in Florida. But nevertheless, it is quite
certain that this war proved one of the principle causes of Mr. Van Buren's
defeat.2
In Martin Van Buren and the American Political System. Donald B.
Cole wrote that by the spring of 1840, as the presidential campaign was in
progress, a principle burden was the Seminole War. The Democrats and
2 Joshua Giddings, Exiles. 274-275.
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Whigs debated over expenditures for the war. This caused a great deal of
hostility for Van Buren.3 It seems that there were other campaign issues
which weakened his candidacy. The war was an added burden which helped
assure his defeat.4
For four years Van Buren ordered the execution of the Payne's Landing
Treaty. The first casualty of this impossible policy came at the center of its
failure, the battlefield. General Scott was relieved of the command in Florida
even before Van Buren's Presidency, because he could not enforce the Treaty.
Scott was a victim of President Jackson's high expectations for a "ten-day"
victory.
In four years, after millions of dollars spent and over 1,000 dead,
stalemate reverberated from the battlefield to the White House, giving voters
one more reason to reject Van Buren.
Van Buren's loss of the Presidency was not a direct result of MLR,
however it helped to shape his fate. For four years MLR was directly opposed
to his objective. In all probability any aspect of American politics which
depended upon the fulfillment of the Payne's Landing Treaty were forced to
adjust to the new policy. Conversely, there were entities which were akin to
the goals of MLR. At the core of the Seminole War was the resistance to
slavery.
3Donald B. Cole, Martin Van Buren and the American Political System (Princeton-
Princeton University Press, 1984) 366.
4 Edward M. Shepherd, American Statesman (Boston and New York: Houghton,
Mifflin and Co, 1899) 365-66; Dennis Tilden Lynch, An Epoch and a Man (New York-
Horace Liveright, 1929) 452.
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In the 1830s a national abolitionist movement was inaugurated. The
Abolitionist Congressman, Joshua Giddings, indicates that the national
movement including members in Congress were unaware of the fight against
slavery being waged in Florida. In general though, the Seminole and the
Abolitionists had a common objective in their opposition to slavery.
By 1832, many petitions concerned with the issue of slavery poured
into Congress. Northern abolitionists were alarmed over many aspects of
slavery and sought to influence changes in national slave policies by
petitioning Congress. But in 1835 a southern-dominated Congress passed a
resolution which prevented discussion of such Abolitionist petitions. The
South reasoned that the Constitution forbade any federal interference with the
institution of slavery in the various states; additionally they said the petitions
were disruptive and could lead to disunion. This 1835 resolution became
known as the gag-rule.5
Because the gag-rule prevented all discussion of slavery, Abolitionists
in Congress often went to great lengths to connect other issues to slavery in
the remotest sense. Sometimes this method allowed them to engage in limited
discourses on slavery before being called to order by southern Congressmen.
However, the persistence of the Seminole War required annual appropriations
from Congress, and the President had to keep Congress informed about the
war's progress. Therefore, with the enslavement of the Seminole rebels being
the core issue of the war, Abolitionists were provided a means of transcending
5 Joshua R. Giddings, Speeches in Congress. (: Cleveland: John P. Jewett and
Company, 1853) 52.
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the gag-rule. Eventually, by 1844, the Seminole War issue helped them vote
out the rule.
In 1836 some Congressmen from Alabama sought relief for their
constituents, who were made refugees by efforts to move Creeks to the West.
John Quincy Adams took advantage of this occasion to discuss a similar
resolution, which had been approved for refugees in Florida. He argued that
in both instances the citizens were covered by the war powers of Congress and
the President, which he said incorporated vast indefinite authority,
unstipulated by the Constitution. Adams infuriated the southern Congressmen
by saying that war powers gave authority to do anything, from providing for
refugees to separating slaves from their masters. He argued that during servile
wars such as in Florida, that if liberating slaves was in the best interest of the
nation, then the federal government was required to do so.6
Unlike the slavery petitions which were pouring into Congress, the
Seminole War demanded discussion. As Adams spoke in 1836, President
Jackson and the Congress were proceeding with the Court of Inquiry,
examining General Scott's conduct. Even if Southern legislators sought to
direct discussion away from the Black Seminole, the very nature of the war
provided a legitimate issue related to slavery, which Congressional
Abolitionists could use to evade the gag-rule and chastise the institution.
In 1841 southern Congressmen proposed the first of two resolutions
which provided $1.1 million to assist in the removal of the Seminole. They
had just narrowly defeated a proposal by John Quincy Adams to repeal the
6 Congress, House, John Quincey Adams discusses the impact ofthe Seminole War on
slavery, 24th Congress, 2nd Sess., Congressional Globe (25 May 1836), 4037-50.
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gag-rule. Adams, Giddings and other Congressional Abolitionists were using
every opportunity to challenge the rule.7 With this proposal, Congressman
Giddings first acquired proof that the principle issue of the war was slavery.
He decided to use this aspect of the war to test and weaken the gag-rule.
Speaking to the whole House, Giddings commented:
I am somewhat incredulous as to its [the war's] immediate termination by
the means presented by the gentleman from South Carolina. In order that
our legislature shall conduce to its early close, we must act with reference
to the causes which have unfortunately involved us in hostilities. This war
has occupied the attention of the Executive for the last five years; our
whole military force has been employed to carry it forward; our officers
and soldiers have fallen victims to the climate; our funds have been
squandered; but the propriety of this vast expenditure of life and treasure
have been kept from the public view. . . . No member has attempted to
explain the causes of its commencement.8
Giddings explained as much of the Seminole history as he knew at that
time. In this explanation he pointed out how Blacks became the key point of
contention between American slave holders and both Indians and Spaniards.
Then he presented documentation from the War Department which proved that
the effort to enslave the Black Seminole was the cause of the war. Giddings
expressed shock at the suggestion that a resolution calling for additional
expenditures could now suddenly bring an end to the war. Southern members
of Congress insisted that the gag-rule prohibited exposure of the war's
7 James Brewer Stewart, Joshua R. Giddings and the Tactics ofRadical Politics.
(Cleveland: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1970) 62-63.
8 Giddings, Speeches. 1-2.
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relationship to slavery, but the presiding officer, Mr. Clifford of Maine,
allowed Giddings to continue.9
Giddings said:
I regard this interposition of the federal power to sustain slavery as
unwarranted by the Constitution. This war is, therefore, unconstitutional,
unjust, and an outrage upon the rights of the people of the free states. . . .
I hold that if the slaves of Georgia or of any other state leave their
masters and go among the Indians, the federal government has no right, no
constitutional power to employ the army for their recapture, or to expend
the national treasure to purchase them from the Indians. . . . These
extraordinary efforts of the President to sustain slavery, will constitute an
interesting chapter in our political history. . . . They have been kept from
the people, and my present object is to bring them forth to the public
gaze. . . . And, Sir, our army was put in motion to capture Negroes and
slaves. Our officers and soldiers became slave-catchers, companions of
the most degraded class of human beings who disgrace that slave-cursed
region. . . . Indeed, it seems to have been an object with some of the
officers employed in Florida to induce government itself to enter into the
business of capturing and selling slaves.10
While Giddings spoke, Southern members screamed for him to be
silenced. But he was quickly able to show the ties to new appropriations
requested. Southerners gathered around him in an effort to intimidate him.
Giddings received a continuous stream of attacks from the South, including
one suggestion that he be lynched, and also he traded death threats with
another. Julius Alford of Georgia ran to attack Giddings but was restrained.
In his inaugural address, President Harrison alluded to Giddings as he
denounced those who would bring on a civil war.11
9 Giddings, Exiles. 280-81.
10 Giddings, Speeches. 6-12.
11 Stewart, Giddings. 65-62.
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Giddings1 three-hour speech was perhaps the most deadly blow which
had been struck against the gag-rule and therefore against slavery, since the
latter had become a national issue in the 1830's.12
The Abolitionist movement against slavery was carried on through the
underground railroad and other means. Nevertheless, the gag-rule's
prohibition against all speeches and petitions further strengthened the South
and weakened the Abolitionists.
In the Congress, the Seminole War was an issue which ensnared the
South in a web of its own lies. The South's insistence that the war had
nothing to do with slavery permitted the most volatile of all slave issues to
transcend their carefully crafted gag-rule. Giddings1 speech was distributed
nationwide. Had the Seminole War been put down in "ten days," as Jackson
had hoped, there may not have been a comparable means to transcend
American law and thereby strike blows for the abolition of slavery.
In 1842, John Quincy Adams presented a petition from 46 of his
constituents requesting a peaceful dissolving of the Union because of Southern
outrages including the gag-rule. Several Southern Congressmen wanted to
censure Adams, and they charged and tried him for treason. Among the issues
which caused extreme anger in the trial was Adams' enunciation of the policy
that slaves could be freed under war powers. This policy was brought to
reality in the Seminole War, which clearly demonstrated the validity and
practicality of the policy. In this instance the Black Seminole struggle played
12 James M. McPherson, "The Fight against the Gag Rule: Joshua Leavitt and
Antislavery Insurgency in the Whig Party, 1839-42," Journal ofNepro History. 1963, (48)
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an indirect role in the South's unsuccessful effort to censure Adams. This
failed effort moved the nation closer to repeal of the gag-rule.13
There were numerous issues concerning slavery which were used by
Adams, Giddings and other abolitionist Congressmen to oppose the gag-rule,
but few actually provided an opportunity for legitimate debate. One such
issue involved the slave ship Creole. The Creole was loaded with Virginia
slaves headed for New Orleans. En route, the slaves revolted and sailed into
the Bahamas. The British freed the slaves, but the southern legislators
demanded their return.M Giddings was poised to use the introduction of
resolutions on the Creole case to challenge the gag-rule, but the South refused
to act.15 They realized that the Abolitionists were eager to overturn the rule.
Giddings attempted to argue that the federal government had no
jurisdiction over slavery, only state government did. Therefore, neither state
nor federal government had jurisdiction when the Creole revolt occurred in
international waters, which allowed slaves to revert back to their God given
natural rights of freedom, given back by Britain.16
Before Giddings could state his case the South attacked him and he
was called to order for breaching the gag-rule. Giddings was censured and
13 John Quincy Adams, The Diarv ofJohn Ouincv Adams. 1794-1845 (New York:
Charles Scribners Sons, 1951) 533-35; Joshua R. Giddings, History ofthe Rebellion: Its
Authors and Causes (Cleveland: Follet, Foster and Company, 1864) 160-172- Stewart
Giddings. 71-72.
"McPherson, "Gag Rule," 188.
15 Ibid, 193; Stewart, Giddings. 73.
16 Ibid, 70; McPherson, "Gag Rule," 188.
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removed from his House seat.17 The resolution which removed Giddings
stated:
Whereas the Hon. Joshua R. Giddings has this day presented to this
House a series of resolutions touching the most important interest
connected with a large portion of the Union, now a subject of negotiation
between the United States and Great Britain of the most delicate nature,
the results of which may eventually involve those nations and perhaps the
whole civilized world in war; and whereas it is the duty of every good
citizen, and particularly the duty of every selected agent and representative
of the people, to discountenance all efforts to create excitement,
dissatisfaction, and division among the people of the United States. . .
.therefore, Resolved, that this House hold the conduct of the said member
as altogether unwarranted. . . deserving the severe condemnation of the
people of this country, and of this body in particular.18
In general the petitions which flooded into Congress, calling for
abolition, came from the constituents of Giddings, Adams, and most of the
other northern Congressmen. The South's removal of one of their leading
representatives was the tossing of the gauntlet to Abolitionists. Giddings'
removal was a challenge which forced the Abolitionists to organize like no
previous event had, nationwide and in Congress. Not only did the
Abolitionists determine to overthrow the gag-rule, which Giddings was
challenging, but they were preparing to overthrow the dominance of the slave
industry which had been paramount in national politics since the Washington
administration. The Seminole rebels would prove to be an immobile source of
strength in this challenge.19
17 Congressional Globe. 27th Congress, Blair and Rivers, eds. (Printed at the Globe
office, Washington, 1842) 340-346.
18 Ibid, 344-345.
19 Stewart, Giddings. 75-76.
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In spite of threats of lynching from Southern Congressmen, Giddings
made his way back to Ohio and prepared for re-election. He was re-elected by
a 7,469 to 393 vote in May, 1842. His constituents demanded that he
reintroduce the Creole resolutions. Even southern members acknowledged
that Giddings1 return was a great triumph for Abolitionists. Giddings
presented the Creole resolutions in spite of a few protesters, but no member
attempted to invoke the gag-rule.20 According to Stewart:
Through the process of his censure, re-election, and reassertion of
the Creole resolutions, Giddings had successfully defied his party and
nearly all of Congress. The continued independence of the antislavery
Whigs was now insured. Congress would henceforth be unable to escape
sectional issues by forcing the agitators out. . . .21
Giddings1 presentation of the Creole resolutions seemed to unofficially
end the gag-rule, but it was officially voted down by Congress in February of
1844. Before that vote Giddings made many comments on the rule. He said
that Adams had sought disunion because of the rule's unfairness to the North;
Giddings agreed that the rule challenged the permanency of the Union. He
reminded members that the Articles of Confederation gave each state sole
authority over its slaves and that the Constitution refused to touch the issue.
But he again concurred with Adams that war powers permitted federal
interference with the institution. He stated:
It is, I believe, well understood by military men; it was practiced by
General Jackson, General Gaines, and General Jesup, and I believe by




hesitate to severe the relation of master and slave whenever they believed
the public good demanded it.22
Giddings commented upon the South's unwillingness to tolerate federal
interference under the war powers, but in the case of securing the slave
industry, he noted their demands of federal interference. He spoke of the case
of the Negro Fort, in which "270 men, women, and children were
instantaneously murdered, for no other crime than a love of liberty."23
Giddings pointed to the millions of federal dollars expended by
southern dominated administrations: "For the purpose of enabling the owners
of southern slaves to regain their runaway Negroes, we waged a bloody and
expensive war with the Indians of Florida."24
Giddings and other Abolitionists had succeeded in undermining the
gag-rule in 1842 and voted it out in 1844. Even while the rule existed, violent
threats were uttered in Congress, but after there was no legislative barrier,
heated debates occurred which hastened the commencement of the Civil War.
From this perspective the rebels can be seen indirectly to have contributed to
the total abolition of slavery in the U.S.
From the quasi-legislature of the battlefield, Seminole success in
guerrilla war ultimately resulted in their policy goals being executed. In
general Black Seminole were permitted to travel freely to Arkansas. This pre
war Seminole objective only became an executed policy because of war, which
22 Giddings, Speeches. 55.
23 Giddings, Speeches. 59.
24 Ibid, 58.
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demonstrates the direct political impact of the rebels. Their objectives
reverberated from the quasi-legislature to Washington.
For four years, Van Buren, as Commander-in-Chief, had led the effort
against MLR, the failure of his orders, ultimately help to assure his defeat at
the polls. Conversely, the Abolitionist and the Black Seminole had fought for
common interests. Therefore the success of MLR was indirectly beneficial to
the Abolitionists. Unwittingly, they were coconspirators in the great
American quest to abolish slavery.
CHAPTER XI
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION
From 1693 to 1842, Black Seminoles launched a consistent assault
against the institution of slavery on the North American continent. Though
only a relatively small percentage of slaves ever escaped to Florida and fought
with the Seminoles, the lives of many thousands of slaves were indirectly
influenced by their efforts. The success and perseverance of the Black
Seminoles perhaps can best be explained by three factors: the alliance with
Spain and the Native Americans, Geography, and the will of the African to be
free.
The geography of Florida, as a factor in the Black Seminole struggle,
has been very well documented. However, in particular, the Second Seminole
War was a conflict in which the United States army meticulously documented
how geographical factors aided the Seminoles in battle. United States officers
and enlisted men alike gave testimony in Present Andrew Jackson's Court of
Inquiry in 1836. Their testimony stressed Seminole knowledge and U.S.
ignorance of Florida's swamps and forests; and as a consequence, American
forces were stalemated by the Seminoles for nearly seven years.
Captain Sprague was a veteran of this conflict from the beginning to
the end. He wrote in his account of the war that as few as ten Black
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Seminoles, who knew their geographical surroundings, were capable of mass
destruction in the state. Sprague said that, "the swamps and hammocks of
Florida could, for many years, be made safe retreats from bondage, where
without labor or expense, they might defy the efforts of armed men."
British and American references to the Seminoles included
documentation of geographical problems which complicated their endeavors to
confront the Florida allies. But in the Second Seminole War, geography was
stated to be one of the primary factors of the U.S.-Florida morass. One
American commander, General Jesup, declared that the War Department had
sent an army to explore a wilderness, and that U.S. forces were as ignorant of
Florida as of the interior of China.
Perhaps the ultimate demonstration of an American commander's effort
to eliminate the army's geographical liability came under the command of
General Zachary Taylor. Taylor proposed to divide Florida into districts of
twenty square miles each, with forty soldiers and five topographical engineers.
The engineers would in theory explore and map the state and therefore put the
U.S. troops on equal footing with the Seminoles. However, Taylor's ambitious
plans were not adopted. They would have been far too costly, requiring a
standing army of 30-40,000 troops as opposed to the approximate 6,000
already in the field.
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Though Florida had been under European dominion since the 16th
century, it is apparent that neither Spain, Britain, nor the United States made a
comprehensive effort to explore the territory geographically until the Second
Seminole War. Therefore, undoubtedly, the Black Seminoles were blessed by
these advantageous geographical conditions. Consequently, their quest for
freedom was strengthened, and reciprocally the efforts of Britain and the
United States to apprehend them were weakened.
Another paramount benefit to the cause of the Black Seminole rebels
was their alliances, first with the Spanish and later with the Native Americans.
The rebels' alliance with Spain was initiated with the Edict of 1693. This
order from King Charles II to the governor of Florida inaugurated a quid pro
quo relationship between rebellious British slaves and Spain. Perhaps the
greatest symbol of the Spanish rebel alliance was Ft. Mose, which was in fact
the manifestation of Spain's hopes and expectations from the relationship-
British slaves shielding St. Augustine from a British invasion; and for the
rebels a place to live in freedom and security. Ft. Mose was the realization of
the objectives of both allies.
From 1693 until the final Spanish evacuation in 1821, the Black
Seminole rebels were in the vanguard of Florida's military defense, but Spain
provided the political sanctuary of a European "great power." Spanish
political sovereignty, and its parallel complex of European treaty obligations
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made war a defensive measure of last resort. Both rebel freedom and Spanish
territorial integrity were rarely challenged.
The Black and Red Seminole alliance was much more complex, yet it
was likewise instrumental to the accomplishments of the rebels. Native
American slaves and African rebel slaves formed alliances, prior to their joint
flight into Florida. Africans and Native Americans provided the bulk of
Spanish Florida's defensive capability during the most crucial invasions—
Oglethorpe's assault of 1740, and James Madison's Patriot War of 1811-12.
However, the crux of the Black and Native Seminole alliance came after
Spain's departure from Florida, in 1821.
After 1821, the rebels lost the political legitimacy of their status as
freemen in Florida. That status had been based upon the Spanish. The rebels
had no political legitimacy with the United States government. In the wake of
the Spanish evacuation and the new U.S. sovereignty, the freedom of rebels
was precariously suspended between their own military skills and the policy of
the United States government.
Though the Black Seminole rebels were still capable of maintaining
their free status with military force, that freedom now was more likely to be
subjected to continuous military challenges. They were now on U.S. soil.
However, the United States did recognize limited Native Seminole
sovereignty.
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Most Native Americans were officially included in at least one of the
many treaties with the United States. Though the provisions of these treaties
were rarely fulfilled, legally the U.S. was required to respect Native lands and
property.
For the "Five Civilized Tribes," (Seminole, Creek, Cherokee, Choctaw,
and Chickasaws) property rights were extended to the ownership of African
slaves. However, after a very careful analysis of the relations between the Red
and Black Seminole, it is evident that a true master slave relationship did not
exist. Nevertheless, the Federal government's respect for a purported master-
slave relationship was sufficient to provide the Black Seminoles with
approximately fifteen years of relative peace and freedom before the Second
Seminole War. During these years, American citizens who claimed rebels in
Florida had to do so through the Seminole Indian agent and the court system.
Native Americans provided both military assistance and a brief period
of political legitimacy for the Black Seminoles. Their joint efforts in the
Second Seminole War sustained the rebels during the period of greatest peril.
In general the Black Seminoles were dependent upon their Spanish and Native
allies. But perhaps their greatest resource was their own will to be free.
The slave industry challenged and even questioned the very humanity
of Africans. If humans are naturally born free, then the slave industry
interfered with that natural state, at birth or whenever freedom was taken.
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Slaves who successfully rebel are able to reassert their humanity and reclaim
their natural rights. While the slave industry was predominant in North
America, the Black Seminoles' humanity and natural rights were only
sustained by their will to fight the policies of the British and the United States.
The determination and will of the rebels led to warfare against those
who would claim their natural rights. According to Von Clauswitz, war is
politics by other means. The sustained will of slaves to proclaim their
humanity and God given rights is the prerequisite to a war against the slave
industry and its policy makers. Therefore, it seems that the rebel will and
humanity was ultimately expressed in the political arena. In the mix of war and
politics they were in opposition to Britain and the United States, and allied to
the Spanish.
In addition to the Edict of 1693 and Governor Montiano's
establishment of a rebel presidio at Ft. Mose, there were other key Spanish
political actions which had some bearing upon the Black Seminoles. In 1790,
the Spanish King Charles IV rescinded the Edict of 1693, as a concession to
the United States because of its impact upon the slave industry. Also, in 1795,
Spain negotiated the treaty of San Lorenzo with the U.S. In this treaty, the
Spanish agreed to return any rebels belonging to U.S. citizens and to prevent
the Seminole allies from invading the U.S.
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Perhaps the ultimate Spanish political act which was related to the
Black Seminoles came in 1821. At the end of the First Seminole War, Spain
agreed to give Florida to the U.S. primarily as payment for millions of dollars
in slave property which resided in that territory. This was an ironic reversal of
fate for Spain. The Black Seminole's military services had been key to Spain's
survival, as well as its final downfall in Florida. Political policies had begun
and ended the ties between the Black Seminoles and the Spanish.
The military services of the Black Seminoles was very beneficial to the
Spanish, but reciprocally it was damaging to the British. Between 1693 and
1763, the Florida allies kept the British colonies of the Southeast on the
defensive. Consequently, British political leaders in Europe and America were
forced to adopt a two-step process. First, diplomatic overtures were made to
Florida in an effort to retrieve runaways and end allied attacks; then, after the
failure of diplomacy, the political leaders demanded war. Within the
framework of this two-step process, various political activities occurred which
demonstrate a relationship between the British and the rebels.
Carolina colonial administrators sent emissaries to Florida seeking the
return of their slaves. Political debates erupted between colonial
administrators and Parliament, because constant attacks from Florida drove
the budgets of South Carolina and Georgia far over their projections. The
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British invasion of Florida failed. This failure caused severe strains between
colonial leaders in Georgia and South Carolina.
The activities and policies of the British, whether diplomatic or
military, failed to end the problems they faced with Black Seminoles. Their
inability to bring about a resolution meant that following the American
Revolution, the founding fathers had to fight the same battle. Like their British
ancestors, the United States political leaders also engaged in the same two-
step process. However, unlike the British, the U.S. effort resulted in a limited
compromise.
As Washington's Secretary of State, in 1790, Jefferson negotiated the
end of the Edict of 1693. Also in 1795, the Washington Administration signed
the Treaty of San Lorenzo with Spain, and the Treaties of New York and
Colrein with the Creeks. These treaties were designed both to assist the
American effort to capture the rebels and to prevent their attacks.
The failure of these diplomatic efforts led to a series of wars:
Madison's secret foray, the Patriots' War, from 1811-13; the First Seminole
War from 1817-19; and the Second Seminole War from 1835-42. Ultimately,
the U.S. military efforts succeeded in removing the Black Seminole rebel
threat to the slave industry in the Southeast. In the Second Seminole War,
President Andrew Jackson ordered that the Black Seminoles be enslaved and
Native Seminoles be moved west of the Mississippi.
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Though Jackson's orders were never carried out, a compromise move,
allowing Black Seminoles to move to Arkansas with the Natives, secured
slavery in the Southeast to a greater extent than it had perhaps ever been.
Nonetheless, this security was obtained only because a compromise was
arranged between the United States commander, General Jesup, and the Black
Seminole leader, Abraham. The primary issue in the compromise, the
unmolested emigration of the Black Seminoles, was sought diplomatically by
Abraham before the war. Abraham used the Seminole's ability to stalemate the
U.S. Army to secure these terms of compromise from General Gaines.
Abraham's request then fight for and finally achievement of, the free
movement of the Black Seminoles from Florida to Arkansas represented direct
Black influence upon U.S. politics. Additionally, the ability of the rebels to
persevere on the battlefield won them a latent ally in Congress, the
congressional Abolitionist. A congressional gag rule blocked all discussion of
slavery in the House of Representatives. However, Abolitionists in the House
were able to evade the gag rule when they discussed appropriations for the
Seminole War, and, the war's impact upon the forbidden topic of slavery.
Subtle pressure from the Abolitionists on the one hand and the perseverance of
the Black Seminoles on the other combined to convince a Southern dominated
Congress that the Seminole War should be ended, even though President
Jackson's original orders were not fulfilled.
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The Seminole War provided congressional Abolitionists with a means
to challenge the gag rule—the only barrier separating slavery from anti-slavery
interests-which preserved congressional harmony. Therefore, unknowingly the
Black Seminoles and the Abolitionists in Congress were allies. Slave victories
in Florida provided a foundation in Congress from which Abolitionists could
launch an unrestrainable assault upon the gag rule. Without a gag rule, anti-
slavery debates in Congress continued until the Civil War and helped to bring
on the war. Thus, the Black Seminoles' unending rebellion against the slave
industry helped to destroy that industry and free all enslaved Blacks in the
United States.
This study contributes to more than one field of scholarship. In history
it gives new life to old documents. There are thousands of pages in Spanish,
British, and United States' archives which bare witness to and reflect upon
rebel slaves. This study is drawn from a small percentage of these documents.
It appears that never before has anyone collected these documents in a
comprehensive study and analysis. Since Black Seminoles have usually been
studied historically as an appendage to other primary topics, this very rare
compilation of facts permits new historical conclusion to be drawn about an
obscure subject.
In the field of Political Science, this study follows in the footsteps of
and expands upon the research of Giddings' Exiles at Florida As an
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abolitionist congressman during the Second Seminole War, Giddings was
anxious to reveal congressional misconduct to his northern constituents and
the nation. Nevertheless, it appears that until this study, there has been little if
any expansion upon his foundation. This research offers new conclusions about
the rebels' relationship to U.S. since the Washington administration.
Additionally, with Giddings' basic establishment of a clear political
relationship between rebel slaves and the United States, it was apparent that a
similar relationship must exist with Spain and Britain. Thus, this study gives a
more in-depth overview of an already obscure area of political research. Still it
seems that new ground is broken in the demonstration of political relations
between the Spanish and British administrators and rebel slaves. Also, never
before has an extensive analysis of the political relationship between Black and
Native Seminoles been attempted.
In the field of African-American or Afro-centric studies, this topic
forces scholars to reconsider the extent of slave rebellion in the United States.
Also, scholars must reconsider how U.S. rebels compare with others in the
Americas. Scholars are perhaps more familiar with the slave rebels of Brazil,
Suriname, and Jamaica. But this study reveals that the accomplishments of the
Black Seminoles in Florida are equal to or perhaps exceed all other rebels in
the hemisphere. Haitian rebels founded a new nation. Rebels of Suriname and
Jamaica won permanent land concessions. But the Florida rebels were
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ultimately able to prevail against the dominant military powers of the
Hemisphere, Britain and later the United States.
Additionally, the Florida rebels confronted the nation with the largest
white population in the Americas, with the greatest armed forces in the
hemisphere. Also, they were often outnumbered in the theatre of battle ten to
one. In Haiti, Jamaica, and Suriname, the Black and slave population was far
greater than the white, perhaps as much as ten times greater in Haiti and
Jamaica. Even when the Florida alliances are considered, the Black Seminoles
appear to have prevailed against the greatest odds in the Western Hemisphere.
In general, the warriors in particular were never subdued or conquered, and
they ultimately dictated the terms of their departure from Florida.
From 1693-1842, the Black Seminoles prevailed in no fewer than two
British and three U.S. wars in which the primary objective was to eliminate
their threat to the slave industry. Thus, it seems the Afro-centric scholars must
re-evaluate the history of slave rebellion and place the Black Seminoles in the
vanguard of that tradition.
Therefore, just as the United States often termed the vast lands west of
the Mississippi as "Indian territory," until they were subdued after the Civil
War, Florida can be viewed as "rebel slave territory," up to the end of the
Second Seminole War.
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In the process of conducting this research it became evident that there
are perhaps tens-of-thousands of pages of documents which are directly or
indirectly related to the Black Seminoles. Additional in-depth research can be
conducted on topics related to the rebels regarding: Native Americans who
fought for the British and the U.S.; the military papers and reports of British
and American officers; and, the survival of African culture in Florida villages.
Also interesting research might be done on the extent of interaction between
the Black Seminoles and the rebels of Haiti. One unfortunate fact of American
history is that from the start of the slave industry, in the middle of the
seventeenth century to its end, after the Civil War, various Native American
leaders have been convinced that the best interest of their people were served
by sending thousands of warriors to help capture Blacks in Florida. The
circumstances, justifications, outcomes, and perspectives of native leaders and
people would be a worthwhile study.
British and American officers provide extensive documentation of their
encounters with the Seminole. My study uses only a small fraction of the
available military documents. Data which is conceived in battle, while life and
limb are in jeopardy, can provide a glimpse of reality which may be
unattainable in times of more somber reflection.
The survival of African culture among the Black Seminole is a topic
which could yield a very rich vein of scholarship. The data reveals that many
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of the escapees to Florida had been recent arrivals from Africa. Consequently,
one would expect to find a significant amount of non-western and non-native
cultural traditions in the Florida villages.
Perhaps the most politically significant and most rewarding area for
future scholarship lies in the exploration of a nexus between the rebels of
Florida, Haiti, and other West Indian islands. The search for a Florida-Haitian
nexus is particularly compelling. This is because Andrew Jackson, as Florida's
first United States Governor, and James Monroe, as President, discussed the
possibilities of convincing the Seminole rebels to emigrate to Haiti. The rebels
seem to have had access to Spanish ships traveling from Florida to the West
Indies, and some are known to have settled in the Bahamas, other British
Islands, and Cuba.
Any linkage between the Florida and Haitian rebels could yield
astonishing political-historical revelations about the nature of Macro-level
rebellion. Did Haiti attempt to assist North American rebels to fight the slave
industry? Did any Florida rebel take refuge in Haiti? Such questions will
hopefully be addressed by future scholarship.
After their migration to Arkansas, many of the Black Seminole were
threatened with re-enslavement. Therefore, they and some Native Seminoles
fled to Mexico and became military allies of the governor of the State of
Coahuila. From their base in northern Mexico, the Black Seminoles gave
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refuge to Texas slaves and helped them obtain their freedom. They conducted
these activities with the same defensive military skills which they developed in
Florida. Here they fought bounty-hunting slave catchers and Texas Rangers
until the Civil War. Thus, it can be said that in general, Black Seminole rebels
consistently and successfully waged war upon the slave industry of North
America, from the beginning to the end.
And we must recall that ultimately the demise of the slave industry in
North America was assisted by the "latent" alliance between congressional
Abolitionists and the Florida rebels. The will of a few Africans to steadfastly
challenge the slave industry eventually helped to free all slaves.
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